Cited by 11Pharmaceutical Economics and PolicyHealthcare Policy and ManagementHealth Systems, Economic Evaluations, Quality of Life

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Examining opportunities to increase savings from Medicare price negotiations.

Open access

Abstract

Importance: Allowing the US Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services to negotiate prescription drug prices for Medicare may improve drug affordability. Objective: To estimate savings from Medicare price negotiation under the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and examine opportunities to increase savings. Design, Setting, and Participants: This cross-sectional, population-based study used data from 2020 Medicare prescription drug claims. The study was conducted and data were analyzed in 2022. Exposures: Eligibility for Medicare price negotiation under the IRA and alternative criteria. Main Outcomes and Measures: Minimum savings under the IRA's eligibility criteria were estimated and compared with savings within alternative scenarios, including (1) selecting drugs for negotiation based on net spending after rebates rather than gross spending; (2) extending eligibility to drugs with biosimilar or generic competitors; (3) reducing the minimum years since US Food and Drug Administration approval for eligibility; and (4) changing 2 or 3 of these factors. Estimated savings were calculated at different levels of scale-up of price negotiation under the IRA, from 10 Part D drugs in 2026 to 60 Part B and D drugs in 2029. Gross spending was calculated using the US Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services 2020 Medicare drug spending dashboard. Rebates were estimated using SSR Health data. Information on FDA approvals, generics, and biosimilars was obtained from FDA websites. Results: Under IRA rules, estimated minimum savings from price negotiation in 2026 for 10 Part D drugs would be $3.2 billion. For 2029 for 60 Part D and B drugs, estimated savings were $16.0 billion. Selecting drugs for negotiation based on net rather than gross spending would be associated with estimated savings of $4.6 billion (a 45% increase) in 2026 and $18.9 billion (an 18% increase) in 2029. Including drugs with generic competitors or biosimilars would be associated with an estimated savings of $6.6 billion (a 109% increase) in 2026 and $24.9 billion (a 56% increase) in 2029. Making both changes would be associated with savings of $9.5 billion (a 200% increase) in 2026 and $28.3 billion (a 77% increase) in 2029. A sensitivity analysis suggested that reducing the required number of years since marketing approval by 2 years would be associated with increased estimated savings of 4% when 10 Part D drugs are negotiated and 12% when 60 Part D and B drugs are negotiated. Changing all 3 criteria would be associated with the greatest increase in estimated savings in 2029 (119% increase when 10 Part D drugs are negotiated and 93% increase for 60 Part D and B drugs). Conclusions and Relevance: The results of this cross-sectional study suggest that adjusting the eligibility criteria for Medicare prescription drug price negotiation to permit inclusion of drugs with biosimilar or generic competitors and selecting drugs based on net rather than gross spending may be a promising approach to substantially increase estimated savings.

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Crossref · 10.1001/jamainternmed.2023.0763

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  • Antidepressant use is common in individuals with obesity because there is a bidirectional biological association of depression with obesity.

    “Antidepressant use is common in individuals with obesity because there is a bidirectional biological association of depression with obesity.29”

    From Factors Associated With Semaglutide Initiation Among Adults With Obesity (2025) · cites this paper as [29]

    The Discussion and Results discuss estimated savings from Medicare drug-price negotiation, not antidepressant use or the relationship between depression and obesity. Searches for antidepressants, obesity, depression, and related terms found no passage addressing the claim. (LLM, conf=0.78)

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Research works printed but not linked: 5

  1. Anderson, 2022, Prescribing of low- versus high-cost part B drugs in Medicare Advantage and traditional Medicare., Health Serv Res, 57, 537, 10.1111/hesr.v57.3 · DOI
  2. National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine, 2018, Making Medicines Affordable: A National Imperative
  3. Ippolito? B, Levy? J. Best practices using SSR Health net drug pricing data. Accessed March 17, 2023. https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/forefront.20220308.712815/ · DOI
  4. Mulcahy? A. Medicare drug price negotiation: key decisions to reach a “fair price.” Accessed March 17, 2023. https://www.healthaffairs.org/content/forefront/medicare-drug-price-negotiation-key-decisions-reach-fair-price
  5. Ollendorf? DA, Voehler? D. Options for CMS price negotiations. Accessed March 17, 2023. https://www.healthaffairs.org/content/forefront/options-cms-drug-price-negotiations

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Metadata

Authors
Reitsma, M. B., Dusetzina, S. B., Ballreich, J. M., Trujillo, A. J., & Mello, M. M.
Affiliations
  • Stanford Medicine (US)
  • Vanderbilt University Medical Center (US)
  • Johns Hopkins University (US)
Corresponding author
Mello, Michelle M.
Venue
JAMA Internal Medicine
Published
2023-06-01
Volume
183
Issue
6
Pages
581
ISSN
2168-6106 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W4366083402
Cited by
11
References
4
Citations by year
2025: 4 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 4
FWCI
2.23
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • JAMA Internal Medicine (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Pharmaceutical Economics and Policy
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Healthcare Policy and Management
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Health Systems, Economic Evaluations, Quality of Life
Keywords
Inflation Reduction Act, prescription drug affordability, drug rebates, Medicare Part D, Medicare Part B, biosimilars, generic drugs, drug pricing policy
MeSH terms
Aged, Cross-Sectional Studies, Humans, United States, Drug Costs, Drugs, Generic, Negotiating, Medicare Part D, Prescription Drugs, Biosimilar Pharmaceuticals

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