Human Nature: The Categorial Framework
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Abstract
Preface. Part I: The Project. 1. Human Nature. 2. Philosophical Anthropology. 3. Grammatical Investigation. 4. Philosophical Investigation. 5. Philosophy and 'Mere Words'. 6. A Challenge to the Autonomy of the Philosophical Enterprise: Quine. 7. The Platonic and the Aristotelian Traditions in Philosophical Anthropology. Part II: Substance. 1. Substances: Things. 2. Substances: Stuffs. 3. Substance-referring Expressions. 4. Conceptual Connections between Things and Stuffs. 5. Substances and their Substantial parts. 6. Substances Conceived as Natural Kinds. 7. Substances Conceived as a Common Logico-linguistic Category. 8. A Historical Digression: Misconceptions of the Category of Substance. Part III: Causation. 1. Causation: Humean, Neo-Humean and Anti-Humean. 2. On Causal Necessity. 3. Event Causation is not a Prototype. 4. The Inadequacy of Hume's Analysis: Observability, Spatio-temporal Relations, and Regularity. 5. The Flaw in the Early Modern Debate. 6. Agent Causation as Prototype. 7. Agent Causation is Only a Prototype. 8. Event Causation and Other Centres of Variation. 9. Overview. Part IV: Powers. 1. Possibility. 2. Powers of the Inanimate. 3. Active and Passive Powers of the Inanimate. 4. Power and its Actualization. 5. Power and its Vehicle. 6. First- and Second-order Powers Loss of Power. 7. Human Powers: Basic Distinctions. 8. Human Powers: Further Distinctions. 9. Dispositions. Part V: Agency. 1. Inanimate Agents. 2. Inanimate Needs. 3. Animate Agents: Needs and Wants. 4. Volitional Agency: Preliminaries. 5. Doings, Acts and Actions. 6. Human Agency and Action. 7. A Historical Overview. 8. Human Action as Agential Causation of Movement. Part VI: Teleology and Teleological Explanation. 1. Teleology and Purpose. 2. What Things have a Purpose?. 3. Purpose and Axiology. 4. The Beneficial. 5. A Historical Digression: Teleology and Causality. Part VII: Reasons and Explanation of Human Action. 1. Rationality and Reasonableness. 2. Reason, Reasoning and Reasons. 3. Explaining Human Behaviour. 4. Explanation in Terms of Agential Reasons. 5. Causal Mythologies. Part VIII: The Mind. 1. Homo loquens. 2. The Cartesian Mind. 3. The Nature of the Mind. Part IX: The Self and the Body. 1. The Emergence of the Philosophers' Self. 2. The Illusions of the Philosophers' Self. 3. The Body. 4. The Relationship between Human Beings and their Bodies. Part X: The Person. 1. The Emergence of the Concept. 2. An Unholy Trinity: Descartes, Locke and Hume. 3. Changing Bodies and Switching Brains: Puzzle Cases and Red Herrings. 4. The Concept of a Person. Index
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Cited by
Origins of biological teleology: how constraints represent ends
García-Valdecasas, M., & Deacon, T. W. (2024) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-024-04705-w · Cited by 13
“…reduce teleology to more basic forms of explanations or eliminate it altogether have failed to convince many of the wisdom of this strategy (Jonas, 1966 ; Woodfield, 1976; Jacobs, 1986; Bedau, 1991, 1992; Hacker, 2007; Thompson, 2007; Deacon, 2012; Moreno & Mossio, 2015; Walsh, 2015; Nguyen, 2021).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Hacker, P. M. S.
- Venue
- Wiley eBooks
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2007-08-09
- OpenAlex
- W1628228870
- Cited by
- 290
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 9.58
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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