The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Millikan's Isomorphism Requirement
Open accessAbstract
This chapter contains section titles: Introduction Isomorphism and Functional Isomorphism Millikan's Reliance on Functional Isomorphism Isomorphisms and Productivity Exploiting 1–1 Maps Which Preserve Natural Relations Conclusion
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
Standing in mapping relations to states of the world-also known as 'structural resemblance'-is insufficient for representation.
“However, philosophers of representation have long recognised that standing in mapping relations to states of the world-also known as 'structural resemblance'-is insufficient for representation.”
From The Vector Grounding Problem (2026) · cites this paper as Shea, 2012
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism
Millikan, R. G. (1984) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4124.001.0001 · Cited by 4,758
Flagged first, then by citations
Research works printed but not linked: 13
- Cover, T.M. and Thomas, J.A. 2006: Elements of Information Theory, second edition. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons.
- Godfrey-Smith, P. 1996: Complexity and the Function of Mind in Nature. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Godfrey-Smith, P. 2006a: Mental representation, naturalism and teleosemantics. In Papineau, David and Macdonald, Graham (eds.) New Essays on Teleosemantics. Oxford: OUP.
- Millikan, R.G. 1984: Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Millikan, R.G. 1989: Biosemantics. Journal of Philosophy, 86, 281-97.
- Millikan, R.G. 1995: A bet with Peacocke. In Macdonald, Cynthia and Macdonald, Graham (eds.) Philosophy of Psychology: debates on psychological explanation. Oxford: Blackwell pp. 285-92.
- Millikan, R.G. 2000a: On Clear and Confused Ideas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Millikan, R.G. 2000b: Naturalizing Intentionality. In Elevitch, Bernard (ed.) Philosophy of Mind, Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 9. Philosophy Documentation Center.
- Millikan, R.G. 2003: Teleological Theories of Mental Content. In Nadel, L (ed.) The Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Macmillan.
- Millikan, R.G. 2004: Varieties of Meaning. London / Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
- Millikan, R.G. 2005: Language: A Biological Model. Oxford: OUP.
- Shannon, C.E. 1949: The mathematical theory of communication. In Shannon, Claude E and Weaver, Warren (eds.) The Mathematical Theory of Communication. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Weisberg, M. 2007: Who is a modeler? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 58(2), 207-233.
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Coelho Mollo, D., & Millière, R. (2026) · Philosophy and the Mind Sciences · doi:10.33735/phimisci.2026.12307 · Cited by 48
Metadata
- Authors
- Shea, N.
- Corresponding author
- Shea, Nicholas
- ORCID
- Shea, Nicholas
- Venue
- Millikan and Her Critics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2012-11-26
- Pages
- 63-86
- OpenAlex
- W2152415120
- Cited by
- 31
- References
- 1
- Citations by year
- 2024: 2 · 2023: 1 · 2021: 1 · 2020: 1 · 2019: 3 · 2018: 2 · 2016: 5 · 2015: 7 · 2014: 4 · 2013: 2 · 2012: 2
- Type
- other
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- kclpure.kcl.ac.uk
- Locations
- Research Portal (King's College London) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Social Sciences › Linguistics and Language › Language, Metaphor, and Cognition
- Keywords
- Fred Dretske, isomorphism, productivity, functionalism, philosophy of mind
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
