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Revenue authorities: are they the right vehicle for improved tax administration?
Abstract
It is now well recognised that reforms to tax administration are as important as tax policy changes for overall fiscal reform. One institutional model of tax administration, which has been quite widely adopted in Africa in recent years, is that of the semi‐independent Revenue Authority. This approach is based on the executive agency model, widely adopted in the UK and elsewhere, as a way of improving performance of certain governmental functions. This article looks at the arguments for and against the Revenue Authority model, and examines a number of practical issues in the design of such an agency. It draws on the recent experience of Revenue Authorities in a number of countries. It concludes that the Revenue Authority model can offer an appropriate institutional framework for reforming tax administration, particular where low pay rates and rigid civil service systems inhibit effective management. However, Revenue Authorities do not solve all problems, and can only be expected to deliver results if they form part of a wider reform. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Although no formal evaluations exist, there seems to be consensus that the experiences with ARAs have been mixed.
“Although no formal evaluations exist, there seems to be consensus that the experiences with ARAs have been mixed (Kidd and Crandall 2006; Keen 2012: 12; Devas et al. 2001).”
From Tax And Development: Donor Support To Strengthen Tax Systems In Developing Countries (2014) · cites this paper as Devas et al. 2001
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Tax And Development: Donor Support To Strengthen Tax Systems In Developing Countries
Fjeldstad, O. (2014) · Public Administration and Development · doi:10.1002/pad.1676 · Cited by 96
Metadata
- Authors
- Devas, N., Delay, S., & Hubbard, M.
- Affiliations
- University of Birmingham (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Devas, Nick
- Venue
- Public Administration and Development
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2001-05-30
- Volume
- 21
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 211-222
- ISSN
- 0271-2075 (ISSN-L)
- 1099-162X
- OpenAlex
- W2014334374
- Cited by
- 76
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 4 · 2020: 1 · 2019: 6 · 2018: 2 · 2017: 3 · 2016: 3 · 2015: 1 · 2014: 6 · 2013: 4 · 2012: 2
- FWCI
- 8.16
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Public Administration and Development (publishedVersion)
- University of Birmingham Research Portal (University of Birmingham) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Taxation and Compliance Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic and Fiscal Studies
- Social Sciences › Public Administration › Public Policy and Administration Research
- Keywords
- tax administration reform, tax authorities, institutional design, fiscal reform, Africa, civil service pay, public sector management, tax policy
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