When the target may know better: Effects of experience and information asymmetries on value from mergers and acquisitions
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Research summary : Extending research on the effect of experience on acquisition outcomes, we examine how the differential in previous M&A experience between the target and the acquirer affects the value they, respectively, obtain when the acquirer takes over the target. Drawing on literature about organizational learning, negotiation, and information economics, we theorize that the party with greater experience will be able to obtain more value. Furthermore, we theorize that the effect of differential M&A experience on value obtained is contingent on the level of information asymmetry the acquirer faces with respect to the target, specifically as a function of the target's product‐market scope and whether the deal is friendly. We test and find support for these predictions in a sample of 1,241 M&As over a 30‐year period. Managerial summary : Corporate strategy is about a firm's scope and development decisions and outcomes, but corporate strategizing is incomplete unless managers anticipate the moves of other economic actors. We demonstrate the importance of these points when it comes to learning to make acquisitions. Using an innovative research design and theory that enables comparison between acquirer and target gains, we show that whatever their firm's acquisition history and capabilities, acquisitive managers should mind the negotiation and other pitfalls that arise when target firms possess ample acquisition experience of their own. We also demonstrate that the effect of experience advantage, whereby the more experienced party benefits, depends on the target firm's scope and whether the deal is friendly—two dimensions that acquirers can and should take into account . Copyright © 2016 The Authors. Strategic Management Journal published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
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Cites
FAMA, E. F. (1991) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb04636.x · Cited by 5,350
Morck, R. K., Yu, W., & Yeung, B. Y. (1999) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.194530 · Cited by 3,334
Economies of scope and the scope of the enterprise
Teece, D. J. (1980) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/0167-2681(80)90002-5 · Cited by 1,775 · cited 2×
“Thus, firm scope is directly associated with the presence of proprietary know-how and related knowledge-intensive assets, which cannot be readily transferred, transacted, or valued (Arrow, 1971; Teece, 1980).”
Background
Cited by
Information Asymmetry in Management Research: Past Accomplishments and Future Opportunities
Bergh, D. D., Ketchen, D. J., Orlandi, I., Heugens, P. P. M. A. R., & Boyd, B. K. (2019) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/0149206318798026 · Cited by 510
Metadata
- Authors
- Cuypers, I. R. P., Cuypers, Y., & Martin, X.
- Venue
- Strategic Management Journal
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2016-03-17
- Volume
- 38
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 609-625
- ISSN
- 0143-2095 (ISSN-L)
- 1097-0266
- OpenAlex
- W2290077605
- Cited by
- 218
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 53.65
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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- Cuypers, I. R. P., Cuypers, Y., & Martin, X. (2017). When the target may know better: Effects of experience and information asymmetries on value from mergers and acquisitions. Strategic Management Journal. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.2502
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