Tools for bridging the cultures of everyday and scientific thinking
Open accessAbstract
A perspective about science education is developed which has implications for the design of interactive learning technologies. Current philosophical work concerning the interpretative nature of scientific inquiry is reviewed as a context for discussing the situation of the child in developing scientific understanding. This view of learning emphasizes the relationships among informal understanding, conceptual change, and enculturation into modes of scientific discourse. A prototype software system for supporting scientific inquiry processes in students is described.
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References 77 · Cited by 202
- Authors
- Hawkins, J., & Pea, R. D.
- Affiliations
- Bank Street College of Education (US)
- ORCID
- Pea, Roy D.
- Venue
- Journal of Research in Science Teaching
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1987-04
- Volume
- 24
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 291-307
- ISSN
- 0022-4308 (ISSN-L)
- 1098-2736
- OpenAlex
- W2138478376
- Cited by
- 202
- References
- 77
- Citations by year
- 2025: 4 · 2024: 5 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 4 · 2019: 7 · 2018: 2 · 2017: 6 · 2016: 7 · 2015: 6 · 2014: 5 · 2013: 6 · 2012: 7
- FWCI
- 9.18
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- telearn.hal.science
- Licence
- Locations
- Journal of Research in Science Teaching (publishedVersion)
- HAL (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Funders
- National Science Foundation
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Education › Science Education and Pedagogy
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Science Education and Perceptions
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Evolution and Science Education
- Keywords
- conceptual change, interactive learning technologies, philosophy of science education
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