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Learning Mixed Equilibria
Open accessAbstract
We study learning processes for finite strategic-form games, in which players use the history of past play to forecast play in the current period. In a generalization of fictitious play, we assume only that players asymptotically choose best responses to the historical frequencies of opponents′ past play. This implies that if the stage-game strategies converge, the limit is a Nash equilibrium. In the basic model, plays seems unlikely to converge to a mixed-strategy equilibrium, but such convergence is natural when the stage game is perturbed in the manner of Harsanyi′s purification theorem. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72.
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Cited by
Roth, A. E., & Erev, I. (1995) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/s0899-8256(05)80020-x · Cited by 1,678
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Friedman, D. (1998) · Journal of Evolutionary Economics · doi:10.1007/s001910050054 · Cited by 879
A survey of random processes with reinforcement
Pemantle, R. (2007) · Probability Surveys · doi:10.1214/07-ps094 · Cited by 578
Dynamics of stochastic approximation algorithms
Benaïm, M. (1999) · Lecture Notes in Mathematics · doi:10.1007/bfb0096509 · Cited by 413
If multi-agent learning is the answer, what is the question?
Shoham, Y., Powers, R., & Grenager, T. (2007) · Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1016/j.artint.2006.02.006 · Cited by 410
Metadata
- Authors
- Fudenberg, D., & Kreps, D. M.
- Venue
- Games and Economic Behavior
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1993-07
- Volume
- 5
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 320-367
- ISSN
- 0899-8256 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2070214254
- Cited by
- 485
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 10.62
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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