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Social Norms and Random Matching Games
Open accessAbstract
Nash equilibrium has been tremendously useful in understanding economic problems in which strategic behavior is important. The theoretical foundations of the solution concept often include the assumption that the game to be played is common knowledge, an unrealistic assumption in games with many players. We introduce the concept of norm equilibrium for random matching games. A norm equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium that relies on substantially less information than common knowledge of the game. We use norm equilibria to provide a folk theorem for random matching games and to analyze increasing numbers of players in a random matching game. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, C72.
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Cited by
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Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K. (2005) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature04131 · Cited by 2,762
Greif, A. (1994) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261959 · Cited by 2,384
Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching
Ellison, G. (1994) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297904 · Cited by 456
Reputations, Relationships, and Contract Enforcement
MacLeod, W. B. (2007) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.45.3.595 · Cited by 384
Cooperation among strangers with limited information about reputation
Bolton, G. E., Katok, E., & Ockenfels, A. (2005) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.03.008 · Cited by 305
Metadata
- Authors
- Okuno-Fujiwara, M., & Postlewaite, A.
- Venue
- Games and Economic Behavior
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1995-04
- Volume
- 9
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 79-109
- ISSN
- 0899-8256 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2092671978
- Cited by
- 218
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 4.75
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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- Okuno-Fujiwara, M., & Postlewaite, A. (1995). Social Norms and Random Matching Games. Games and Economic Behavior. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1995.1006
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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