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Muddling Through: Noisy Equilibrium Selection
Open accessAbstract
This paper examines an evolutionary model in which the primary source of “noise” that moves the model between equilibria is not arbitrarily improbable mutations but mistakes in learning. We model strategy selection as a birth–death process, allowing us to find a simple, closed-form solution for the stationary distribution. We examine equilibrium selection by considering the limiting case as the population gets large, eliminating aggregate noise. Conditions are established under which the risk-dominant equilibrium in a 2×2 game is selected by the model as well as conditions under which the payoff-dominant equilibrium is selected. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers C70, C72.
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Cites
Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications
Milgrom, P. R. (1981) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003562 · Cited by 3,123
Young, H. P. (1993) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2951778 · Cited by 2,399
Cited by
(2011) · SpringerReference · doi:10.1007/springerreference_60360 · Cited by 2,855
Roth, A. E., & Erev, I. (1995) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/s0899-8256(05)80020-x · Cited by 1,678
The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure
Skyrms, B. (2003) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139165228 · Cited by 1,524
Learning Through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics
Börgers, T., & Sarin, R. (1997) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1006/jeth.1997.2319 · Cited by 737
Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game
Gale, J., Binmore, K. G., & Samuelson, L. (1995) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/s0899-8256(05)80017-x · Cited by 492
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Binmore, K., & Samuelson, L.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Theory
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1997-06
- Volume
- 74
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 235-265
- ISSN
- 0022-0531 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2101574338
- Cited by
- 223
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 48.91
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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