Conflict and Distribution
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
Esteban and Ray (1999) show that a two-point symmetric distribution of population maximizes conflict.
“Esteban and Ray (1999) show, using a behavioral model and a quite general metric of preferences, that a two-point symmetric distribution of population maximizes con ict.”
From Ethnic Polarization, Potential Conflict, and Civil Wars (2005) · cites this paper as Esteban and Ray (1999)
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Ethnic Polarization, Potential Conflict, and Civil Wars
Montalvo, J. G., & Reynal-Querol, M. (2005) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828054201468 · Cited by 1,386 · see citing works
“As mentioned above, the index of fractionalization can be interpreted as the probability that two randomly selected individuals do not belong to the same group.”
BackgroundPolarization: Concepts, Measurement, Estimation
Duclos, J.-Y., Esteban, J., & Ray, D. (2004) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00552.x · Cited by 611 · see citing works
Self-citationThe Legacy of Historical Conflict: Evidence from Africa
BESLEY, T., & REYNAL-QUEROL, M. (2014) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055414000161 · Cited by 322 · see citing works
- Authors
- Esteban, J., & Ray, D.
- Affiliations
- Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (ES)
- ORCID
- Esteban, Joan
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Theory
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1999-08
- Volume
- 87
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 379-415
- ISSN
- 0022-0531 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2044739107
- Cited by
- 553
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 16 · 2025: 14 · 2024: 20 · 2023: 15 · 2022: 23 · 2021: 22 · 2020: 20 · 2019: 35 · 2018: 19 · 2017: 15 · 2016: 18 · 2015: 27 · 2014: 29 · 2013: 20 · 2012: 17
- FWCI
- 10.03
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Journal of Economic Theory (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- DIGITAL.CSIC (Spanish National Research Council (CSIC)) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
- Keywords
- social conflict, bimodal distribution, extremism, moderation, wealth, ethnicity, political ideology
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
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