Signalling among Relatives
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Models of costly signalling are commonly employed in evolutionary biology in order to explain how honest communication between individuals with conflicting interests can be stable. These models have focused primarily on a single type of honest signalling equilibrium, the separating equilibrium in which any two different signallers send distinct signals, thereby providing signal receivers with complete information. In this paper, we demonstrate that in signalling among relatives (modelled using the Sir Philip Sidney game), there is not one but a large number of possible signalling equilibria, most of which are pooling equilibria in which different types of signallers may share a common signal. We prove that in a general Sir Philip Sidney game, any partition of signallers into equi-signalling classes can have a stable signalling equilibrium if and only if it is a contiguous partition, and provide examples of such partitions. A similar (but slightly stricter) condition is shown to hold when signals are transmitted through a medium with signalling error. These results suggest a solution to a problem faced by previous signalling theory models: when we consider the separating equilibrium, signal cost is independent of the frequency of individuals sending that signal and, consequently, even very rare signaller types can drastically affect signal cost. Here, we show that by allowing these rare signallers to pool with more common signallers, signal cost can be greatly reduced.
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Cites
Mate selection—A selection for a handicap
Zahavi, A. (1975) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/0022-5193(75)90111-3 · Cited by 5,251
Biological signals as handicaps
Grafen, A. (1990) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/s0022-5193(05)80088-8 · Cited by 2,462
The continuous Sir Philip Sidney game: a simple model of biological signalling
Johnstone, R. A., & Grafen, A. (1992) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/s0022-5193(05)80674-5 · Cited by 118
Signalling among relatives. I. Is costly signalling too costly?
Bergstrom, C. T., & Lachmann, M. (1997) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.1997.0041 · Cited by 89 · cited 1×
“Notice that this definition is broader than that given in the first paper of the series (Bergstrom and Lachmann 1997, referred to from here on as Signalling I) as it now encompasses even the completely pooling equilibrium, the ``no-signalling equilibrium,'' as a signalling equilibrium.”
BackgroundSelf-citation
Cited by
Costly Signaling and Cooperation
GINTIS, H., SMITH, E. A., & BOWLES, S. (2001) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1006/jtbi.2001.2406 · Cited by 862
Cost and conflict in animal signals and human language
Lachmann, M., Számadó, S., & Bergstrom, C. T. (2001) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.231216498 · Cited by 286
Self-citationThe Evolution of Language: A Comparative Review
Fitch, W. T. (2005) · Biology & Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s10539-005-5597-1 · Cited by 137
Signalling among relatives. I. Is costly signalling too costly?
Bergstrom, C. T., & Lachmann, M. (1997) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.1997.0041 · Cited by 89
“A full investigation of such equilibria in the Sir Philip Sidney game is presented in Lachmann & Bergstrom (1997).”
BackgroundSelf-citationWhen will evolution lead to deceptive signaling in the Sir Philip Sidney game?
Hamblin, S., & Hurd, P. L. (2009) · Theoretical Population Biology · doi:10.1016/j.tpb.2009.02.002 · Cited by 13
Metadata
- Authors
- Lachmann, M., & Bergstrom, C. T.
- Venue
- Theoretical Population Biology
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1998-10
- Volume
- 54
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 146-160
- ISSN
- 0040-5809 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1568740248
- Cited by
- 98
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 18.67
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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