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AsyncShock: Exploiting Synchronisation Bugs in Intel SGX Enclaves
Open accessAbstract
Intel’s Software Guard Extensions (SGX) provide a new hardware-based trusted execution environment on Intel CPUs using secure enclaves that are resilient to accesses by privileged code and physical attackers. Originally designed for securing small services, SGX bears promise to protect complex, possibly cloud-hosted, legacy applications. In this paper, we show that previously considered harmless synchronisation bugs can turn into severe security vulnerabilities when using SGX. By exploiting use-after-free and time-of-check-to-time-of-use (TOCTTOU) bugs in enclave code, an attacker can hijack its control flow or bypass access control.
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Cited by
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Cheng, R., Zhang, F., Kos, J., He, W., Hynes, N., Johnson, N., Juels, A., Miller, A., & Song, D. (2019) · 2019 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P) · doi:10.1109/eurosp.2019.00023 · Cited by 431
Götzfried, J., Eckert, M., Schinzel, S., & Müller, T. (2017) · Proceedings of the 10th European Workshop on Systems Security · doi:10.1145/3065913.3065915 · Cited by 351
On Security Analysis of Proof-of-Elapsed-Time (PoET)
Chen, L., Xu, L., Shah, N., Gao, Z., Lu, Y., & Shi, W. (2017) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-69084-1_19 · Cited by 351
T-SGX: Eradicating Controlled-Channel Attacks Against Enclave Programs
Shih, M.-W., Lee, S., Kim, T., & Peinado, M. (2017) · Proceedings 2017 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium · doi:10.14722/ndss.2017.23193 · Cited by 331
ZombieLoad: Cross-Privilege-Boundary Data Sampling
Schwarz, M., Lipp, M., Moghimi, D., Van Bulck, J., Stecklina, J., Prescher, T., & Gruss, D. (2019) · Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/3319535.3354252 · Cited by 328
Metadata
- Authors
- Weichbrodt, N., Kurmus, A., Pietzuch, P., & Kapitza, R.
- Venue
- Lecture Notes in Computer Science
- Publisher
- Springer International Publishing
- Published
- 2016
- Pages
- 440-457
- ISSN
- 0302-9743 (ISSN-L)
- 1611-3349
- OpenAlex
- W2519006453
- Cited by
- 173
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 15.61
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- Weichbrodt, N., Kurmus, A., Pietzuch, P., & Kapitza, R. (2016). AsyncShock: Exploiting Synchronisation Bugs in Intel SGX Enclaves. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-45744-4_22
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
