The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The “Criminology of the Corporation” and Regulatory Enforcement Strategies
Abstract
Interviews mit staatlichen Aufsichtsämtern (regulatory agencies) und Wirtschaftsunternehmen in den USA führten zu drei „Theorien“, warum Wirtschaftsunternehmen das Recht verletzen: wirtschaftliches Kalkül, grundsätzliche Ablehnung und Unkenntnis. Alle drei führen zu unterschiedlichen Steuerungsstrategien: Abschreckung, Verhandlung und Aufklärung. Durchsetzungsversuche, die nur auf einer der Theorien der Nichteinhaltung beruhen würden, wären schädlich, wenn Abweichung aus einem der anderen Gründe erfolgt. Allerdings verhindern technische, bürokratische und politische Zwänge, daß eine flexible Durchsetzung sich an den jeweiligen Nichteinhaltungs-Gründen orientiert.
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Citations
Cites
Deterrence: The Legal Threat in Crime Control
Zimring, F., & Hawkins, G. (1973) · Stanford Law Review · doi:10.2307/1227719 · Cited by 638
Cited by
The dark side of organizations: mistake, misconduct, and disaster.
Vaughan, D. (1999) · Annual Review of Sociology · doi:10.1146/annurev.soc.25.1.271 · Cited by 1,072
Constructing and contesting legitimacy and accountability in polycentric regulatory regimes
Black, J. (2008) · Regulation & Governance · doi:10.1111/j.1748-5991.2008.00034.x · Cited by 1,215
The Legal Environments of Organizations
Edelman, L. B., & Suchman, M. C. (1997) · Annual Review of Sociology · doi:10.1146/annurev.soc.23.1.479 · Cited by 730
The Role of Trust in Nurturing Compliance: A Study of Accused Tax Avoiders.
Murphy, K. (2004) · Law and Human Behavior · doi:10.1023/b:lahu.0000022322.94776.ca · Cited by 584
Locke, R., Amengual, M., & Mangla, A. (2009) · Politics & Society · doi:10.1177/0032329209338922 · Cited by 546
Metadata
- Authors
- Kagan, R. A., & Scholz, J. T.
- Venue
- Organisation und Recht
- Publisher
- VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften
- Published
- 1980
- Pages
- 352-377
- OpenAlex
- W176180923
- Cited by
- 253
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 22.81
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- de
- Open access
- closed
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- Kagan, R. A., & Scholz, J. T. (1980). The “Criminology of the Corporation” and Regulatory Enforcement Strategies. Organisation und Recht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-83669-4_21
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