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Cited by 253

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

The “Criminology of the Corporation” and Regulatory Enforcement Strategies

Kagan, Robert A., Scholz, John T.·1980·Organisation und Recht

Abstract

Interviews mit staatlichen Aufsichtsämtern (regulatory agencies) und Wirtschaftsunternehmen in den USA führten zu drei „Theorien“, warum Wirtschaftsunternehmen das Recht verletzen: wirtschaftliches Kalkül, grundsätzliche Ablehnung und Unkenntnis. Alle drei führen zu unterschiedlichen Steuerungsstrategien: Abschreckung, Verhandlung und Aufklärung. Durchsetzungsversuche, die nur auf einer der Theorien der Nichteinhaltung beruhen würden, wären schädlich, wenn Abweichung aus einem der anderen Gründe erfolgt. Allerdings verhindern technische, bürokratische und politische Zwänge, daß eine flexible Durchsetzung sich an den jeweiligen Nichteinhaltungs-Gründen orientiert.

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Metadata

Authors
Kagan, R. A., & Scholz, J. T.
Venue
Organisation und Recht
Published
1980
Pages
352-377
OpenAlex
W176180923
Cited by
253
References
1
FWCI
22.81
Type
book chapter
Language
de
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The “Criminology of the Corporation” and Regulatory Enforcement Strategies. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1007/978-3-322-83669-4_21
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Kagan, R. A., & Scholz, J. T. (1980). The “Criminology of the Corporation” and Regulatory Enforcement Strategies. Organisation und Recht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-83669-4_21

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