The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Private Circuits: Securing Hardware against Probing Attacks
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Citations
Cites
Goldreich, O., Micali, S., & Wigderson, A. (1987) · Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM conference on Theory of computing - STOC '87 · doi:10.1145/28395.28420 · Cited by 3,590
Cited by
Threshold Implementations Against Side-Channel Attacks and Glitches
Nikova, S., Rechberger, C., & Rijmen, V. (2006) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/11935308_38 · Cited by 507
Public-Key Cryptosystems Resilient to Key Leakage
Naor, M., & Segev, G. (2009) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-03356-8_2 · Cited by 403
Signature Schemes with Bounded Leakage Resilience
Katz, J., & Vaikuntanathan, V. (2009) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-10366-7_41 · Cited by 257
Overcoming the Hole in the Bucket: Public-Key Cryptography Resilient to Continual Memory Leakage
Brakerski, Z., Kalai, Y. T., Katz, J., & Vaikuntanathan, V. (2010) · 2010 IEEE 51st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science · doi:10.1109/focs.2010.55 · Cited by 242
SoK: SGX.Fail: How Stuff Gets eXposed
Van Schaik, S., Seto, A., Yurek, T., Batori, A., AlBassam, B., Genkin, D., Miller, A., Ronen, E., Yarom, Y., & Garman, C. (2024) · 2024 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) · doi:10.1109/sp54263.2024.00260 · Cited by 31
Metadata
- Authors
- Ishai, Y., Sahai, A., & Wagner, D.
- Venue
- Lecture Notes in Computer Science
- Publisher
- Springer Berlin Heidelberg
- Published
- 2003
- Pages
- 463-481
- ISSN
- 0302-9743 (ISSN-L)
- 1611-3349
- OpenAlex
- W1592625985
- Cited by
- 1,073
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 6.38
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Private Circuits: Securing Hardware against Probing Attacks. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1007/978-3-540-45146-4_27
- The paper
- Ishai, Y., Sahai, A., & Wagner, D. (2003). Private Circuits: Securing Hardware against Probing Attacks. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-45146-4_27
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
