Cited by 207Cryptographic Implementations and SecurityCoding theory and cryptographyCryptography and Residue Arithmetic

A Meet-in-the-Middle Attack on 8-Round AES

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Demirci, Hüseyin, Selçuk, Ali Aydın·2008·Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Crossref · 10.1007/978-3-540-71039-4_7

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  • The omission of the MixColumn transformation in the last round of AES helps to design attacks for more rounds.

    “Also, as already observed in [19,37], the fact that the MixColumn transformation is omitted in the last round of AES helps to design attacks for more rounds.”

    From Biclique Cryptanalysis of the Full AES (2011) · cites this paper as [19]

    Section 2 (page unavailable) says that AES has no MixColumn operation in its final round. Section 5.2 (page unavailable) describes extending the attack to eight rounds by searching the last-round key, but does not say that omitting MixColumn enables the extension. The claimed causal link is therefore not established by our copy. (LLM, conf=0.83)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • As a result, the number of rounds broken with meet-in-the-middle is rather small, which seems to prevent it from producing results on yet unbroken 8-, 9-, and 10-round (full) AES.

    “As a result, the number of rounds broken with this technique is rather small [19], which seems to prevent it from producing results on yet unbroken 8-, 9-, and 10-round (full) AES.”

    From Biclique Cryptanalysis of the Full AES (2011) · cites this paper as [19]

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Research works printed but not linked: 20

  1. Biham, E., Dunkelman, O., Keller, N.: Related-key and boomerang attacks. In: Cramer, R.J.F. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2005. LNCS, vol. 3494, pp. 507-525. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)
  2. Biham, E., Dunkelman, O., Keller, N.: Related-key impossible differential attacks on AES-192. In: Pointcheval, D. (ed.) CT-RSA 2006. LNCS, vol. 3860, pp. 21-31. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)
  3. Biham, E., Keller, N.: Cryptanalysis of reduced variants of Rijndael. In: The Third AES Candidate Conference (2000)
  4. Biryukov, A.: Boomerang attack on 5 and 6-round AES. In: The Fourth Conference on Advanced Encryption Standard (2004)
  5. Cheon, J.H., Kim, M.J., Kim, K., Lee, J., Kang, S.: Improved impossible differential cryptanalysis of Rijndael. In: Kim, K.-c. (ed.) ICISC 2001. LNCS, vol. 2288, pp. 39-49. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)
  6. Courtois, N.T., Pieprzyk, J.: Cryptanalysis of block ciphers with overdefined sys- tems of equations. In: Zheng, Y. (ed.) ASIACRYPT 2002. LNCS, vol. 2501, pp. 267-287. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)
  7. Daemen, J., Knudsen, L., Rijmen, V.: The block cipher SQUARE. In: Biham, E. (ed.) FSE 1997. LNCS, vol. 1267, pp. 149-165. Springer, Heidelberg (1997)
  8. Daemen, J., Rijmen, V.: AES proposal: Rijndael. In: The First AES Candidate Conference (1998)
  9. Demirci, H., Selçuk, A.A., Türe, E.: A new meet-in-the-middle attack on IDEA. In: Matsui, M., Zuccherato, R.J. (eds.) SAC 2003. LNCS, vol. 3006, pp. 117-129. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)
  10. Gilbert, H., Minier, M.: A collision attack on 7 rounds of Rijndael. In: The Third AES Candidate Conference (2000)
  11. Hellman, M.E.: A cryptanalytic time-memory trade-off. IEEE Trans. Information Theory 26(4), 401-406 (1980)
  12. Hong, S., Kim, J., Lee, S., Preneel, B.: Related-key rectangle attacks on reduced versions of SHACAL-1 and AES-192. In: Gilbert, H., Handschuh, H. (eds.) FSE 2005. LNCS, vol. 3557, pp. 368-383. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)
  13. Jakimoski, G., Desmedt, Y.: Related-key differential cryptanalysis of 192-bit key AES variants. In: Matsui, M., Zuccherato, R.J. (eds.) SAC 2003. LNCS, vol. 3006, pp. 208-221. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)
  14. Kara, O.: Personal communication 17. Kim, J., Hong, S., Preneel, B.: Related-key rectangle attacks on reduced AES-192 and AES 256. In: Biryukov, A. (ed.) FSE 2007. LNCS, vol. 4593, pp. 225-241. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)
  15. Lucks, S.: Attacking seven rounds of Rijndael under 192-bit and 256-bit keys. In: The Third AES Candidate Conference (2000)
  16. Nyberg, K., Knudsen, L.R.: Provable security against a differential attack. Journal of Cryptology 8(1), 27-38 (1995)
  17. Phan, R.C.W.: Classes of impossible differentials of Advanced Encryption Stan- dard. IEE Electronics Letters 38(11), 508-510 (2002)
  18. Phan, R.C.W.: Impossible differential cryptanalysis of 7-round Advanced Encryp- tion Standard AES. Information Processing Letters 91, 33-38 (2004)
  19. Phan, R.C.W., Siddiqi, M.U.: Generalized impossible differentials of Advanced Encryption Standard. IEE Electronics Letters 37(14), 896-898 (2001)
  20. Zhang, W., Wun, W., Zhang, L., Feng, D.: Improved related-key impossible dif- ferential attacks on reduced round AES-192. In: Biham, E., Youssef, A.M. (eds.) SAC 2006. LNCS, vol. 4356, pp. 15-27. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)

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Authors
Demirci, H., & Selçuk, A. A.
Affiliations
Bilkent University (TR)
Venue
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Published
2008-07-18
Pages
116-126
ISSN
  • 0302-9743 (ISSN-L)
  • 1611-3349
OpenAlex
W1571067952
Cited by
207
References
1
Citations by year
2026: 4 · 2025: 8 · 2024: 17 · 2023: 19 · 2022: 13 · 2021: 10 · 2020: 9 · 2019: 7 · 2018: 10 · 2017: 12 · 2016: 13 · 2015: 20 · 2014: 9 · 2013: 12 · 2012: 14
FWCI
7.32
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Lecture notes in computer science (publishedVersion)
  • Bilkent University Institutional Repository (Bilkent University) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Cryptographic Implementations and Security
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Coding theory and cryptography
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Cryptography and Residue Arithmetic
Keywords
meet-in-the-middle attack, AES, AES-192, AES-256, time-memory trade-off, block cipher cryptanalysis

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