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On Privacy Models for RFID
Open accessAbstract
We provide a formal model for identification schemes. Under this model, we give strong definitions for security and privacy. Our model captures the notion of a powerful adversary who can monitor all communications, trace tags within a limited period of time, corrupt tags, and get side channel information on the reader output. Adversaries who do not have access to this side channel are called narrow adversaries. Depending on restrictions on corruption, adversaries are called strong, destructive, forward, or weak adversaries. We derive some separation results: strong privacy is impossible. Narrow-strong privacy implies key agreement. We also prove some constructions: narrow-strong and forward privacy based on a public-key cryptosystem, narrow-destructive privacy based on a random oracle, and weak privacy based on a pseudorandom function.
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Cited by
Shokri, R., Theodorakopoulos, G., Le Boudec, J.-Y., & Hubaux, J.-P. (2011) · 2011 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2011.18 · Cited by 699
Lightweight Mutual Authentication for IoT and Its Applications
Li, N., Liu, D., & Nepal, S. (2017) · IEEE Transactions on Sustainable Computing · doi:10.1109/tsusc.2017.2716953 · Cited by 166
Universal and secure object ownership transfer protocol for the Internet of Things
Ray, B. R., Abawajy, J., Chowdhury, M., & Alelaiwi, A. (2018) · Future Generation Computer Systems · doi:10.1016/j.future.2017.02.020 · Cited by 34
Metadata
- Authors
- Vaudenay, S.
- Venue
- Lecture Notes in Computer Science
- Publisher
- Springer Berlin Heidelberg
- Published
- 2007
- Pages
- 68-87
- ISSN
- 0302-9743 (ISSN-L)
- 1611-3349
- OpenAlex
- W2150402532
- Cited by
- 390
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 39.96
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- Vaudenay, S. (2007). On Privacy Models for RFID. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-76900-2_5
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