Cited by 95Evolutionary Game Theory and CooperationExperimental Behavioral Economics StudiesGame Theory and Applications

Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma

Howard, J. V.·1988·Theory and Decision

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Crossref · 10.1007/bf00148954

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  • Autonomous AI agents might serve as credible commitment devices, enabling actors to carry out actions based on complex conditions and helping solve problems with incomplete contracting.

    “Autonomous AI agents themselves might also serve as credible commitment devices (Howard, 1988; McAfee, 1984; Tennenholtz, 2004), enabling actors to carry out actions based on potentially complex conditions and thus helping to solve problems with incomplete contracting (Schmitz, 2001).”

    From Multi-Agent Risks from Advanced AI (2025) · cites this paper as Howard, 1988

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Authors
Howard, J. V.
Affiliations
London School of Economics and Political Science (GB)
Corresponding author
Howard, J. V.
Venue
Theory and Decision
Published
1988-05
Volume
24
Issue
3
Pages
203-213
ISSN
  • 0040-5833 (ISSN-L)
  • 1573-7187
OpenAlex
W2038234670
Cited by
95
References
0
Citations by year
2025: 1 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 6 · 2022: 1 · 2021: 2 · 2020: 2 · 2019: 1 · 2018: 1 · 2017: 1 · 2016: 1 · 2015: 4 · 2014: 4 · 2013: 2 · 2012: 27
FWCI
6.23
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Theory and Decision (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
Keywords
prisoner's dilemma, cooperation, game theory, social dilemmas

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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

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