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Cited by 5World Trade Organization LawGlobal trade and economicsLaw, logistics, and international trade

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Preferential rules of origin—A conceptual outline

Open access
Jakob, Thinam, Fiebiger, Gernot·2003·Intereconomics

Abstract

The European Community’s preferential trading agreements with third countries all contain origin rules, which lay down a number of detailed criteria that must be met in order for goods to qualify for preferential customs treatment. These “preferential rules of origin” are currently under discussion by policy-makers 1 and economists developing guidelines for policy-makers. However, no such discussion is apparent in the more recent academic literature. It appears that scientific debate so far has not analysed in depth the basic legal concepts and instruments contained in preferential trading agreements. The following article attempts to identify these instruments and draft a conceptual overview.

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References 6 · Cited by 5

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  1. Cf. Edwin Vermulst: Rules of Origin as Commercial Policy Instruments — Revisited, in: Journal of World Trade, Vol. 26, No. 6, 1992, pp. 61 f. · DOI
  2. Joseph A. LaNasa: An Evaluation of the Uses and Importance of Rules of Origin, and the Effectiveness of the Uruguay Round’s Agreement on Rules of Origin in Harmonizing and Regulating Them, Working Paper, Harvard Law School 1995. · DOI
  3. As for the EC cf. articies 22ff of the Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2913/92 of 12 October 1992 establishing the Community Customs Code, OJ 1992 L pp. 1–50 as amended by Regulation (EC) No. 2700/2000 of 16 November, OJ L 311 12.12.2000 p. 17; also Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 2454/93 of 2 July 1993 laying down provisions for the implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code as ammended by Commission Regulation (EC) No. 993/2001 of 4 May 2001, OJ 2001 L 141 pp. 1–128.
  4. For a detailed analysis of non-preferential ROO see Edwin Vermulst, op. cit., Rules of Origin as Commercial Policy Instruments—Revisited, in: Journal of World Trade, Vol. 26, No. 6, 1992, pp. 61 f. · DOI
  5. Joseph A. LaNasa, op. cit. An Evaluation of the Uses and Importance of Rules of Origin, and the Effectiveness of the Uruguay Round’s Agrement on Rules of Origin in Harmonizing and Regulating Them, Working Paper, Harvard Law School 1995. · DOI
  6. Cf. Edwin Vermulst, op. cit. Rules of Origin as Commercial Policy Instruments—Revisited, in: Journal of World Trade, Vol. 26, No. 6, 1992, p. 82. · DOI
  7. Exceptions are Joseph A. La Nasa, op. cit. An Evaluation of the Uses and Importance of Rules of Origin, and the Effectiveness of the Uruguay Round’s Agreement on Rules of Origin in Harmonizing and Regulating Them, Working Paper, Harvard Law School 1995. also Edwin Vermulst, op. cit. Rules of Origin as Commercial Policy Instruments—Revisited, in: Journal of World Trade, Vol. 26, No. 6, 1992, pp. 61. f. · DOI
  8. Joseph A. LANasa, op. cit. An Evaluation of the Uses and Importance of Rules of Origin, and the Effectiveness of the Uruguay Round’s Agreement on Rules of Origin in Harmonizing and Regulating Them, Working Paper, Harvard Law School 1995; also Edwin Vermulst, op. cit. Rules of Origin as Commercial Policy Instruments—Revisited, in: Journal of World Trade, Vol. 26, No. 6, 1992, pp. 61 f. · DOI
  9. Cf. Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement on trade and cooperation between the European Community and the Palestine Liberation Organization (EC-Palestine Authority Association Agreement), Protocol 3 (Rules of Origin), Art. 4, OJ 1987 L 187 pp. 3 f.
  10. Rod Falvey, Geoff Reed, op. cit. Rules of Origin as Commercial Policy Instruments, Research Paper 2000/18, Centre for Research on Globalisation and Labour Markets, University of Nottingham 2000, p. 1; also Edwin Vermulst, op. cit. Rules of Origin as Commercial Policy Instruments—Revisited, in: Journal of World Trade, Vol. 26, No. 6, 1992, pp. 61–102; Edwin Vermulst, Paul Waer, Jacques Bourgeois (eds.): Rules of Origin in International—Revisited, in: Journal of World Trade, Vol. 26, No. 4, 1992, pp. 61–102; is (eds.): Rules of Origin in International Trade: A Comparative Study, Ann Arbor 1994, The University of Michigan Press. · DOI
  11. For further details about the various tests and their advantages and disadvantages see Edwin Vermulst, op. cit. Rules of Origin as Commercial Policy Instruments—Revisited, in: Journal of World Trade, Vol. 26, No. 6, 1992, pp. 63–75; also Rod Falvey, Geoff Reed, op. cit. Rules of Origin as Commercial Policy Instruments, Research Paper 2000/18, Centre for Research on Globalisation and Labour Markets, University of Nottingham 2000. FN 1–4, and Joseph A. LaNasa, op cit. · DOI
  12. Joseph A. LaNasa, op. cit. An Evaluation of the Uses and Importance of Rules of Origin, and the Effectiveness of the Uruguay Round’s Agreement on Rules of Origin in Harmonizing and Regulating Them, Working Paper, Harvard Law School 1995. · DOI
  13. Cf. definitions regarding “bilateral cumulation” and “diagonal cumulation”, in: The Sussex European Institute: Study on the economic impact of extending the pan-European system of cumulation of origin to the Mediterranean partners part of the Barcelona process, Final Report, University of Sussex, pp. 6 f.
  14. According to Edwin Vermulst op. cit. Rules of Origin as Commercial Policy Instruments—Revisited, in: Journal of World Trade, Vol. 26, No. 6, 1992, p. 80, Japan is an exception from this development because of its geographical distance. · DOI
  15. Ibid. Rules of Origin as Commercial Policy Instruments—Revisited, in: Journal of World Trade, Vol. 26, No. 6, 1992, pp. 61 f. · DOI

Metadata

Authors
Jakob, T., & Fiebiger, G.
Affiliations
  • European Commission (BE)
  • OMV (Austria) (AT)
Venue
Intereconomics
Published
2003-05
Volume
38
Issue
3
Pages
138-146
ISSN
  • 0020-5346 (ISSN-L)
  • 1613-964X
OpenAlex
W2061387967
Cited by
5
References
6
Citations by year
2024: 2 · 2020: 1
FWCI
2.16
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Intereconomics (publishedVersion)
  • Econstor (Econstor) (submittedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › World Trade Organization Law
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › General Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Global trade and economics
  • Social Sciences › Law › Law, logistics, and international trade
Keywords
preferential rules of origin, preferential trade agreements, European Community, trade policy

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Preferential rules of origin—A conceptual outline. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1007/bf03031765
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Jakob, T., & Fiebiger, G. (2003). Preferential rules of origin—A conceptual outline. Intereconomics. https://doi.org/10.1007/bf03031765

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