On the effects of incentive framing on bribery: evidence from an experiment in Burkina Faso
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Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
Salary schemes combining bonuses with penalties tend to increase officials' propensity to take bribes by lowering the moral cost of corruption.
“According to the study of Armantier and Boly (2014), salary schemes that combine bonuses with penalties tend to increase officials’ propensity to take bribes, because this type of intervention diverts subjects away from their sense of duty and their ethical responsibilities, thereby lowering the moral cost of corruption.”
From Public sector reforms and their impact on the level of corruption: A systematic review (2021) · cites this paper as Armantier and Boly (2014)
The citation lists haven’t been fetched yet
References 41 · Cited by 11
- Authors
- Armantier, O., & Boly, A.
- Affiliations
- Federal Reserve Bank of New York (US)
- United Nations Industrial Development Organization (AT)
- Corresponding author
- Boly, Amadou
- Venue
- Economics of Governance
- Published
- 2013-09-03
- Volume
- 15
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-15
- ISSN
- 1435-6104 (ISSN-L)
- 1435-8131
- OpenAlex
- W2084166778
- Cited by
- 11
- References
- 41
- Citations by year
- 2025: 2 · 2023: 1 · 2021: 2 · 2019: 3 · 2018: 2 · 2016: 1
- FWCI
- 0.82
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Economics of Governance (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Corruption and Economic Development
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Keywords
- bribery, corruption, employer-employee relationship, worker effort, Burkina Faso
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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
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