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Cited by 43Legal and Constitutional StudiesEvolving Legal Systems and GovernanceEconomic Theory and Institutions

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Constitutional craftsmanship and the rule of law

Rajagopalan, Shruti, Wagner, Richard E.·2013·Constitutional Political Economy
DOI 10.1007/s10602-013-9144-9
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Research works printed but not linked: 32

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  13. Epstein, R. A. (1985). Takings: Private property and the power of eminent domain. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. · DOI
  14. Eusepi, G., & Wagner, R. E. (2005). Polycentric polity: Genuine vs. Spurious Federalism. Review of Law and Economics, 6, 329–345. · DOI
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  20. Niskanen, W. A. (1978). The prospect for liberal democracy. In J. M. Buchanan & R. E. Wagner (Eds.), Fiscal responsibility in constitutional democracy (pp. 157–174). Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff. · DOI
  21. Ostrom, V. (1987). The political theory of a compound republic (2nd ed.). Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
  22. Ostrom, V. (1997). The meaning of democracy and the vulnerability of societies: A response to Tocqueville’s challenge. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. · DOI
  23. Polanyi, M. (1951). The logic of liberty. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
  24. Rogowski, R. (1974). Rational legitimacy: A theory of political support. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
  25. Runst, P., & Wagner, R. E. (2011). Choice, emergence, and constitutional process: A framework for positive analysis. Journal of Institutional Economics, 7, 131–145. · DOI
  26. Samuels, W. J. (1971). Interrelations between legal and economic processes. Journal of Law and Economics, 14, 439–452. · DOI
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  32. Young, H. P. (1998). Individual strategy and social order: An evolutionary theory of institutions. Princeton: Princeton University Press. · DOI

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Metadata

Authors
Rajagopalan, S., & Wagner, R. E.
Affiliations
  • Purchase College (US)
  • George Mason University (US)
Corresponding author
Wagner, Richard E.
ORCID
Venue
Constitutional Political Economy
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Published
2013-09-22
Volume
24
Issue
4
Pages
295-309
ISSN
  • 1043-4062 (ISSN-L)
  • 1572-9966
DOI
10.1007/s10602-013-9144-9
OpenAlex
W2087602650
Cited by
43
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2025: 1 · 2023: 2 · 2020: 6 · 2019: 19 · 2018: 5 · 2017: 4 · 2016: 1 · 2015: 2 · 2014: 2
FWCI
3.91
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
Locations
  • Constitutional Political Economy (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Legal and Constitutional Studies
  • Social Sciences › Law › Evolving Legal Systems and Governance
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Theory and Institutions
Keywords
rule of law, constitutional design, rule enforcement, polycentric governance, network governance, social rules

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Constitutional craftsmanship and the rule of law. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1007/s10602-013-9144-9
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Rajagopalan, S., & Wagner, R. E. (2013). Constitutional craftsmanship and the rule of law. Constitutional Political Economy. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-013-9144-9