Judicial Career Incentives and Court Performance: An Empirical Study of the German Labour Courts of Appeal
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
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Cites
What To Do (and Not to Do) with Time-Series Cross-Section Data
Beck, N., & Katz, J. N. (1995) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2082979 · Cited by 6,840
Cooper, W. W., Seiford, L. M., & Tone, K. (2000) · doi:10.1007/b109347 · Cited by 1,079
The motives of judges: Empirical evidence from antitrust sentencing
Cohen, M. A. (1992) · International Review of Law and Economics · doi:10.1016/0144-8188(92)90003-a · Cited by 67 · cited 2×
“For instance, the appointment process affords judges more or less discretion in decision making (Hanssen, 2004; Maitra and Smyth, 2004), and the career incentives resulting from the judicial employment system shape the publication of opinions (Taha, 2004), the reversal rate (Higgins and Rubin, 1980; Ramseyer and Rasmu…”
Background
Cited by
Is There a Politically Optimal Level of Judicial Independence?
Hanssen, F. A. (2004) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828041464470 · Cited by 258
Metadata
- Authors
- Schneider, M. R.
- Venue
- European Journal of Law and Economics
- Published
- 2005-09
- Volume
- 20
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 127-144
- ISSN
- 0929-1261 (ISSN-L)
- 1572-9990
- OpenAlex
- W1976290073
- Cited by
- 170
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 1.62
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Judicial Career Incentives and Court Performance: An Empirical Study of the German Labour Courts of Appeal. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1007/s10657-005-1733-2
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- Schneider, M. R. (2005). Judicial Career Incentives and Court Performance: An Empirical Study of the German Labour Courts of Appeal. European Journal of Law and Economics. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-005-1733-2
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.