General Relativity, Mental Causation, and Energy Conservation
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Abstract
Examines locality, Noether's theorem, and conservation in general relativity in relation to nonphysical causation.
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## TL;DR
The paper argues that General Relativity does not make immaterial mental causation easier; in the simplest scalar-field case, the generalized Bianchi identities force the mental influence to be constant and therefore zero. It also argues that GR’s formal structure supports taking gravitational energy-momentum seriously and can be relevant to debates about conserved quantity theories of causation.
## Key findings
- Using coordinate-covariant calculations and the generalized Bianchi identities, the paper claims GR “tends to exclude, not facilitate” Cartesian mental causation; in the simplest case, the mental influence must be “spatio-temporally constant, and hence 0.”
- GR is presented as formally having “an infinity of rigid symmetries” and thus, by Noether’s first theorem, “an infinity of conserved energies-momenta,” which the paper takes to support realism about gravitational energy-momentum.
- For a mental influence modeled as a single scalar field, the Bianchi-identity constraint is too strong: the field is forced to be constant, and a spatiotemporally localized mind-body influence cannot be represented that way.
- The paper argues that if the mental influence is modeled with more than one field, the objection weakens; it says that with “5 or perhaps a bit higher” scalar components, the soul “wins” may be possible, but this is only a crude plausibility claim.
## Methods
- The paper is a theoretical/philosophical analysis of General Relativity, Noether’s theorem and converse, gravitational energy, and mental causation; it does not report empirical data.
- It uses coordinate-covariant calculations, especially the generalized Bianchi identities, to derive constraints on a putative immaterial influence coupled to gravity and matter.
- It examines toy models in which the mental influence is represented as a scalar, a scalar density, or more general collections of fields, and it compares these with field-redefinition examples from classical field theory.
## Limitations
- The paper itself says the multi-field extension is only a “function-counting argument” and is “admittedly crude and merely plausible”; a more definitive result would need a more specific postulate about the number and type of fields and how they couple.
- The author notes that the simplest result applies to the “simplest case” of a scalar-field mental influence, and that the difficulty “may diminish for more complicated models.”
- Evident from the text: the discussion is highly idealized and mathematical, so its conclusions depend on unproven assumptions about how souls or mental influences would be represented in a field-theoretic model.
Model-written summary of a shortened version of the paper’s full text (it is longer than we read). Check it against the paper before relying on it.
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Claims the paper makes
6 Valid · 2 Not valid · 26 Not checked · 124 Own results and interpretations
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In the paper
“General Relativity loves conservation of energy-momentum; indeed it isn’t a large exaggeration to say that General Relativity is energy-momentum conservation, given that the field equations and the conservation laws are logically equivalent: each entails the other (Noether 1918; Bergmann 1958; Pitts 2010, 2016a; Anderson 1967, p. 428).”
§ General Relativity, Mental Causation, and Energy Conservation > Philosophical Payoff Outside the Philosophy of Mind > Bearing on Gravitational Energy (Anti)Realism and Conservation The treatment of the generalized Bianchi identities above shows that the relevance of General Relativity for mental causation does not have to be yoked to the frequently denigrated pseudotensor conservation laws for energy and momentum. Rather, the tendency of General Relativity to restrict immaterial-to-material causation can be explored in a tensorial way, free of conventional taint and hence free of the usual interpretive controversy over gravitational energy. The fact that these calculations do show a tendency to resist immaterial-to-material causation shows that the heuristic force of the widely received anti-realist gloss on the conservation laws is incorrect. That heuristic was the basis for the Mohrhoff–Collins view that General Relativity facilitates immaterial-to-material causation. The conclusion that General Relativity makes immaterial-to-material causation harder rather than easier could have been motivated [and indeed has been (Pitts 2010)] by realism about gravitational energy localization and consequently about total (gravitational + material) energy-momentum conservation. Anti-realism continues to attract philosophical adherents (Duerr 2019a, b). But because anti-realism leads to a false heuristic and realism leads to a correct heuristic in this context, there results some additional justification for taking realism about gravitational energy and conservation laws more seriously. General Relativity loves conservation of energy-momentum; indeed it isn’t a large exaggeration to say that General Relativity is energy-momentum conservation, given that the field equations and the conservation laws are logically equivalent: each entails the other (Noether 1918; Bergmann 1958; Pitts 2010, 2016a; Anderson 1967, p. 428). [This outcome charmingly satisfies Einstein’s mysterious desideratum in seeking gravitational field equations (Brading 2005; Pitts 2016b), that the gravitational field equations alone entail conservation laws, without assuming matter equations of motion.] There are doubtless other field equations than Einstein’s, such as those built with higher derivatives of the metric, with the same property but a different form of the conservation laws, so the claim that General Relativity is energy conservation, is something of an exaggeration. Such theories will share some important structural properties with Einstein’s theory, however. One can interpret the general relativistic objection to immaterial-to-material causation as saying that General Relativity tries hard to conserve energy and momentum (infinitely many of each, at each point in space!), much harder than other field theories do. Thus contemplation of spirit-to-matter causation sheds a bit of light on the gravitational energy localization debate in favor of realism. Gravitational energy nonrealist Duerr has mused:Does the use of gravitational and [gravitational wave] energy perhaps enable us to ascertain more easily GR’s empirical content? I fail to see how this could be true (Duerr 2019b).The question of mental causation suggests, however, that it is true. Realism suggests that immaterial minds would have a harder time acting on general relativistic worlds than in non-general relativistic worlds, whereas anti-realism suggests that it would not be harder and might well be easier. What happens if a soul equipped with at most 4 scalar fields of influence (and nothing else) tries to act on the physical world? The non-realist likely would think that such a soul would succeed (unless the nonrealist has done the Bianchi identity calculation), whereas the realist would wonder whether such a soul might fail. The Bianchi identities show that such a soul would indeed fail.
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites Noether 1918
An author–year citation the paper’s reference list doesn’t settle. We don’t search these by name.
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Bergmann 1958 matched to “Conservation Laws in General Relativity as the Generators of Coordinate Transformations” (1958) source
- Supportedcites Pitts 2010 matched to “Gauge-invariant localization of infinitely many gravitational energies from all possible auxiliary structures” (2010) source
Section 9 (p. 16) explicitly states that Einstein’s equations entail a pseudotensorial conservation law in every coordinate system and that the collection of those laws entails the equations. The equivalence concerns the collection of conservation laws, not any single law in isolation. (LLM, conf=0.94)
boostedstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“The conclusion that General Relativity makes immaterial-to-material causation harder rather than easier could have been motivated [and indeed has been (Pitts 2010)] by realism about gravitational energy localization and consequently about total (gravitational + material) energy-momentum conservation.”
§ General Relativity, Mental Causation, and Energy Conservation > Philosophical Payoff Outside the Philosophy of Mind > Bearing on Gravitational Energy (Anti)Realism and Conservation The treatment of the generalized Bianchi identities above shows that the relevance of General Relativity for mental causation does not have to be yoked to the frequently denigrated pseudotensor conservation laws for energy and momentum. Rather, the tendency of General Relativity to restrict immaterial-to-material causation can be explored in a tensorial way, free of conventional taint and hence free of the usual interpretive controversy over gravitational energy. The fact that these calculations do show a tendency to resist immaterial-to-material causation shows that the heuristic force of the widely received anti-realist gloss on the conservation laws is incorrect. That heuristic was the basis for the Mohrhoff–Collins view that General Relativity facilitates immaterial-to-material causation. The conclusion that General Relativity makes immaterial-to-material causation harder rather than easier could have been motivated [and indeed has been (Pitts 2010)] by realism about gravitational energy localization and consequently about total (gravitational + material) energy-momentum conservation. Anti-realism continues to attract philosophical adherents (Duerr 2019a, b). But because anti-realism leads to a false heuristic and realism leads to a correct heuristic in this context, there results some additional justification for taking realism about gravitational energy and conservation laws more seriously. General Relativity loves conservation of energy-momentum; indeed it isn’t a large exaggeration to say that General Relativity is energy-momentum conservation, given that the field equations and the conservation laws are logically equivalent: each entails the other (Noether 1918; Bergmann 1958; Pitts 2010, 2016a; Anderson 1967, p. 428). [This outcome charmingly satisfies Einstein’s mysterious desideratum in seeking gravitational field equations (Brading 2005; Pitts 2016b), that the gravitational field equations alone entail conservation laws, without assuming matter equations of motion.] There are doubtless other field equations than Einstein’s, such as those built with higher derivatives of the metric, with the same property but a different form of the conservation laws, so the claim that General Relativity is energy conservation, is something of an exaggeration. Such theories will share some important structural properties with Einstein’s theory, however. One can interpret the general relativistic objection to immaterial-to-material causation as saying that General Relativity tries hard to conserve energy and momentum (infinitely many of each, at each point in space!), much harder than other field theories do. Thus contemplation of spirit-to-matter causation sheds a bit of light on the gravitational energy localization debate in favor of realism. Gravitational energy nonrealist Duerr has mused:Does the use of gravitational and [gravitational wave] energy perhaps enable us to ascertain more easily GR’s empirical content? I fail to see how this could be true (Duerr 2019b).The question of mental causation suggests, however, that it is true. Realism suggests that immaterial minds would have a harder time acting on general relativistic worlds than in non-general relativistic worlds, whereas anti-realism suggests that it would not be harder and might well be easier. What happens if a soul equipped with at most 4 scalar fields of influence (and nothing else) tries to act on the physical world? The non-realist likely would think that such a soul would succeed (unless the nonrealist has done the Bianchi identity calculation), whereas the realist would wonder whether such a soul might fail. The Bianchi identities show that such a soul would indeed fail.
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites Pitts 2010 matched to “Gauge-invariant localization of infinitely many gravitational energies from all possible auxiliary structures” (2010) sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Section 11 (pp. 17–18) argues that recognizing local conservation laws including gravitational energy blocks unwarranted conclusions drawn from the supposed lack of conservation in General Relativity. Section 12 (p. 19) treats gravitational energy localizations as real. The available passages do not state the specific conclusion that General Relativity makes immaterial-to-material causation harder rather than easier. (LLM, conf=0.78)
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- Partly supported
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In the paper
“When one does the generalized Bianchi identity mathematics (below), one finds that General Relativity makes Cartesian mental causation harder, not easier.”
- Also stated in: § Abstract The conservation of energy and momentum have been viewed as undermining Cartesian mental causation since the 1690s. Modern discussions of the topic tend to use mid-nineteenth century physics, neglecting both locality and Noether’s theorem and its converse. The relevance of General Relativity (GR) has rarely been considered. But a few authors have proposed that the non-localizability of gravitational energy and consequent lack of physically meaningful local conservation laws answers the conservation objection to mental causation: conservation already fails in GR, so there is nothing for minds to violate. This paper is motivated by two ideas. First, one might take seriously the fact that GR formally has an infinity of rigid symmetries of the action and hence, by Noether’s first theorem, an infinity of conserved energies-momenta (thus answering Schrödinger’s 1918 false-negative objection). Second, Sean Carroll has asked (rhetorically) how one should modify the Dirac–Maxwell–Einstein equations to describe mental causation. This paper uses the generalized Bianchi identities to show that General Relativity tends to exclude, not facilitate, such Cartesian mental causation. In the simplest case, Cartesian mental influence must be spatio-temporally constant, and hence 0. The difficulty may diminish for more complicated models. Its persuasiveness is also affected by larger world-view considerations. The new general relativistic objection provides some support for realism about gravitational energy-momentum in GR (taking pseudotensor laws seriously). Such realism also might help to answer an objection to theories of causation involving conserved quantities, because energies-momenta would be conserved even in GR. · hedged
“This paper uses the generalized Bianchi identities to show that General Relativity tends to exclude, not facilitate, such Cartesian mental causation.”
§ General Relativity, Mental Causation, and Energy Conservation > Introduction The energy conservation objection to nonphysical mental causation has been made starting from Leibniz in the 1600s (Leibniz 1997, 1981, Book I, chapter 1, section 73, 1985, p. 156; Schmaltz 2008, p. 172) until today and has engaged Wolff, Knutzen, Crusius, the young Kant, Maxwell, Helmholtz, Broad (not all on the same side) and many more modern authors. This objection is made with great frequency and often considerable confidence in the contemporary philosophy of mind literature [see citations in Montero (2006), Collins (2008), Gibb (2010), Pitts (2019)] as well as some striking instances (Bunge 1980, p. 17; Dennett 1991, p. 35; Churchland 2011). Even E. J. Lowe thought that conservation laws might be problematic for interactionist dualism, though he proposed several ways out, one of which (though not his favorite) has merit (Lowe 1992, 1996, pp. 56–61, 2003, p. 139; Cucu and Pitts 2019). As various authors have noted, non-epiphenomenalist forms of property dualism suffer from analogous worries about how the mental can affect the physical (Crane 2001, pp. 40, 43, 50; Searle 2004, pp. 44–46; Zimmerman 2007). Thus one needn’t be attracted to substance dualism to encounter this worry: if the deliciousness of pizza is a quale that helps to bring about your eating seconds over and above what your body would have done anyway, then you face the conservation objection. Unfortunately quite a few dualists, not grasping the relevance of the converse of Noether’s first theorem or of the locality of conservation laws in modern physics (Pitts 2019), have tried to argue that mind-to-body causation is compatible with the conservation laws. The converse Noether theorem says that conservation laws imply symmetries, so by contraposition non-symmetries imply non-conservation. Interactionist dualism manifestly violates symmetries, because my soul (if I have one) acts only in my body and not on Mars, and during my lifetime rather than during the Battle of Hastings. Thus non-conservation is a fact about interactionist dualism, at least insofar as physics is described by the principle of least action (which ignores quantum mechanics). But to what extent is such non-conservation an objection rather than a just a consequence that can be accepted? Recently (Pitts 2019; Cucu and Pitts 2019) this 300+-year-old objection was assessed in light of modern physics, including aspects that rarely come up and some that seem not to have entered the debate at all. It was found that, construed as an argument, the objection begs the question. Such a conclusion is not entirely novel (Watkins 1995; Ducasse 1960; Averill and Keating 1981; Garber 1983; Lowe 1992; Plantinga 2007; Pitts 2020), but evidently it has not been argued in such detail and with an eye to the twentieth century physics of fields. On occasion it has been noted that theoretical physics infers conservation laws from symmetries (Plantinga 2007). This is the topic of Noether’s first theorem and its simpler antecedents. In contrast to Einstein (Gorelik 2002; Pitts 2016b), Max Born, generalizing ideas from Gustav Mie’s electrodynamics and Gustav Herglotz’s relativistic continuum mechanics, had a clear understanding of how rigid translation symmetries imply conservation laws:The assumption of Mie just emphasized, that the function [the Lagrangian density] is independent of x, y, z, t, is also the real mathematical reason for the validity of the momentum-energy-law. ...We assert that for these differential equations, a law, analogous to the energy law (3) of Lagrangian mechanics, is always valid as soon as one of the 4 coordinates does not appear explicitly in (Born 2007).This result had nineteenth century antecedents (Lagrange 1997, pp. 233, 234, 1811, p. 318; Hamilton 1834; Jacobi 1996; Kastrup 1987). Clearly interactionist dualist mental causation violates the symmetries of time- and space-translation. My soul (if I have one) acts in my body today, not 500 years ago or on the Moon; your soul (if you have one) is analogous. Thus interactionist mental causation removes the theoretical expectation of conservation by falsifying the symmetry that would otherwise hold. The preceding paper novelly applied the converse Noether theorem, which says that conservation laws imply symmetries, to show that one can go further (Pitts 2019). Not only is there no reason to expect conservation to hold, but there is reason to expect it not to hold, given interactionism. Hence given the dialectic of the attempted objection to interactionism, the critic needs to give some reason for expecting conservation to hold in the brain that has some purchase on the interactionist. But there is apparently none to be had, at least not from physics (as opposed to empirical neuroscience), or at any rate not from classical field theories excluding General Relativity. Hence the conservation argument against interactionism degenerates into a mere denial or an incredulous stare. If philosophers of mind aim to respect real physics rather than A-level chemistry (a concern previously directed toward metaphysicians (Ladyman et al. 2007, p. 24), then it is necessary to notice that in view of Noether’s first theorem and its converse, physics implies a biconditional rather than categorical status of conservation laws. Hence the traditional Leibniz-to-Dennett energy conservation objection fails. One of course can and should employ neuroscience a posteriori for more serious objections to interactionist dualism, but that is a completely different argument, one having only accidental connections to conservation laws. The failure of the Leibniz-to-Churchland energy conservation objection is not really news to philosophers of physics. As Jeremy Butterfield wrote over two decades ago:...[A] traditional argument against interactionism is flawed....The idea is that any causal interaction between mind and matter would violate the principle of the conservation of energy....But, says the argument, physics tells us that energy is conserved in the sense that the energy of an isolated system is constant, neither increasing nor decreasing....And there is no evidence of such energy gains or losses in brains. So much the worse, it seems, for interactionism. [Though traditional, the argument is still current; for example, Dennett endorses it (1991, pp. 34–35).]This argument is flawed, for two reasons. The first reason is obvious: who knows how small, or in some other way hard to measure, these energy gains or losses in brains might be? Agreed, this reason is weak: clearly, the onus is on the interactionist to argue that they could be small, and indeed are likely to be small. But the second reason is more interesting, and returns us to the danger of assuming that physics is cumulative. Namely: the principle of the conservation of energy is not sacrosanct. ...[A]lthough no violations have been established hitherto, it has been seriously questioned on several occasions. It was questioned twice at the inception of quantum theory.... And furthermore, it is not obeyed by a current proposal ...for solving quantum theory’s measurement problem.In short: physicalists need to be wary of bad reasons to think physicalism is true, arising from naivety about physics (Butterfield 1997).Note that Butterfield, who is not himself sympathetic to dualism, doesn’t seriously entertain the idea, common in the philosophy of mind, that the failure of exact conservation constitutes an interesting objection. Of course conservation fails, given that it follows from symmetry and the symmetry is violated by interactionism. (The symmetry-to-conservation law link in Noether’s theorem is common knowledge among philosophers of physics, though the converse was perhaps less well known until recently.) A more interesting question for interactionists is whether their view violates conservation laws badly enough to run afoul of experiment. Unfortunately Butterfield’s insights have not had the deserved effect on the philosophy of mind literature. The failure of the traditional Leibnizian objection occurs in what would seem to be the most conservation-friendly territory available, classical local field theory with the principle of least action (Pitts 2019).1 Aspects of conservation laws in modern physics that have been largely overlooked in the philosophy of mind literature include some mentioned above and others as well: locality (energy conservation holds not primarily for the whole universe, but in every place separately) (Lange 2002, ch. 5), conditionality upon the absence of external influences, indeed biconditionality (symmetries and conservation laws being mutually entailing by Noether’s first theorem and its converse (Noether 1918; Brading 2001; Brown and Holland 2004; Kosmann-Schwarzbach 2011; Romero-Maltrana 2015; Goldstein 1980, chapter 12), and gentle failure (robustness implying that a small violation of conservation would not be catastrophic, in line with Butterfield (1997) and contrary to Bunge (1980)). Basically the same holds for the conservation of momentum. Thus Noether’s theorem leaves the door open to mental causation; the traditional Leibnizian energy conservation objection simply assumes what needed to be proven. Hence any quantum-based replies to the objection that one might give (as many do) push at an already open door (unless General Relativity closes the door), though possibly it doesn’t hurt to have additional replies anyway, especially for a widely dismissed view. Of course anyone aiming to give a positive account or a defense of traditional mind-body interaction (which I do not aim to do) might need to take into account quantum physics somehow. Given that this paper explains how General Relativity implies a less trivial objection than the traditional Leibnizian one, quantum replies could become relevant for that reason also. The mind-body problem was of considerable interest to Herbert Feigl (1958, 2003, 2004). Feigl took the conservation of energy to be only empirically valid and potentially subject to refutation (Feigl 1958, p. 472), so he (wisely) would be unlikely to make the Leibnizian energy conservation objection to interactionism. Presumably he and other logical empiricists would have been interested in the bearing of General Relativity on the philosophy of mind (if there is one) and likely would have been pleased to find therein some evidence against interactionism. > Enter General Relativity
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- Also stated in: § Abstract The conservation of energy and momentum have been viewed as undermining Cartesian mental causation since the 1690s. Modern discussions of the topic tend to use mid-nineteenth century physics, neglecting both locality and Noether’s theorem and its converse. The relevance of General Relativity (GR) has rarely been considered. But a few authors have proposed that the non-localizability of gravitational energy and consequent lack of physically meaningful local conservation laws answers the conservation objection to mental causation: conservation already fails in GR, so there is nothing for minds to violate. This paper is motivated by two ideas. First, one might take seriously the fact that GR formally has an infinity of rigid symmetries of the action and hence, by Noether’s first theorem, an infinity of conserved energies-momenta (thus answering Schrödinger’s 1918 false-negative objection). Second, Sean Carroll has asked (rhetorically) how one should modify the Dirac–Maxwell–Einstein equations to describe mental causation. This paper uses the generalized Bianchi identities to show that General Relativity tends to exclude, not facilitate, such Cartesian mental causation. In the simplest case, Cartesian mental influence must be spatio-temporally constant, and hence 0. The difficulty may diminish for more complicated models. Its persuasiveness is also affected by larger world-view considerations. The new general relativistic objection provides some support for realism about gravitational energy-momentum in GR (taking pseudotensor laws seriously). Such realism also might help to answer an objection to theories of causation involving conserved quantities, because energies-momenta would be conserved even in GR. · hedged
A result the paper states — it cites no source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In the simplest case, Cartesian mental influence must be spatio-temporally constant, and hence 0.”
§ General Relativity, Mental Causation, and Energy Conservation > Abstract The conservation of energy and momentum have been viewed as undermining Cartesian mental causation since the 1690s. Modern discussions of the topic tend to use mid-nineteenth century physics, neglecting both locality and Noether’s theorem and its converse. The relevance of General Relativity (GR) has rarely been considered. But a few authors have proposed that the non-localizability of gravitational energy and consequent lack of physically meaningful local conservation laws answers the conservation objection to mental causation: conservation already fails in GR, so there is nothing for minds to violate. This paper is motivated by two ideas. First, one might take seriously the fact that GR formally has an infinity of rigid symmetries of the action and hence, by Noether’s first theorem, an infinity of conserved energies-momenta (thus answering Schrödinger’s 1918 false-negative objection). Second, Sean Carroll has asked (rhetorically) how one should modify the Dirac–Maxwell–Einstein equations to describe mental causation. This paper uses the generalized Bianchi identities to show that General Relativity tends to exclude, not facilitate, such Cartesian mental causation. In the simplest case, Cartesian mental influence must be spatio-temporally constant, and hence 0. The difficulty may diminish for more complicated models. Its persuasiveness is also affected by larger world-view considerations. The new general relativistic objection provides some support for realism about gravitational energy-momentum in GR (taking pseudotensor laws seriously). Such realism also might help to answer an objection to theories of causation involving conserved quantities, because energies-momenta would be conserved even in GR.
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“The first equation, which shows of Einstein’s equations (the trace, that is, the sum of the diagonal components of the equations) in the presence of mental causation, shows that the gravitational field equations differ by a term involving the soul’s influence and thus are not equivalent.”
§ General Relativity, Mental Causation, and Energy Conservation > Bianchi Identities Constrain Mental Influence A more clearly compelling reason that General Relativity does not help the dualist is that one can show mathematically that whereas pre-GR theories will tolerate the introduction of an external mental potential(s) without objection [with symmetries and conservation laws both spoiled thereby in accord with Noether’s first theorem and converse (Noether 1918)], General Relativity actively resists such an external influence by striving to make it vanish. One can, but need not, construe this point as a general relativistic energy conservation objection. Carroll’s undefended claim that nonphysical mental causation would “overthrow everything we think we have learned about modern physics” (Carroll 2011) cannot be defended (at least by him) in terms of energy conservation because he denies it (Carroll 2010); his General Relativity textbook does not apply Noether’s theorem to General Relativity (Carroll 2004). However, his clearly framing the question of how to modify the Dirac-Maxwell-Einstein equations to permit immaterial mental influence suggests a research question. If one attempts to answer this question, then a new difficulty for interactionist dualism from the generalized Bianchi identities emerges. If one introduces souls that act on physical fields in theories different from General Relativity, then some of the conservation equations will be false,10 because the souls act as sources/sinks for energy and momentum. But in General Relativity, the generalized Bianchi identities, related to Noether’s second theorem, are also relevant. In this application one can show that they tend to constrain how the soul could act on matter. General Relativity presents dualism not a new solution as Mohrhoff and Collins envisaged, but a new problem of surprising technical intricacy. General Relativity proves very different from earlier physical theories in that whereas earlier theories passively tolerate the introduction of external causal influences (applied fields, external potentials), General Relativity actively resists them by trying to force them to vanish. One might take the view that laws of nature describe the tendencies of physical entities, while leaving unspecified whether any nonphysical entities influence the physical (von Wachter 2006). The Bianchi identities exhibit how and to what extent resistance occurs. Let the action for General Relativity with matter u (indices suppressed) and influence from immaterial minds be . While little can be said with any confidence about how the mental influence enters in, let us treat it as a field (or collection thereof) with some definite coordinate transformation properties, entering the action algebraically or with up to some finite number of derivatives, with invariant (at least up to a boundary term) under coordinate transformations as usual.11 Crucially, does not have any equations of motion from the principle of least action: one does not postulate the vanishing of . (One might assume the boundary condition that outside brains, or wherever immaterial minds might act.) Using coordinate transformations that are trivial at the boundary (to annihilate boundary terms), one has1Because of the matter field equations , the second term vanishes. Because of the gravitational field equations (Einstein’s equations or some modification thereof), the first term vanishes. To go further, it is necessary to be a bit more specific about the mental influence To emphasize the possibility of multiple components, one can write as where the index A runs over all the components. Suppose (with little loss of generality) that under infinitesimal coordinate transformations along the vector field transforms as(Anderson 1958). This expression lacks a term independent of and so suits the assumption above that is physically distinguished as the state when the soul does nothing to the body. While is presumably linear in , allowing the transformation rule for to depend also on leaves room for to contain spinor fields if desired.12 The terms that survive when the gravitational and material field equations are imposed takes the form2Integrating by parts, discarding boundary terms because the coordinate transformations are assumed to be trivial at the boundary, and using the arbitrariness of in the interior to remove the integration implies3Now let us make the simplest assumption, that the mental influence is described by a scalar field (just one function, the same in all coordinate systems; a pseudoscalar, changing sign under negative-determinant coordinate transformations, would work the same way). In this case One can consider various possibilities for ; with only one component, does not need the index A. Then the Lie derivative along the vector field is just the directional derivative. The equation above becomes4Because is arbitrary due to general covariance, one therefore has5If (because appears only in a boundary term), then plays no role and can be eliminated from the discussion. Another possibility (which appears in a toy example below) is that ; then spatiotemporal constancy of follows immediately. Assuming then that is not identically a constant (0 or not), suppose that does not depend on but depends on and/or u. Then wherever varies spatiotemporally (), as it must to have any chance of representing the mind’s action on the body, the resulting equation will impose a novel restriction on the allowed states of matter and gravity like a Lagrange multiplier even without the postulation that . (A nonzero constant everywhere and always is not suitable for representing the influence of spatiotemporally localized minds, so if the boundary condition implies that vanishes throughout space-time.) Hence either does nothing or unreasonably restricts the physical possibilities for gravity and matter, or perhaps does nothing in some parts of space-time and unreasonably restricts the physical possibilities for gravity and matter elsewhere; clearly this option fails. Another possibility, which one might write loosely as , is that depends on algebraically but not on derivatives of [In this case is almost an auxiliary field, where an auxiliary field has Euler–Lagrange equations in which it appears algebraically and so can be solved for (Pons 2010).] In order that not interfere with the dynamics of gravity and matter where and when is ‘turned off’ (such as outside brains), the algebraic-in- equation must have as a solution While there might be other solutions as well—a cubic equation might have 3 real solutions, etc.—presumably they will be countable and will not fill an interval including It seems impossible that jump from 0 to some nonzero solution of . If cannot slide continuously from 0 to small nonzero values while satisfying the relevant algebraic equation, then this algebraic-in- option does not work, either. The remaining possibility (at least if non-local coupling is excluded) is that depends on it might or might not depend algebraically on as well. An example might help: let appear in the Lagrangian density via the expression like a massless scalar field. Then the equation implies that at any space-time point either is spatio-temporally constant or it satisfies the wave equation While most solutions of the wave equation do vary spatiotemporally (a step in the right direction), they are also fixed by initial and boundary data. Prior to the existence of minds acting on bodies, and its time derivative should vanish, yielding everywhere and always due to the wave equation. Hence this partial differential equation is still too strong to leave the wiggle room needed to represent the soul’s action on the body. Assuming that the wave equation example is representative, it seems that local classical field theory provides no options suitable for modelling the effect of the mind on the body if such effects are mediated by a single scalar (or pseudoscalar) function.13 Hence either there is no such dualist mental causation after all, or its influence is not represented by one scalar (or pseudoscalar) field, or some other Lagrangian makes a relevant qualitative difference. That result contrasts sharply with what would happen in a special relativistic field theory, namely, that the energy-momentum currents would fail to be conserved where and when the mental causation occurs, and the theory does not try to force would-be mental causation to disappear. Regardless of one’s interpretation of gravitational energy and general relativistic conservation laws, General Relativity makes mental causation more difficult by excluding at least the simplest case. What if there are two, three or four scalar fields? If their gradients are linearly independent, then one will have two, three or four copies (respectively) of the same sad story. One can use the scalars with independent gradients as space-time coordinates locally and thus turn the expressions into a rectangular matrix with two, three or four entries with the value 1 and the rest 0. But if the scalars’ gradients are not all linearly independent, then one has correspondingly fewer equations and correspondingly fewer unknowns. So evidently even up to four scalar fields cannot do the job; success, if possible at all, would require more scalars (at least 5), non-scalars, or some combination of the two. Withdrawing the simple assumption that is a scalar field and allowing it to be a quite arbitrary collection of fields one has the more general relationfrom above. The question arises whether these relations are still strong enough to annihilate the soul’s influence. Note that there are still only four of these identities,14 but there is no limit on how many field components over which the index A can range. The freedom to choose the form of the transformations of the fields is also relevant, albeit in a less transparent and less important way. In the single scalar case, the generalized Bianchi identities exclude the soul’s influence, which is forced to constancy and then vanishing everywhere. But if has enough components (5 or perhaps a bit higher being a plausible first estimate), then arguably the soul ‘wins’ and manages to act as it wishes even in a general relativistic world. Perhaps the soul deploys four scalar fields sacrificially as pawns to saturate the generalized Bianchi identities while the more commanding field component(s) undertake to implement the soul’s intentions in the world. If there are, for example, 5 scalar fields in let try to impose the soul’s intentions on the world (or at any rate on the brain). Can it get by with a little help from its friends, the other four scalar fields? It seems plausible that one (call it ) could accommodate dependence on coordinate another (call it ) could accommodate dependence on another (call it ) on and another (call it ) on locally, for example, so as to satisfy the generalized Bianchi identities without forcing . That last equation would seem to block the soul’s effort. [This would not be the first time in General Relativity that one needs to invest 5 scalar fields to keep 1 of them (Bergmann 1962, pp. 253, 254; Rovelli 2004, pp. 81, 82).] This function-counting argument is admittedly crude and merely plausible. A more definitive resolution would require a more specific postulate about how many field components of various types contains and how they couple to the metric and matter fields u. Thus it could turn out that the general relativistic objection still has force even with some additional field components to employ. But that seems unlikely to be true to any great extent. There is a literature on underdetermined differential equations, which in general outline confirms the expectation that having fewer equations than unknowns leads to having a variety of solutions (Bender et al. 2000; Elkin 2009). Mutatis mutandis a similar discussion would apply to (special) divine action (a.k.a. miracles), angelic action, demonic action, genie action (genies/jinn being part of Muslim belief), action by the spirits presumably of the dead [which was accepted by a number of distinguished Victorian scientists who studied the matter in séances and the like (Wallace 1905)], or action of whatever wholly or partly immaterial personal beings someone might wish to consider. Note that the description above does not supply a field for each spirit. If there can be multiple angels in the same place [a topic of renewed interest recently in analytic philosophy (Hawthorne and Uzquiano 2011)], then one could consider how to describe such scenarios. But the discussion has strayed near, if not past, the boundaries of contemporary plausibility structures already. Some readers might share Carroll’s experience: “[n]obody ever asks these questions out loud, possibly because of how silly they sound.” While I don’t altogether disagree, in my estimation the asking and answering of these questions pays for itself, if in no other way, by the fruit yielded regarding gravitational energy in General Relativity and possibly also in the consequences for conserved quantity theories of causation. One might also respond that the questions have a sort of timeless interest; a few centuries centuries ago such questions, or at any rate close analogs of such questions, were very seriously debated by leading thinkers (Watkins 1995, 1998), whereas some current questions (such as how consciousness is possible for a purely physical system) not only sounded silly to many people, but attracted strong arguments in refutation, such as Leibniz’s mill argument:Furthermore, one is obliged to admit that perception and what depends upon it is inexplicable on mechanical principles, that is, by figure and motions. In imagining that there is a machine whose construction would enable it to think, to sense, and to have perception, one could conceive it enlarged while retaining the same proportions, so that one could enter into it, just like into a windmill. Supposing this, one should, when visiting within it, find only parts pushing one another, and never anything by which to explain a perception. Thus it is in the simple substance, an not in the composite or in the machine, that one must look for perception (Rescher 1991, p. 83).This kind of argument has contemporary proponents (Plantinga 2007; Ruse 2018). Without endorsing the argument, Markus Gabriel calls it “one of the earliest modern formulations of the so-called hard problem of consciousness” (Gabriel 2017, p. 121, emphasis in the original). The de-materialization of matter into fields with basically just mathematical properties seems not to affect the force of the argument. Whether one struggles to take seriously a mathematical description of the mind-body problem in General Relativity due to materialist sympathies or not, it is sometimes useful to step out of one’s view and see to what extent the weight of argument forces one back into it. The analogy of destructive testing, understanding something by breaking it, comes to mind. One non-dualist undertook such an exercise and concluded that the arguments against dualism weren’t very compelling (Lycan 2009). Here I have taken Carroll’s foundling research questions (or analogs suited to classical field theory) seriously enough to do some calculations and find some results that, in some cases, are very congenial to Carroll’s views, hence providing an argument rather than an assertion. > More Options from Inequivalence Under Field Redefinitions Another surprise is that there are more distinct ways that the distinctively mental influence on matter might be realized than one might have expected, because some options that are equivalent in more standard physical contexts become distinct in the present problem. Suppose that one is trying to write down a toy mathematical description of how the distinctively mental influence (the soul’s effect) relates to gravity and matter. The interaction term coupling the soul to gravity and matter should respect general covariance and thus be a scalar under coordinate transformations. Hence the integrand should be a scalar density of weight 1. Ignoring matter and letting the soul couple to gravity only for simplicity (to make an important point vivid), two obvious choices (out of an uncountable infinity) are:(the soul’s influence acts as a scalar field, the same in all coordinate systems), or(the soul’s influence acts as a scalar density of weight 1). Usually in physics one regards such choices as equivalent because one can relate the two choices by In cases where all fields satisfy the principle of least action, it is easy to find that the resulting equations of motion are unaffected by field redefinitions. An analogous result holds in quantum field theory (Duff 1981). But now suppose (as holds in our case) that some fields satisfy the principle of least action and some do not. A typical application is electromagnetism in special relativity with arbitrary coordinates; the flat metric tensor of Special Relativity appears in a mildly non-trivial form because one can label the flat space-time in an arbitrary way (coordinates can be angles or can slosh around because your body or the Earth or the Sun defines the origin, or whatever). A variation of the action S made by varying the fields and (the inverse of ), with the variations being 0 at the boundary, is6where |A indicates the holding constant of The Euler–Lagrange equations for electromagnetism are Now let us introduce a new field One can use and as a new set of fields (so that is now primitive and the relation now defines ) and vary the action:7with Euler–Lagrange equations . The relation lets one write Equating coefficients of and of yields, respectively,89(where the parentheses imply symmetrization). One finds that the electromagnetic field equations are equivalent, and the (Hilbert–Rosenfeld) stress-energy tensor (basically ) changes only by terms that are 0 when the electromagnetic field equations hold (Pons 2011; Pitts 2016c). In this case one has redefined the dynamical field by folding some non-dynamical field into it (), but the non-dynamical inverse flat metric tensor is left alone. Hence it doesn’t matter if electromagnetism is a covariant vector or a contravariant vector The usual covariant choice has the virtue of not requiring the construction of covariant derivatives and so perhaps is preferable. But the case of the soul’s influence on gravity (and other physical fields) is different, because the entity not redefined, gravity, has Euler–Lagrange equations but the redefined entity does not. By an analogous derivation one finds that new and old Euler–Lagrange equations differ. Does the soul’s influence transform as (e.g.) a scalar or a scalar density of weight 1? (It should be possible to describe the soul’s influence in any admissible coordinate system within General Relativity, so questions of this sort have to make sense, however incongruous they might sound at first.) Now the dynamical field (which defines volumes in General Relativity), for which the principle of least action applies (because it is part of the space-time metric ), is left alone, while the mental influence which does not satisfy the principle of least action, is redefined by folding in some of Using the generalized Bianchi identities as above, one can easily find that the term (the soul acting as a scalar) leads to a cosmological constant (), altering the gravitational field equations in the same way throughout the whole history of the universe, which is startling for an influence that was supposed to be confined to my brain (and my lifetime)—unless one imposes the boundary condition at the boundaries, in which case everywhere and always, so the soul does nothing at all. The term (the soul’s influence as a scalar density of weight 1), by contrast, definitely does nothing at all (even without appeal to boundary conditions) because it does not couple to anything physical; that is also disappointing, but in a different way. Not appealing to boundary conditions in one case and needing boundary conditions in another shows that the two cases are inequivalent. The point is not that two ludicrously oversimplified examples behave badly, but that they are inequivalent, one not needing boundary conditions and the other needing them—contrary to what one might have assumed based on related but subtly different experiences with field redefinitions in fundamental physics. The two cases’ Euler–Lagrange equations for gravity (the Einstein-like equations) differ. Explicitly one has for the variational derivatives1011The first equation, which shows of Einstein’s equations (the trace, that is, the sum of the diagonal components of the equations) in the presence of mental causation, shows that the gravitational field equations differ by a term involving the soul’s influence and thus are not equivalent. Whether the soul’s influence is a scalar, or a scalar density of weight 1, or something(s) else, makes a difference in the field equations. One might have expected to be equivalent to but one sees that in fact they differ by a nonzero term Admittedly, the generalized Bianchi identities substantially reduce this difference by forcing the soul’s influence (rescaled by a suitable power of ) to be constant, but do not go so far as to establish equivalence of the field equations, which differ by a cosmological constant. (Imposing boundary conditions to make that constant influence 0 does yield equivalence, but that is too weak: using boundary conditions is inequivalent to not using them.) Analogously, one needs to contemplate in principle distinct vector-like possibilities: a covariant vector, a contravariant vector, a covariant vector density of any real weight, and a contravariant vector density of any real weight are not one option, but that might differ. Obviously there are other possibilities: various flavors of spinor fields, etc., not to mention multiple scalars, multiple scalar densities, a scalar and vector of some sort, etc. Thus not only can involve any kinds of fields in whatever quantities you like, but also some cases that one might have expected to be equivalent, in fact differ. Hence there is in principle an enormous zoo of possibilities that could be explored if one aimed (as I do not) to try to give some positive realistic account of how immaterial minds might act in a general relativistic physical world. If one wishes to supply Carroll’s missing argument, then one has a great many distinct options to consider. If some options survives this elimination process, the result will still be very far from biological realism, presumably. But that is a different kind of argument, one best left to neuroscientists rather than theoretical physicists and philosophers of physics.
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Divine Action, Determinism, and the Laws of Nature
Koperski, J. (2019) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9780429029110 · Cited by 33
Metadata
- Authors
- Pitts, J. B.
- Affiliations
- University of Cambridge (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Pitts, J. Brian
- ORCID
- Pitts, J. Brian
- Venue
- Erkenntnis
- Published
- 2020-08-04
- Volume
- 87
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1931-1973
- ISSN
- 0165-0106 (ISSN-L)
- 1572-8420
- PMC
- PMC9296431
- OpenAlex
- W2972138214
- Cited by
- 1
- References
- 237
- FWCI
- 0.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (tdm)
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (vor)
- Locations
- Erkenntnis (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- PhilSci-Archive (University of Pittsburgh) (acceptedVersion)
- arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
- Apollo (University of Cambridge) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- arXiv (Cornell University)
- Apollo
- Funders
- John Templeton Foundation (60745)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Physical Sciences › Physics and Astronomy › Astronomy and Astrophysics › Relativity and Gravitational Theory
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Keywords
- mental causation, conservation of energy, momentum conservation, general relativity, Noether's theorem, gravitational energy-momentum, Sean Carroll, pseudotensors
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