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A phenomenology and epistemology of large language models: transparency, trust, and trustworthiness

Open access
Heersmink, Richard, de Rooij, Barend, Clavel Vázquez, María Jimena, Colombo, Matteo · 2024 · Ethics and Information Technology

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 79 of the 82 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; none of the 25 sources its claims cite is checked for support yet.

Abstract

This paper analyses the phenomenology and epistemology of chatbots such as ChatGPT and Bard. The computational architecture underpinning these chatbots are large language models (LLMs), which are generative artificial intelligence (AI) systems trained on a massive dataset of text extracted from the Web. We conceptualise these LLMs as multifunctional computational cognitive artifacts, used for various cognitive tasks such as translating, summarizing, answering questions, information-seeking, and much more. Phenomenologically, LLMs can be experienced as a “quasi-other”; when that happens, users anthropomorphise them. For most users, current LLMs are black boxes, i.e., for the most part, they lack data transparency and algorithmic transparency. They can, however, be phenomenologically and informationally transparent, in which case there is an interactional flow. Anthropomorphising and interactional flow can, in some users, create an attitude of (unwarranted) trust towards the output LLMs generate. We conclude this paper by drawing on the epistemology of trust and testimony to examine the epistemic implications of these dimensions. Whilst LLMs generally generate accurate responses, we observe two epistemic pitfalls. Ideally, users should be able to match the level of trust that they place in LLMs to the degree that LLMs are trustworthy. However, both their data and algorithmic opacity and their phenomenological and informational transparency can make it difficult for users to calibrate their trust correctly. The effects of these limitations are twofold: users may adopt unwarranted attitudes of trust towards the outputs of LLMs (which is particularly problematic when LLMs hallucinate), and the trustworthiness of LLMs may be undermined.

Overview

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TL;DR

The paper conceptualizes LLM chatbots such as ChatGPT and Bard as multifunctional computational cognitive artifacts and analyzes their phenomenology and epistemology. It argues that data/algorithmic opacity plus phenomenological/informational transparency and anthropomorphism can lead users to misplace trust, while also undermining LLM trustworthiness.

Key findings

  • LLMs are multifunctional computational cognitive artifacts with strong computational agency; they shift the division of computational labour toward the artifact and perform tasks such as translation, summarization, code generation, and dialogue.
  • Phenomenologically, users can relate to LLMs as “quasi-others” and anthropomorphize them; current LLMs lack reflective transparency (data and algorithmic), but can be phenomenologically and informationally transparent, producing interactional flow.
  • These features can create unwarranted trust: for example, ChatGPT hallucinated that Leonardo painted the Mona Lisa in 1815 (later 1502; a Google snippet gave 1503), and both chatbots fabricated nonexistent references (e.g., Hutchinson 2018; Sutton & Levy 2012).
  • Epistemically, opacity impedes heuristics for reliability, bias, and track record and can create an “epistemic responsibility gap”; recommendations include increasing data/algorithmic transparency, pointing to sources, confidence scores, avoiding anthropomorphic design, and balancing transparency with conversational flow.

Methods

  • Conceptual/philosophical analysis drawing on 4E cognition, philosophy of technology, postphenomenology, and epistemology of trust/testimony.
  • Uses illustrative conversations with ChatGPT and Bard conducted by the first author, with dates in footnotes, to examine data transparency, summarization, references, and hallucination.
  • Main analysis distinguishes reflective, phenomenological, and informational transparency and assesses trust calibration and trustworthiness.

Limitations

  • Stated: a comprehensive epistemic comparison between Google Search and LLMs is beyond scope and needs future empirical research; more research on heuristics and anthropomorphism-avoiding design is welcome.
  • Stated: users vary in knowledge, skills, and attitudes, so anthropomorphism and trust effects are not uniform.
  • Evident: the chatbot evidence is anecdotal/illustrative rather than systematic; findings are tied to ChatGPT/Bard at the time of writing and may not generalize to newer models.

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Crossref · 10.1007/s10676-024-09777-3

Cites

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Citations

Cites

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Research works printed but not linked: 3

  1. Gunn, H., & Lynch, M. (2018). Googling. In J. Chase & D. Coady (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Applied Epistemology. Routledge.
  2. Heidegger, M. (1962). Being and time. SCM.
  3. Smart, P., & Shadbolt, N. (2018). The world wide web. In J. Chase & D. Coady (Eds.), Routledge handbook of applied epistemology. Routledge.

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Metadata

Authors
Heersmink, R., de Rooij, B., Clavel Vázquez, M. J., & Colombo, M.
Affiliations
Tilburg University (NL)
Corresponding author
Heersmink, Richard
Venue
Ethics and Information Technology
Published
2024-06-18
Volume
26
Issue
3
ISSN
  • 1388-1957 (ISSN-L)
  • 1572-8439
OpenAlex
W4399785210
Cited by
91
References
82
Citations by year
2026: 66 · 2025: 24 · 2024: 1
FWCI
37.59
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Ethics and Information Technology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
  • Research portal (Tilburg University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Cybernetics and Technology in Society
Keywords
large language models, chatbots, phenomenology of AI, epistemology of trust, anthropomorphism, algorithmic transparency, data transparency, information transparency, trustworthiness, hallucinations, ChatGPT, bards

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: A phenomenology and epistemology of large language models: transparency, trust, and trustworthiness. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1007/s10676-024-09777-3
The paper
Heersmink, R., de Rooij, B., Clavel Vázquez, M. J., & Colombo, M. (2024). A phenomenology and epistemology of large language models: transparency, trust, and trustworthiness. Ethics and Information Technology. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-024-09777-3

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.