Examining popular arguments against AI existential risk: a philosophical analysis
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Concerns about artificial intelligence (AI) and its potential existential risks have garnered significant attention, with figures like Geoffrey Hinton and Dennis Hassabis advocating for robust safeguards against catastrophic outcomes. Prominent scholars, such as Nick Bostrom and Max Tegmark, have further advanced the discourse by exploring the long-term impacts of superintelligent AI. However, this existential risk narrative faces criticism, particularly in popular media, where scholars like Timnit Gebru, Melanie Mitchell, and Nick Clegg argue, among other things, that it distracts from pressing current issues. Despite extensive media coverage, skepticism toward the existential risk discourse has received limited rigorous treatment in academic literature. Addressing this imbalance, this paper reconstructs and evaluates three common arguments against the existential risk perspective: the Distraction Argument, the Argument from Human Frailty, and the Checkpoints for Intervention Argument. By systematically reconstructing and assessing these arguments, the paper aims to provide a foundation for more balanced academic discourse and further research on AI.
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Citations
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Cited by
When AI ethicists shoot from the hip: Stone-Age moral psychology in the age of AI
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Metadata
- Authors
- Swoboda, T., Uuk, R., Lauwaert, L., Rebera, A. P., Oimann, A.-K., Chomanski, B., & Prunkl, C.
- Affiliations
- Vlerick Business School (BE)
- KU Leuven (BE)
- Royal Military Academy (BE)
- Utrecht University (NL)
- Corresponding author
- Swoboda, Torben
- Lauwaert, Lode
- Venue
- Ethics and Information Technology
- Published
- 2025-11-25
- Volume
- 28
- Issue
- 1
- ISSN
- 1388-1957 (ISSN-L)
- 1572-8439
- OpenAlex
- W4416677864
- Semantic Scholar
- 5f3ba28cb118dc72fbdc7b07fd5999698fdac00c
- Cited by
- 1
- References
- 15
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1
- FWCI
- 1.05
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springernature.com/gp/researchers/text-and-data-mining (tdm)
- www.springernature.com/gp/researchers/text-and-data-mining (vor)
- Locations
- Ethics and Information Technology (publishedVersion)
- Lirias (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Cybernetics and Technology in Society
- Social Sciences › Law › Literary and Philosophical Studies
- Keywords
- superintelligent AI, AI safety, Nick Bostrom, Geoffrey Hinton, Nick Clegg
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- The paper
- Swoboda, T., Uuk, R., Lauwaert, L., Rebera, A. P., Oimann, A.-K., Chomanski, B., & Prunkl, C. (2026). Examining popular arguments against AI existential risk: a philosophical analysis. Ethics and Information Technology. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-025-09881-y
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