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A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments
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Abstract Many economic, political and social environments can be described as contests in which agents exert costly effort while competing over the distribution of a scarce resource. These environments have been studied using Tullock contests, all-pay auctions and rank-order tournaments. This survey provides a comprehensive review of experimental research on these three canonical contests. First, we review studies investigating the basic structure of contests, including the number of players and prizes, spillovers and externalities, heterogeneity, risk and incomplete information. Second, we discuss dynamic contests and multi-battle contests. Then we review studies examining sabotage, feedback, bias, collusion, alliances, group contests and gender, as well as field experiments. Finally, we discuss applications of contests and suggest directions for future research.
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“However, empirical research on contests and tournaments contradicts Festinger's expectation that underachievers increase effort.”
From Relative Feedback Increases Disparities in Effort and Performance in Crowdsourcing Contests: Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment on Topcoder (2022) · cites this paper as Dechenaux et al., 2015
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“Specifically, contests and tournaments, where financial rewards depend on rank performance, elicit more individual effort than piece-wise remuneration schemes and, in fact, drive individual effort expenditure beyond what is rational (Cason, Masters, & Sheremeta, 2010;Connelly, Tihanyi, Crook, & Gangloff, 2014;Dechenaux, Kovenock, & Sheremeta, 2015;Dickinson & Isaac, 1998).”
From Relative Feedback Increases Disparities in Effort and Performance in Crowdsourcing Contests: Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment on Topcoder (2022) · cites this paper as Dechenaux, Kovenock, & Sheremeta, 2015
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In the citing paper
“Compared to piece-rate schemes, contests, all-pay auctions, and tournaments result in higher variance in individual effort (Cason et al., 2010;Dechenaux et al., 2015;van Dijk, Sonnemans, & van Winden, 2001).”
From Relative Feedback Increases Disparities in Effort and Performance in Crowdsourcing Contests: Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment on Topcoder (2022) · cites this paper as Dechenaux et al., 2015
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“Specifically, contests and tournaments, where financial rewards depend on rank performance, elicit more individual effort than piece-wise remuneration schemes and, in fact, drive individual effort expenditure beyond what is rational (Cason, Masters, & Sheremeta, 2010;Connelly, Tihanyi, Crook, & Gangloff, 2014;Dechenaux, Kovenock, & Sheremeta, 2015;Dickinson & Isaac, 1998).”
From Relative Feedback Increases Disparities in Effort and Performance in Crowdsourcing Contests: Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment on Topcoder (2022) · cites this paper as Dechenaux, Kovenock, & Sheremeta, 2015
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredIn the citing paper
“The IADC is an all-pay contest with a single mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (Abbink et al., 2010; Dechenaux et al., 2015).”
From Oxytocin promotes coordinated out-group attack during intergroup conflict in humans (2019) · cites this paper as Dechenaux et al., 2015
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Caps on bidding in all-pay auctions: Comments on the experiments of A. Rapoport and W. Amaldoss
Dechenaux, E., Kovenock, D., & Volodymyr Lugovskyy, A. (2005) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2004.11.010 · Cited by 23
The Dark Side of the Future: An Experimental Test of Commitment Problems in Bargaining
Tingley, D. H. (2011) · Harvard Dataverse · doi:10.7910/dvn/im4ue3 · Cited by 23
Efficient Rent-Seeking in Experiment
Vogt, C., Weimann, J., & Yang, C.-L. (2002) · Public Choice · doi:10.1023/a:1013051501754 · Cited by 22
When will the Range of Prizes in Tournaments Increase in the Noise or in the Number of Players?
Gerchak, Y., & He, Q. (2003) · International Game Theory Review · doi:10.1142/s0219198903000957 · Cited by 22
Kohli, P., Kearns, M. J., Bachrach, Y., Herbrich, R., Stillwell, D. J., & Graepel, T. (2012) · ACM Web Science Conference (WebSci) · doi:10.1145/2380718.2380738 · Cited by 21
Single versus multiple-prize all-pay auctions to finance public goods: An experimental analysis
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Policy making and rent-dissipation: An experimental test
Bullock, D. S., & Rutström, E. E. (2007) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-006-9133-1 · Cited by 20
Volunteering a public service: an experimental investigation
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Chowdhury, S. M., Sheremeta, R. M., & Turocy, T. L. (2012) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2050545 · Cited by 19
Political autonomy and independence: Theory and experimental evidence
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Independent Trials are a Model for Disaster
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Multi-Battle Contests: An Experimental StudyPreprint
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Favorites and underdogs: Strategic behavior in an experimental contest
Shogren, J. F., & Baik, K. H. (1992) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf00140767 · Cited by 18
The Attack and Defense of Weakest-Link NetworksPreprint
Kovenock, D., Roberson, B., & Sheremeta, R. M. (2010) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1694437 · Cited by 18
When less is more: Rationing and rent dissipation in stochastic contests
Faravelli, M., & Stanca, L. M. (2011) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.008 · Cited by 18
The Paradox of Misaligned Profiling
Holt, C. A., Kydd, A. H., Razzolini, L., & Sheremeta, R. M. (2014) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002714545223 · Cited by 17
Strategic bidding and investments in final offer arbitration: Theory and experimental evidence
DECK, C. A., & Farmer, A. (2009) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2009.01.010 · Cited by 17
Elements of the Theory of Auctions and ContestsPreprint
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Bidding Behavior in Pay-to-Bid Auctions: An Experimental Study
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On the Role of Group Size in Tournaments: Theory and Evidence from Lab and Field Experiments
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Endogenous versus exogenous allocation of prizes in teams—Theory and experimental evidence
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Kräkel, M., Nieken, P., & Przemeck, J. (2013) · European Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2013.12.003 · Cited by 14
Auction-Theoretic Approach to Modeling Legal Systems: An Experimental AnalysisPreprint
Dechenaux, E., & Mancini, M. (2008) · SSRN Electronic Journal · Cited by 14
All-Pay Auctions with Negative Prize Externalities: Theory and Experimental EvidencePreprint
Sacco, D., & Schmutzler, A. (2008) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1291085 · Cited by 14
Behavioral variation in Tullock contests
Masiliūnas, A., Mengel, F., & Reiß, J. P. (2014) · Repository KITopen (Karlsruhe Institute of Technology) · doi:10.5445/ir/1000038522 · Cited by 13
The Equivalence of ContestsPreprint
Chowdhury, S. M., & Sheremeta, R. M. (2010) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1603968 · Cited by 13
Choosing Between Adaptive Agents
Kareev, Y., & Avrahami, J. (2007) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01951.x · Cited by 13
Young, H. P. (1978) · IIASA PURE (International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis) · Cited by 13
A DESIGNER'S CHOICE BETWEEN SINGLE‐PRIZE AND PARALLEL TOURNAMENTS
Büyükboyacı, M. (2016) · Economic Inquiry · doi:10.1111/ecin.12342 · Cited by 12
Time Discounting in Strategic Contests
Deck, C., & Jahedi, S. (2015) · Journal of Economics & Management Strategy · doi:10.1111/jems.12082 · Cited by 12
Heterogeneity in tournaments with incomplete information: An experimental analysis
Hammond, R. G., & Zheng, X. (2012) · International Journal of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2012.11.005 · Cited by 12
Costless discrimination and unequal achievements in an experimental tournament
Filippin, A., & Guala, F. (2012) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-012-9334-8 · Cited by 11
All-Pay Auctions with Negative Prize Externalities: Theory and Experimental Evidence
Sacco, D., & Schmutzler, A. (2008) · Zurich Open Repository and Archive (University of Zurich) · doi:10.5167/uzh-52393 · Cited by 11
Experiments in multi-stage R&D competition
Sbriglia, P., & Hey, J. D. (1994) · Empirical Economics · doi:10.1007/bf01175876 · Cited by 10
Experimental tests of Tullock’s contest with and without winner refunds
Cohen, C., & Shavit, T. (2012) · Research in Economics · doi:10.1016/j.rie.2012.04.004 · Cited by 9
Tiger Women: An All-Pay Auction Experiment on the Gender Heuristic of the Desire to WinPreprint
Ong, D., & Chen, Z. (2011) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1976782 · Cited by 9
Commitment Problems in Conflict ResolutionPreprint
Kimbrough, E. O., Rubin, J., Sheremeta, R. M., et al. (2013) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2251525 · Cited by 8
Self-citationWars of Attrition in Experimental Duopoly Markets
Phillips, O. R., & Mason, C. F. (1997) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1061105 · Cited by 8
SLEEPING WITH THE ENEMY: THE ECONOMIC COST OF INTERNAL ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICTS
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The Effects of Prize Spread and Noise in Elimination Tournaments: A Natural Field ExperimentPreprint
Delfgaauw, J., Dur, R. A. J., Non, A., & Verbeke, W. (2011) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1908192 · Cited by 8
Two‐Stage Team Rent‐Seeking: Experimental Analysis
Cadigan, J. (2007) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.1002/j.2325-8012.2007.tb00828.x · Cited by 8
An experimental analysis of Colonel Blotto Games under alternative environments
ÇINAR, Y., & Göksel, T. (2012) · İktisat İşletme ve Finans · doi:10.3848/iif.2012.312.3271 · Cited by 7
Rent‐seeking models of international competition: An experimental investigation*
Linster, B. G., Fullerton, R. L., Mckee, M., & Slate, S. (2001) · Defence and Peace Economics · doi:10.1080/10430710108404989 · Cited by 7
Relative performance pay in the shadow of crisis
Kräkel, M., & Nieken, P. (2014) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2014.12.002 · Cited by 6
Teams or Tournaments? A Field Experiment on Cooperation and Competition in Academic AchievementPreprint
Bigoni, M., Fort, M., Nardotto, M., & Reggiani, T. (2011) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1854133 · Cited by 6
The over‐weighting of unfair tie in all‐pay contest: An experimental study
Cohen, C., Shavit, T., & Rosenboim, M. (2012) · International Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1111/j.1742-7363.2012.00192.x · Cited by 6
Mixed Tournaments, Common Shocks, and Disincentives: An Experimental StudyPreprint
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Masiliūnas, A., Mengel, F., & Reiß, J. P. (2012) · PsycEXTRA Dataset · doi:10.1037/e629522012-009 · Cited by 5
Horizontal and Vertical Social Preferences in TournamentsPreprint
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Fight Alone or Together? The Need to BelongPreprint
Ke, C. (2011) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1971641 · Cited by 4
Experimental comparison of two multiple-stage contest designs with asymmetric players
Chark, R., Rapoport, A., & Zwick, R. (2010) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/s11127-010-9631-8 · Cited by 3
Efficient rent-seeking in experiment
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Costless Discrimination and Unequal Achievements in a Labour Market ExperimentPreprint
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Bidding to Give in the Field: Door-to-Door Fundraisers Had it Right from the Start
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The Costs of ConflictPreprint
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Crowdsourcing with All-Pay Auctions: A Field Experiment on Taskcn
Liu, T. X., Yang, J., Adamic, L. A., & Chen, Y. (2014) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2013.1845 · Cited by 239
Experimental Games and Social Decision Making
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OVERBIDDING AND HETEROGENEOUS BEHAVIOR IN CONTEST EXPERIMENTS
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Tournament incentives and corporate fraud
Haß, L. H., Müller, M. A., & Vergauwe, S. (2015) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2015.07.008 · Cited by 167
Sabotage in contests: a survey
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Metadata
- Authors
- Dechenaux, E., Kovenock, D., & Sheremeta, R. M.
- Affiliations
- Kent State University (US)
- Chapman University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Sheremeta, Roman M.
- Venue
- Experimental Economics
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2015-12
- Volume
- 18
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 609-669
- ISSN
- 1386-4157 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-6938
- OpenAlex
- W2239954174
- Cited by
- 706
- References
- 383
- Citations by year
- 2026: 21 · 2025: 35 · 2024: 35 · 2023: 33 · 2022: 64 · 2021: 52 · 2020: 56 · 2019: 67 · 2018: 81 · 2017: 70 · 2016: 56 · 2015: 53
- FWCI
- 202.95
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- doi.org
- Locations
- Experimental Economics (publishedVersion)
- SSRN Electronic Journal (acceptedVersion)
- Munich Personal RePEc Archive (Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich) (acceptedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Chapman University Digital Commons (Chapman University) (submittedVersion)
- Econstor (Econstor) (submittedVersion)
- Social Science Open Access Repository (GESIS – Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Auction Theory and Applications
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Keywords
- contests, all-pay auctions, rank-order tournaments, Tullock contest, costly effort, spillover effects, externalities, heterogeneous players, risk, incomplete information, dynamic contests, sabotage, feedback, collusion, alliances, group contests, gender, field experiments
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
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