Contextual Emergence in the Description of Properties
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Contextual emergence theory shows that reductionist physicalism fails to explain nonlinear physical systems because higher-level conditions influence, stabilize or constrain lower-level mechanics, so lower-level mechanics alone cannot explain emergent properties.
“CE shows that reductionist physicalism fails to explain nonlinear physical systems because their higher-level conditions (the “contingent context”) influence or stabilize or constrain the system’s lower-level mechanics, so the latter alone cannot explain the emergent properties”
From Phenomenal Consciousness and Emergence: Eliminating the Explanatory Gap (2020) · cites this paper as Bishop and Atmanspacher, 2006
Cites
Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation
Kim, J. (1998) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4629.001.0001 · Cited by 1,241 · cited 2× · see citing works
“Hence, there are fewer advocates of class (1) today, a notable exception being Kim.”
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Phenomenal Consciousness and Emergence: Eliminating the Explanatory Gap
Feinberg, T. E., & Mallatt, J. (2020) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01041 · Cited by 78 · see citing works
“For example, CE shows that reductionist physicalism fails to explain nonlinear physical systems because their higherlevel conditions (the “contingent context”) influence or stabilize or constrain the system’s lower-level mechanics, so the latter alone cannot explain the emergent properties (Bishop and Atmanspacher, 20…”
BackgroundContextual emergence of mental states.
Atmanspacher, H. (2015) · Cognitive Processing · doi:10.1007/s10339-015-0658-0 · Cited by 13 · see citing works
- Authors
- Bishop, R. C., & Atmanspacher, H.
- Affiliations
- Rice University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Bishop, Robert C.
- ORCID
- Bishop, Robert C.
- Venue
- Foundations of Physics
- Published
- 2006-11-17
- Volume
- 36
- Issue
- 12
- Pages
- 1753-1777
- ISSN
- 0015-9018 (ISSN-L)
- 1572-9516
- OpenAlex
- W2012925169
- Cited by
- 183
- References
- 1
- Citations by year
- 2026: 4 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 8 · 2022: 19 · 2021: 7 · 2020: 24 · 2019: 4 · 2018: 4 · 2017: 9 · 2016: 10 · 2015: 1 · 2014: 9 · 2013: 2 · 2012: 36
- FWCI
- 34.81
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Foundations of Physics (publishedVersion)
- PhilSci-Archive (University of Pittsburgh) (acceptedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy and History of Science
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Physical Sciences › Physics and Astronomy › Statistical and Nonlinear Physics › Complex Systems and Dynamics
- Keywords
- reduction, supervenience, necessary and sufficient conditions, molecular structure, chirality, thermal equilibrium, temperature, stability
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