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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 68 of the 71 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 10 of the 39 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Understanding Agent Complexity Through Affordances

Open access
Baker, Ben, Roberts, Sonia · 2025 · Minds and Machines

Abstract

The rapid development of autonomous systems, some of which emulate animal abilities, raises a question about how to understand and compare their complexity. Taking an “agent” to be any system that can be well-explained by attributing goals and intentional states to it, in what sense should we understand some agents as more “complex” than others? There is a sizable literature about complexity in biology, notably in comparative psychology, where an animal’s complexity informs predictions about its abilities and guides experimental design. In engineering and artificial intelligence, complexity is often assumed to be a sign of progress – we want to build more complex, capable machines. While the goals of researchers in these fields are different, they plausibly overlap in common conceptions of what a “more complex agent” entails. Existing work on “environmental complexity” and its relationship to “complex cognition” inquires into the origins of complexity, but not what it means to be a complex agent. Recognizing that complex behavior comes not just from complex cognition but from the interplay of body, environment, and cognition, we articulate an account of agent complexity in terms of Gibson’s (The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception (Classic), Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1979) notion of affordances. We distinguish between cognitive and behavioral dimensions of affordances, and offer a framework for comparing agents based on the range of affordances they can exploit. Our approach ecologically grounds the sense in which some agents are more complex than others, while also clarifying why the answer to “which agent is more complex?” is sometimes indeterminate. It enables systematic comparison across diverse agent types, as we demonstrate through a detailed analysis of the nematode C. elegans and the hexapod robot RHex. We hope our account can advance discourse around the complexity of animals and guide the development of complex, agential machines.

Overview

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TL;DR

The paper proposes an affordance-based account of agent complexity, where agents are compared by the range of behavioral and cognitive affordances they can exploit rather than by intelligence, human-likeness, or centralized computation. It illustrates the framework by comparing the nematode *C. elegans* and the hexapod robot RHex, arguing that *C. elegans* is more complex both behaviorally and cognitively.

Key findings

  • Agent complexity is analyzed as a system’s current modes of activity, distinguished from intelligence, and grounded in Gibsonian affordances: an affordance is a possibility for an agent’s activity in a given environment.
  • The framework separates behavioral and cognitive affordances and offers sufficient conditions for comparing capacities: capacity A is more complex than B if A’s basic affordances are a superset of B’s, or if they can be pairwise compared so that no B-affordance is more complex than its paired A-affordance and at least one A-affordance is more complex.
  • In the *C. elegans* vs. RHex comparison, *C. elegans* has a broader repertoire of locomotor modes, more sensory modalities, and multiple forms of learning; base RHex has no composite cognitive affordances, while augmented RHex gains locomotor and navigation affordances.
  • Even augmented RHex is less complex by the paper’s enumeration: *C. elegans* possesses “nearly 50% more distinct affordances” than augmented RHex, with many worm affordances addressing dimensions outside RHex’s domain, such as chemicals and reproduction; *C. elegans* has a small nervous system of 302 neurons.

Methods

  • Conceptual and philosophical analysis: the paper develops an affordance-based framework from ecological psychology, the Dennettian intentional stance, and existing complexity debates including the Environmental Complexity Thesis, the Zero Force Evolutionary Law, and Mikhalevich et al. on behavioral flexibility.
  • Illustrative comparative case study: the authors enumerate and organize affordances for *C. elegans* and RHex into basic/composite and behavioral/cognitive categories, using the base RHex model and an augmented version with added sensors and code.
  • Comparative analysis: the framework is applied to the *C. elegans*–RHex case and contrasted with Cochet and Byrne’s three-dimensional account of complexity (motor precision, coordination, planning).

Limitations

  • Stated: the *C. elegans* affordance taxonomy involves interpretive choices and is not authoritative; a specialist might categorize its affordances differently, and the listing is provisional because new behaviors continue to be discovered.
  • Stated: the paper does not defend an ultimate answer to the behavioral–cognitive distinction and relies on the reader’s intuitive view of that divide; it also leaves open exactly which affordances are basic.
  • Stated and evident: the account is silent about some comparison cases where the capacity with fewer component affordances has at least one more complex affordance, and intermediate cases may lack a determinate answer; the authors also note that their broad notion of agency might obscure significant characteristics of animal agency.

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Crossref · 10.1007/s11023-025-09748-7

Cites

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Citations

Cites

Show all 61 references

Research works printed but not linked: 9

  1. Baker, B. (2025). Rethinking artificial general intelligence. In D. Curry & L. Daoust (Eds.), Introducing Philosophy of Mind. London and New York: Today. Routledge. Forthcoming.
  2. Browning, J.: Intentionality all-stars redux: Do language models know what they are talking about? In: Cappelen, H., Sterken, R. (eds.) Communicating with AI: Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press, ??? ( forthcoming)
  3. Dennett, D. C. (1987). The Intentional Stance. MIT Press.
  4. Gibson, J. J. (1966). The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems. Houghton Mifflin.
  5. Godfrey-Smith, P. (2001). Environmental complexity and the evolution of cognition. In R. J. Sternberg & J. C. Kaufman (Eds.), The Evolution of Intelligence (pp. 233–249). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
  6. Kolmogorov, A.N (1965) Three approaches to the quantitative definition of information. Problemy Peredachi Informatsii 1(1), 3–11,. In Russian. English translation in Problems of Information Transmission,1(1), 1–7.
  7. Kuindersma, S., Valenzuela, A., Ferrari, F., Mastalli, C., & Ponton, B. (2024). Advances in humanoid model predictive control. Annual Review of Control, Robotics, and Autonomous Systems, 7, 123–148. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-control-072523-111032 · doi:10.1146/annurev-control-072523-111032
  8. Luck, S. J. (2005). An Introduction to the Event-Related Potential Technique. MIT Press.
  9. Sipser, M. (2012). Introduction to the Theory of Computation (3rd ed.). Cengage Learning.

Metadata

Authors
Baker, B., & Roberts, S.
Affiliations
  • Colby College (US)
  • Wesleyan University (US)
Corresponding author
Baker, Ben
Venue
Minds and Machines
Published
2025-11-13
Volume
35
Issue
4
ISSN
  • 0924-6495 (ISSN-L)
  • 1572-8641
OpenAlex
W4416162083
Cited by
0
References
61
FWCI
0.00
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
Minds and Machines (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Cybernetics and Technology in Society
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
Keywords
affordances, ecological psychology, complex cognition, environmental complexity, comparative cognition, animal cognition, Caenorhabditis elegans, autonomous systems, intentional states

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Understanding Agent Complexity Through Affordances. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1007/s11023-025-09748-7
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Baker, B., & Roberts, S. (2025). Understanding Agent Complexity Through Affordances. Minds and Machines. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-025-09748-7

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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

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