The DOI matches its Crossref record; the references it cites are not checked yet.
From participatory sense-making to language: there and back again
Open accessAbstract
The enactive approach to cognition distinctively emphasizes autonomy, adaptivity, agency, meaning, experience, and interaction. Taken together, these principles can provide the new sciences of language with a comprehensive philosophical framework: languaging as adaptive social sense-making. This is a refinement and advancement on Maturana’s idea of languaging as a manner of living. Overcoming limitations in Maturana’s initial formulation of languaging is one of three motivations for this paper. Another is to give a response to skeptics who challenge enactivism to connect “lower-level” sense-making with “higher-order” sophisticated moves like those commonly ascribed to language. Our primary goal is to contribute a positive story developed from the enactive account of social cognition, participatory sense-making. This concept is put into play in two different philosophical models, which respectively chronicle the logical and ontogenetic development of languaging as a particular form of social agency. Languaging emerges from the interplay of coordination and exploration inherent in the primordial tensions of participatory sense-making between individual and interactive norms; it is a practice that transcends the self-other boundary and enables agents to regulate self and other as well as interaction couplings. Linguistic sense-makers are those who negotiate interactive and internalized ways of meta-regulating the moment-to-moment activities of living and cognizing. Sense-makers in enlanguaged environments incorporate sensitivities, roles, and powers into their unique yet intelligible linguistic bodies. We dissolve the problematic dichotomies of high/low, online/offline, and linguistic/nonlinguistic cognition, and we provide new boundary criteria for specifying languaging as a prevalent kind of human social sense-making.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
The cited source says what the claim attributes to it.
In the citing paper
“As the participatory sense-making framework has shown, integration with other agents also occurs at this deeper scale, and many human intentional processes are, in a sense, socially midtended.”
From Generative midtended cognition and Artificial Intelligence: thinging with thinging things (2025) · cites this paper as Cuffari et al., 2015
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
The citation lists are queued
They are fetched later and appear here then.
References 128 · Cited by 159
Research works printed but not linked: 6
- Arthur, C. (1998). Systematic dialectic. Science & Society, 62(3), 447–459.
- Damasio, A. (1999). The feeling of what happens. New York: Hartcourt Brace.
- Gendlin, E. (1997). How philosophy cannot appeal to experience, and how it can. In Gendlin, E., & Kleinberg-Levin, D. M. (Eds.). Language beyond post-modernism: Language and thinking in Gendlin’s philosophy. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
- Goffman, E. (1967). Interaction ritual. London: Penguin.
- Honneth, A. (1995). The Struggle for Recognition, trans. Joel Anderson. Cambridge, MA: Polity Press.
- Merleau-Ponty, M. (1973). The prose of the world. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
Metadata
- Authors
- Cuffari, E. C., Di Paolo, E., & De Jaegher, H.
- Affiliations
- Worcester State University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Cuffari, Elena Clare
- ORCID
- Cuffari, Elena Clare
- Venue
- Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
- Published
- 2014-11-19
- Volume
- 14
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1089-1125
- ISSN
- 1568-7759 (ISSN-L)
- 1572-8676
- OpenAlex
- W1998301647
- Cited by
- 159
- References
- 128
- Citations by year
- 2026: 13 · 2025: 18 · 2024: 14 · 2023: 16 · 2022: 14 · 2021: 17 · 2020: 17 · 2019: 10 · 2018: 8 · 2017: 8 · 2016: 10 · 2015: 11 · 2014: 3
- FWCI
- 5.95
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Locations
- Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- FP7 People: Marie-Curie Actions (FP7-PEOPLE-2010-ITN, 264828)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Cybernetics and Technology in Society
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Action Observation and Synchronization
- Keywords
- enactivism, languaging, participatory sense-making, social cognition, Maturana, social agency, self-other boundary, meta-regulation
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: From participatory sense-making to language: there and back again. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1007/s11097-014-9404-9
- The paper
- Cuffari, E. C., Di Paolo, E., & De Jaegher, H. (2015). From participatory sense-making to language: there and back again. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-014-9404-9
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.