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Phenomenology-first versus third-person approaches in the science of consciousness: the case of the integrated information theory and the unfolding argument
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“IIT distinguishes itself from most other neuroscientific theories by adopting a 'phenomenology -first' approach that seeks to characterise the intrinsic structure of consciousness (Ellia et al., 2021; Negro, 2020; Oizumi et al., 2014).”
From Integrated information and predictive processing theories of consciousness: An adversarial collaborative review (2026) · cites this paper as Negro, 2020
Citations
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They are fetched later and appear here then.
References 31 · Cited by 25
Metadata
- Authors
- Negro, N.
- Affiliations
- Monash University (AU)
- Corresponding author
- Negro, Niccolò
- ORCID
- Negro, Niccolò
- Venue
- Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
- Published
- 2020-06-11
- Volume
- 19
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 979-996
- ISSN
- 1568-7759 (ISSN-L)
- 1572-8676
- OpenAlex
- W3034460093
- Cited by
- 25
- References
- 31
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 5 · 2021: 5 · 2020: 1
- FWCI
- 3.86
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- www.springer.com/tdm (vor)
- Locations
- Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Keywords
- integrated information theory, theory of consciousness, demarcation problem, falsificationism, circularity, philosophy of mind
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
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How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Phenomenology-first versus third-person approaches in the science of consciousness: the case of the integrated information theory and the unfolding argument. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1007/s11097-020-09681-3
- The paper
- Negro, N. (2020). Phenomenology-first versus third-person approaches in the science of consciousness: the case of the integrated information theory and the unfolding argument. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-020-09681-3
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.