Cited by 335Philosophical Ethics and TheoryFree Will and AgencyEpistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics

Shared intention and personal intentions

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Gilbert, Margaret·2009·Philosophical Studies

Abstract

This article explores the question: what is it for two or more people to intend to do something in the future? In a technical phrase, what is it for people to share an intention ? Extending and refining earlier work of the author’s, it argues for three criteria of adequacy for an account of shared intention (the disjunction, concurrence, and obligation criteria) and offers an account that satisfies them. According to this account, in technical terms explained in the paper, people share an intention when and only when they are jointly committed to intend as a body to do such-and-such in the future. This account is compared and contrasted with the common approach that treats shared intention as a matter of personal intentions, with particular reference to the work of Michael Bratman.

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  • On Gilbert's account, when parties jointly commit themselves to a shared belief or intention, they must see to it as far as possible to emulate, by virtue of the actions of each, a single body that intends to do the thing in question.

    “when parties jointly commit themselves to a shared belief or intention, they must see to it “as far as possible to emulate, by virtue of the actions of each, a single body that intends to do the thing in question” (Gilbert, 2009, p. 180).”

    From Collaborative Irrationality, Akrasia, and Groupthink: Social Disruptions of Emotion Regulation (2017) · cites this paper as Gilbert, 2009

    Section 6 (cited p. 180) uses the quoted formulation for a joint commitment to intend as a body. It separately describes a joint commitment to believe as a body, but does not say that a shared belief requires emulating a body that intends to do something. (LLM, conf=0.88)

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  • In contrast to personal commitments, none of the parties can suspend the normative force of a joint commitment individually or separately, but only through joint deliberation.

    “The central idea is that in sharp contrast to personal commitments none of the parties can suspend the normative force of the commitment thus created individually or separately but, rather, precisely only through joint deliberation.”

    From Collaborative Irrationality, Akrasia, and Groupthink: Social Disruptions of Emotion Regulation (2017) · cites this paper as Gilbert, 2009

    Section 5 (“The concurrence criterion,” page unavailable) contrasts personal intentions, which one can rescind unilaterally, with shared intentions, which one cannot unilaterally rescind. Section 8 (“Implications of the account,” page unavailable) says altering or rescinding a joint commitment requires the other parties’ concurrence absent special background understandings. It does not require joint deliberation specifically, and the claim omits that exception. (LLM, conf=0.86)

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References 30 · Cited by 335

Research works printed but not linked: 4

  1. Bratman, M. (1987). Intentions, plans, and practical reason. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
  2. Bratman, M. (1999). Faces of intention. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  3. Gilbert, M. (1997). What is it for Us to Intend? In G. Holmstrom-Hintikka & R. Tuomela (Eds.), Contemporary action theory, (Vol. 2, pp. 65-85). Dordrecht. (Reprinted in Gilbert (2000)).
  4. Gilbert, M. (2003). The structure of the social atom: Joint commitment as the foundation of human social behavior. In F. Schmitt (Ed.), Socializing metaphysics (pp. 39-64).

Authors
Gilbert, M.
Affiliations
University of California, Irvine (US)
Corresponding author
Gilbert, Margaret
Venue
Philosophical Studies
Published
2009-04-07
Volume
144
Issue
1
Pages
167-187
ISSN
  • 0031-8116 (ISSN-L)
  • 1573-0883
OpenAlex
W2115050393
Cited by
335
References
30
Citations by year
2026: 10 · 2025: 16 · 2024: 25 · 2023: 29 · 2022: 50 · 2021: 35 · 2020: 39 · 2019: 18 · 2018: 15 · 2017: 26 · 2016: 12 · 2015: 19 · 2014: 8 · 2013: 18 · 2012: 8
FWCI
46.98
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
cc-by-nc
Locations
  • Philosophical Studies (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc)
  • SSRN Electronic Journal (submittedVersion)
  • eScholarship (California Digital Library) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • eScholarship (California Digital Library) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Free Will and Agency
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
Keywords
shared intentionality, Michael Bratman, joint commitment, future action, collective intentionality

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