Two conceptions of subjective experience
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People can have different intuitions about two states that theoretically both relate to phenomenal consciousness-e.g., asserting that robots can see red but cannot feel pain.
“For example, people can have different intuitions about two states that theoretically both relate to phenomenal consciousness—e.g. asserting that robots can see red but cannot feel pain (Sytsma and Machery 2010).”
From Folk psychological attributions of consciousness to large language models (2024) · cites this paper as Sytsma and Machery 2010
The citation lists haven’t been fetched yet
References 43 · Cited by 213
- Authors
- Sytsma, J., & Machery, E.
- Affiliations
- University of Pittsburgh (US)
- Corresponding author
- Sytsma, Justin
- ORCID
- Sytsma, Justin
- Venue
- Philosophical Studies
- Published
- 2009-10-01
- Volume
- 151
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 299-327
- ISSN
- 0031-8116 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-0883
- OpenAlex
- W2061814640
- Cited by
- 213
- References
- 43
- Citations by year
- 2026: 22 · 2025: 12 · 2024: 34 · 2023: 9 · 2022: 11 · 2021: 19 · 2020: 17 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 12 · 2017: 11 · 2016: 7 · 2015: 7 · 2014: 11 · 2013: 4 · 2012: 18
- FWCI
- 14.83
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Philosophical Studies (publishedVersion)
- PhilSci-Archive (University of Pittsburgh) (acceptedVersion)
- D-Scholarship@Pitt (University of Pittsburgh) (acceptedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Mental Health and Psychiatry
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Free Will and Agency
- Keywords
- subjective experience, phenomenal consciousness, valence, hard problem of consciousness, philosophy of mind, experimental philosophy
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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
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