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The traversal of the infinite: considering a beginning for an infinite past

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Viglione, Federico · 2024 · Synthese

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 37 of the 37 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 1 of the 10 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Abstract

This paper offers a critical assessment of the Successive Addition Argument (SAA) in support of past finitism, i.e., the thesis that the past of the universe is finite in duration. This old philosophical argument, re-popularized by William Lane Craig in modern times, contends that the universe’s past cannot be infinite because an infinite series cannot be formed by successive addition. I first address a recently popular objection to the Zeno Objection, showing that it can be easily dismissed once each addition is taken to have the same duration. Nevertheless, I contend that the onus of the proof lies on those who propose the SAA, and that their main argumentative strategies fail. Indeed, many of their arguments are based on the supposedly uncontroversial claim that one cannot traverse the infinite by starting somewhere. I argue that a complete traversal of the infinite, with a beginning infinitely far from its end, is logically and metaphysically possible. Other popular arguments against traversed infinities are based on thought experiments such as the backward counter or the Tristram Shandy thought experiments. I argue that, once infinitely far beginnings are granted, none of the arguments based on such thought experiments prove effective, so that the SAA must be rejected.

Overview

CoChat Summary

## TL;DR

The paper argues that the Successive Addition Argument for past finitism fails because its key premise — that an actual infinite cannot be formed by successive addition — is not established. It claims that if one allows an “infinitely far beginning,” then both backward-counting and Tristram Shandy-style objections to traversing an infinite past lose force.

## Key findings

  • The paper rejects the revised finitist premise (2)\*: “An actually infinite series cannot be formed by successive additions of equal (finite) duration,” arguing that this is not supported either logically or metaphysically.
  • It claims the usual Zeno objection does not defeat the revised argument, because ordinary motions in continuous space/time do not amount to “infinite successive additions of finite equal duration.”
  • It argues that a series can coherently have order type ω+ω\*, so an actually infinite series with a first element can still be formed by successive addition; this directly contradicts the claimed First Addition Claim (FAC).
  • It concludes that, once infinitely far beginnings are allowed, the backward counter and Tristram Shandy thought experiments do not prove that an infinite series cannot be completed by successive additions.

## Methods

  • Conceptual/philosophical analysis of the Successive Addition Argument (SAA) and its revised form (SAAr).
  • Examination of objections and thought experiments, especially the Zeno objection, backward counter, and Tristram Shandy scenarios.
  • Use of order-theoretic examples, including the standard integers, a non-standard ω+ω\* ordering, and claims about discrete series and successive addition.

## Limitations

  • The paper is a purely philosophical argument; it does not present empirical data or a formal proof that settles the debate.
  • The text makes evident that the argument depends on contested assumptions about modal status (logical/metaphysical possibility) and the structure of time; the paper itself says these do not need to be settled, which leaves the conclusion vulnerable to disagreement.
  • The paper’s own discussion shows that some replies are acknowledged but not fully pursued, including criticisms of the coherence of ω+ω\* orderings and the possibility that a non-standard time structure may be required (text-made-evident limitation).

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1007/s11229-024-04735-4

Cites

37 of 37 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

1 Valid · 3 Not valid · 6 Not checked · 56 Own results and interpretations

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  • It may state two separate claims as one. 9

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Citations

Cites

Research works printed but not linked: 10

  1. Craig, W. L. (1991a). The Existence of God and the Beginning of the Universe. Truth: A Journal of Modern Thought, 3, 85–96.
  2. Craig, W. L. (1992). Philosophical and scientific pointers to creatio ex nihilo. In R. D. Geivett, & S. Brendan (Eds.), Contemporary perspectives on religious epistemology (pp. 185–200). Oxford University Press.
  3. Craig, W. L. (2013). The Kalam Argument. In J. P. Moreland, K. A. Sweis, & C. Meister (Eds.), Debating Christian Theism (pp. 7–19). Oxford University Press.
  4. Falkenburg, B. (2013). From Kant’s early cosmology to the cosmological antinomy. In De S. Bianchi (Ed.), The harmony of the Sphere (pp. 48–71). Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
  5. Morriston, W. (2017). Must Metaphysical Time Have a Beginning? In P. Copan & W. L. Craig (Eds.), The Kalām Cosmological Argument: Philosophical Arguments for the Finitude of the Past (73–90). Bloomsbury Academic.
  6. Puryear, S. (2014). Finitism and the beginning of the Universe. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 92(4), 619–629. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2014.949804 · DOI · Paper page
  7. Russell, B. (1929). Our knowledge of the External World (2nd ed.). W. W. Norton and Co.
  8. Russell, B. (1937). Principles of Mathematics (2nd ed.). Routledge.
  9. Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (2004). There is no good reason to believe in God. In W. L. Craig, & W. S. Sinnott-Armstrong (Eds.), God? A debate between a Christian and an atheist (pp. 31–52). Oxford University Press.
  10. Viglione, F. (2022). Time and Chances before the Changing Universe: A Metaphysical Inquiry (Doctoral dissertation). Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Bellaterra, Spain. https://ddd.uab.cat/record/272570

Metadata

Authors
Viglione, F.
Affiliations
University of Milan (IT)
Corresponding author
Viglione, Federico
Venue
Synthese
Published
2024-09-27
Volume
204
Issue
4
ISSN
  • 0039-7857 (ISSN-L)
  • 1573-0964
OpenAlex
W4402927777
Cited by
1
References
37
Citations by year
2026: 1
FWCI
1.44
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Synthese (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PhilSci-Archive (University of Pittsburgh) (submittedVersion)
  • Archivio Istituzionale della Ricerca (Universita Degli Studi Di Milano) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
Funders
Università degli Studi di Milano
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › History and Theory of Mathematics
Keywords
infinite past, William Lane Craig, infinite regress, origin of the universe, metaphysics of time

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