The traversal of the infinite: considering a beginning for an infinite past
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Abstract
This paper offers a critical assessment of the Successive Addition Argument (SAA) in support of past finitism, i.e., the thesis that the past of the universe is finite in duration. This old philosophical argument, re-popularized by William Lane Craig in modern times, contends that the universe’s past cannot be infinite because an infinite series cannot be formed by successive addition. I first address a recently popular objection to the Zeno Objection, showing that it can be easily dismissed once each addition is taken to have the same duration. Nevertheless, I contend that the onus of the proof lies on those who propose the SAA, and that their main argumentative strategies fail. Indeed, many of their arguments are based on the supposedly uncontroversial claim that one cannot traverse the infinite by starting somewhere. I argue that a complete traversal of the infinite, with a beginning infinitely far from its end, is logically and metaphysically possible. Other popular arguments against traversed infinities are based on thought experiments such as the backward counter or the Tristram Shandy thought experiments. I argue that, once infinitely far beginnings are granted, none of the arguments based on such thought experiments prove effective, so that the SAA must be rejected.
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## TL;DR
The paper argues that the Successive Addition Argument for past finitism fails because its key premise — that an actual infinite cannot be formed by successive addition — is not established. It claims that if one allows an “infinitely far beginning,” then both backward-counting and Tristram Shandy-style objections to traversing an infinite past lose force.
## Key findings
- The paper rejects the revised finitist premise (2)\*: “An actually infinite series cannot be formed by successive additions of equal (finite) duration,” arguing that this is not supported either logically or metaphysically.
- It claims the usual Zeno objection does not defeat the revised argument, because ordinary motions in continuous space/time do not amount to “infinite successive additions of finite equal duration.”
- It argues that a series can coherently have order type ω+ω\*, so an actually infinite series with a first element can still be formed by successive addition; this directly contradicts the claimed First Addition Claim (FAC).
- It concludes that, once infinitely far beginnings are allowed, the backward counter and Tristram Shandy thought experiments do not prove that an infinite series cannot be completed by successive additions.
## Methods
- Conceptual/philosophical analysis of the Successive Addition Argument (SAA) and its revised form (SAAr).
- Examination of objections and thought experiments, especially the Zeno objection, backward counter, and Tristram Shandy scenarios.
- Use of order-theoretic examples, including the standard integers, a non-standard ω+ω\* ordering, and claims about discrete series and successive addition.
## Limitations
- The paper is a purely philosophical argument; it does not present empirical data or a formal proof that settles the debate.
- The text makes evident that the argument depends on contested assumptions about modal status (logical/metaphysical possibility) and the structure of time; the paper itself says these do not need to be settled, which leaves the conclusion vulnerable to disagreement.
- The paper’s own discussion shows that some replies are acknowledged but not fully pursued, including criticisms of the coherence of ω+ω\* orderings and the possibility that a non-standard time structure may be required (text-made-evident limitation).
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Claims the paper makes
1 Valid · 3 Not valid · 6 Not checked · 56 Own results and interpretations
In the paper
“Since Small does not provide a solution to the problems with the classical setting, my solution seems therefore preferable.”
§ The Traversal of the Infinite: Considering a Beginning for an Infinite Past > 6. Final remarks on the SAA
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Small 1986 source
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“Moreover, an additional commitment comes with premise (3), as it is widely acknowledged that this premise binds SAA's proponents to some dynamic view of time in which events are actualized one after another (Craig 1991a, p. 15;2013, p. 13;Morriston 2021, p. 2).”
§ The Traversal of the Infinite: Considering a Beginning for an Infinite Past > 1. Introduction
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites Craig 1991a, p. 15
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Not matchedcites Craig 2013, p. 13
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Morriston 2021, p. 2 source
boostedstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Not matched
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Therefore, it is consistent to suppose that this series is formed in the specified order by successive addition.18”
§ The Traversal of the Infinite: Considering a Beginning for an Infinite Past > 4. Infinitely far beginnings: logical and metaphysical possibilities
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A statement the paper makes itself — it cites no source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Notice that a temporal series could have ℵ0 events and still be finitely extended.”
§ The Traversal of the Infinite: Considering a Beginning for an Infinite Past > 2. Preliminary remarks on the SAA
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
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A statement the paper makes itself — it cites no source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The Zeno objection hinges on the assumption that any finite interval of space or time is composed of infinitely many parts.”
§ The Traversal of the Infinite: Considering a Beginning for an Infinite Past > 3. Getting over the Zeno objection
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
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Citations
Cites
Bouncing Cosmologies: Progress and Problems
Brandenberger, R., & Peter, P. (2017) · Foundations of Physics · doi:10.1007/s10701-016-0057-0 · Cited by 385
A Theory Of Metaphysical Indeterminacy
Barnes, E., & Williams, J. R. G. (2011) · Oxford Studies in Metaphysics · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199603039.003.0003 · Cited by 276 · cited 1×
“6 For a theory of metaphysical indeterminacy see Barnes and Williams (2011).”
The Kalam Cosmological Argument
Craig, W. L., & Sinclair, J. D. (2009) · The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology · doi:10.1002/9781444308334.ch3 · Cited by 168
(2016) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781316492949 · Cited by 106
Philosophical Perspectives on Infinity
Oppy, G. (2006) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511498985 · Cited by 88 · cited 1×
“Among others, one finds Russell (1929), Bennett (1974), Popper (1978), Bell (1979), Mackie (1982), Sorabji (1984), Smith (1995), Sinnott-Arm-strong (2004), Oppy (2002 ; 2006), Puryear (2014 ; 2016), Zarepour (2021 ; 2022), Morriston (1999 ; 2002 ; 2017 ; 2021), and Malpass (2022 ; 2023).”
On the Gravitization of Quantum Mechanics 2: Conformal Cyclic Cosmology
Penrose, R. (2014) · Foundations of Physics · doi:10.1007/s10701-013-9763-z · Cited by 53
The Teleological and Kalam Cosmological Arguments Revisited
Loke, A. T. E. (2022) · Palgrave frontiers in philosophy of religion · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-94403-2 · Cited by 44 · cited 1×
“For recent works that build upon Craig’s defense of the argument see Oderberg (2017), Erasmus (2018), and Loke (2014 ; 2017 ; 2022).”
A New Kalam Argument: Revenge of the Grim Reaper
(2012) · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2012.00858.x · Cited by 42 · cited 1×
“In fact, discussions on this scenario typically state that it is impossible because inconsistent , as it would entail both that some Grim Reaper has made a particular action and that no Grim Reaper has made that action by the end of the series (Koons, 2014, p. 4).”
On the Impossibility of an Infinite Past
Whitrow, G. J. (1978) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1093/bjps/29.1.39 · Cited by 40
ON THE POSSIBILITY OF AN INFINITE PAST: A REPLY TO WHITROW
(1978) · doi:10.1093/bjps/29.1.47 · Cited by 33 · cited 1×
“Among others, one finds Russell (1929), Bennett (1974), Popper (1978), Bell (1979), Mackie (1982), Sorabji (1984), Smith (1995), Sinnott-Arm-strong (2004), Oppy (2002 ; 2006), Puryear (2014 ; 2016), Zarepour (2021 ; 2022), Morriston (1999 ; 2002 ; 2017 ; 2021), and Malpass (2022 ; 2023).”
(2017) · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-57547-6 · Cited by 29 · cited 2×
“For recent works that build upon Craig’s defense of the argument see Oderberg (2017), Erasmus (2018), and Loke (2014 ; 2017 ; 2022).”
Finitism and the Beginning of the Universe
Puryear, S. (2014) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048402.2014.949804 · Cited by 23
MORRISTON, W. (2002) · Religious Studies · doi:10.1017/s0034412502005978 · Cited by 18 · cited 2×
“…spatial or temporal interval as composed of a finite number of smallest parts; or, alternatively, they could maintain that finite intervals are indeed continuous but deny that this entails that they are composed of an actual infinity of parts (Morriston, 2002, p. 162; Puryear, 2014, pp. 623–624).”
Science and Religion in Dialogue
(2010) · Wiley eBooks · doi:10.1002/9781444317350 · Cited by 18
The Kalām Cosmological Argument: A Reassessment
(2018) · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-73438-5 · Cited by 17 · cited 2×
“For recent works that build upon Craig’s defense of the argument see Oderberg (2017), Erasmus (2018), and Loke (2014 ; 2017 ; 2022).”
The Kalam Cosmological Argument and the Hypothesis of a Quiescent Universe
(1991) · doi:10.5840/faithphil1991819 · Cited by 13 · cited 2×
“(Craig, 1991a, pp. 15–19) According to Craig’s reasoning, the counter cannot have finished counting all the negative integers in their standard order at any time.”
Relationism and Temporal Topology: Physics or Metaphysics?
(1990) · doi:10.2307/2220108 · Cited by 12 · cited 1×
“However, the orthodox view in the philosophy of time is that the overall structure of time should be addressed, and eventually settled, through empirical investigation (Le Poidevin, 1993, p. 151).”
The Kalam Cosmological Argument
(2018) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190842215.003.0024 · Cited by 12 · cited 4×
“The latter view is endorsed by Craig (Craig, 1995, pp. 27–30; Craig & Sinclair, 2009, pp. 112–113).”
InfluentialTraversal of the Infinite, the “Big Bang,” and the Kalam Cosmological Argument
(2002) · doi:10.5840/pc20024236 · Cited by 10 · cited 2×
“For recent works that build upon Craig’s defense of the argument see Oderberg (2017), Erasmus (2018), and Loke (2014 ; 2017 ; 2022).”
Must the Past Have a Beginning?
(1999) · doi:10.5840/philo1999212 · Cited by 10 · cited 4×
“In response, opponents have promptly argued that, although one certainly cannot count to infinity by starting with some number , the same does not hold in the case of a beginningless count (Morriston, 1999, p. 8; 2021, p. 2).”
InfluentialArguing About The Kalam Cosmological Argument
(2002) · doi:10.5840/philo2002513 · Cited by 9 · cited 1×
“Among others, one finds Russell (1929), Bennett (1974), Popper (1978), Bell (1979), Mackie (1982), Sorabji (1984), Smith (1995), Sinnott-Arm-strong (2004), Oppy (2002 ; 2006), Puryear (2014 ; 2016), Zarepour (2021 ; 2022), Morriston (1999 ; 2002 ; 2017 ; 2021), and Malpass (2022 ; 2023).”
(2018) · doi:10.4324/9781315145921 · Cited by 8
Finitism, Divisibilty, and the Beginning of the Universe: Replies to Loke and Dumsday
(2016) · doi:10.1080/00048402.2016.1194443 · Cited by 8 · cited 2×
“Puryear (2014, 2016) has argued that, in adopting Craig’s view, the SAA’s proponents must conceive the infinitely extended past of the universe as one infinitely long event, with any smaller part of it being a mere conceptualization.”
A MODIFIED PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENT FOR A BEGINNING OF THE UNIVERSE
(2013) · doi:10.1017/s147717561300033x · Cited by 8 · cited 2×
“For recent works that build upon Craig’s defense of the argument see Oderberg (2017), Erasmus (2018), and Loke (2014 ; 2017 ; 2022).”
Infinite Magnitudes, Infinite Multitudes, and the Beginning of the Universe
(2020) · doi:10.1080/00048402.2020.1795696 · Cited by 8 · cited 1×
“Among others, one finds Russell (1929), Bennett (1974), Popper (1978), Bell (1979), Mackie (1982), Sorabji (1984), Smith (1995), Sinnott-Arm-strong (2004), Oppy (2002 ; 2006), Puryear (2014 ; 2016), Zarepour (2021 ; 2022), Morriston (1999 ; 2002 ; 2017 ; 2021), and Malpass (2022 ; 2023).”
(2020) · doi:10.1093/mind/fzaa086 · Cited by 7
Finitism and Divisibility: A Reply to Puryear
(2015) · doi:10.1080/00048402.2015.1107601 · Cited by 6 · cited 5×
“Puryear has attempted a brief response to Loke’s and Dumsday’s proposal, raising the suspicion of incoherence (2016, pp. 3–5).”
InfluentialInfinity, Time, and Successive Addition
Morriston, W. (2022) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048402.2020.1865426 · Cited by 6 · cited 8×
“Given this, there could be a counter who would not be finished until next year or a hundred years from now, as well as a counter who would be finished now (Morriston, 1999, p. 13; Morriston, 2017, p. 77; Morriston, 2021, p. 11).”
InfluentialCraig’s Kalam Cosmological Argument
(1989) · doi:10.5840/faithphil1989615 · Cited by 6
THE INFINITE PAST REGAINED: A REPLY TO WHTTROW
(1979) · doi:10.1093/bjps/30.2.161 · Cited by 5 · cited 1×
“Among others, one finds Russell (1929), Bennett (1974), Popper (1978), Bell (1979), Mackie (1982), Sorabji (1984), Smith (1995), Sinnott-Arm-strong (2004), Oppy (2002 ; 2006), Puryear (2014 ; 2016), Zarepour (2021 ; 2022), Morriston (1999 ; 2002 ; 2017 ; 2021), and Malpass (2022 ; 2023).”
Small, R. (1986) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1093/bjps/37.2.213 · Cited by 5 · cited 2×
“…the concept of an infinitely far beginning suggests a solid solution to the Tristram Shandy Paradox, one of the last resources of 21 Discussions on different settings of the Tristram Shandy scenario, such as the one (very much discussed) provided by Robin Small (Small, 1986), are beside the point.”
The Finitude of the Past and the Existence of God
(1995) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198263838.003.0001 · Cited by 3 · cited 1×
“The latter view is endorsed by Craig (Craig, 1995, pp. 27–30; Craig & Sinclair, 2009, pp. 112–113).”
(1995) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198263838.003.0002 · Cited by 2
(2010) · doi:10.1002/9781444317350.ch46 · Cited by 2
Counting to infinity, successive addition, and the length of the past
(2022) · doi:10.1007/s11153-022-09843-0 · Cited by 1 · cited 1×
“Among others, one finds Russell (1929), Bennett (1974), Popper (1978), Bell (1979), Mackie (1982), Sorabji (1984), Smith (1995), Sinnott-Arm-strong (2004), Oppy (2002 ; 2006), Puryear (2014 ; 2016), Zarepour (2021 ; 2022), Morriston (1999 ; 2002 ; 2017 ; 2021), and Malpass (2022 ; 2023).”
Andrew Loke’s indirect defence of the successive addition argument
Malpass, A. (2023) · International Journal for Philosophy of Religion · doi:10.1007/s11153-023-09870-5
Research works printed but not linked: 10
- Craig, W. L. (1991a). The Existence of God and the Beginning of the Universe. Truth: A Journal of Modern Thought, 3, 85–96.
- Craig, W. L. (1992). Philosophical and scientific pointers to creatio ex nihilo. In R. D. Geivett, & S. Brendan (Eds.), Contemporary perspectives on religious epistemology (pp. 185–200). Oxford University Press.
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- Falkenburg, B. (2013). From Kant’s early cosmology to the cosmological antinomy. In De S. Bianchi (Ed.), The harmony of the Sphere (pp. 48–71). Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
- Morriston, W. (2017). Must Metaphysical Time Have a Beginning? In P. Copan & W. L. Craig (Eds.), The Kalām Cosmological Argument: Philosophical Arguments for the Finitude of the Past (73–90). Bloomsbury Academic.
- Puryear, S. (2014). Finitism and the beginning of the Universe. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 92(4), 619–629. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2014.949804 · DOI · Paper page
- Russell, B. (1929). Our knowledge of the External World (2nd ed.). W. W. Norton and Co.
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- Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (2004). There is no good reason to believe in God. In W. L. Craig, & W. S. Sinnott-Armstrong (Eds.), God? A debate between a Christian and an atheist (pp. 31–52). Oxford University Press.
- Viglione, F. (2022). Time and Chances before the Changing Universe: A Metaphysical Inquiry (Doctoral dissertation). Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Bellaterra, Spain. https://ddd.uab.cat/record/272570
Metadata
- Authors
- Viglione, F.
- Affiliations
- University of Milan (IT)
- Corresponding author
- Viglione, Federico
- ORCID
- Viglione, Federico
- Venue
- Synthese
- Published
- 2024-09-27
- Volume
- 204
- Issue
- 4
- ISSN
- 0039-7857 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-0964
- OpenAlex
- W4402927777
- Cited by
- 1
- References
- 37
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1
- FWCI
- 1.44
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- dx.doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (tdm)
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (vor)
- Locations
- Synthese (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PhilSci-Archive (University of Pittsburgh) (submittedVersion)
- Archivio Istituzionale della Ricerca (Universita Degli Studi Di Milano) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Funders
- Università degli Studi di Milano
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › History and Theory of Mathematics
- Keywords
- infinite past, William Lane Craig, infinite regress, origin of the universe, metaphysics of time
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