Cited by 16Indian and Buddhist StudiesPhilosophical Ethics and TheoryStudy and Philosophy of Religion

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 66 of the 68 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; none of the 55 sources its claims cite is checked for support yet.

Buddhism as Reductionism: Personal Identity and Ethics in Parfitian Readings of Buddhist Philosophy; from Steven Collins to the Present

Open access
Hanner, Oren·2018·Sophia

Abstract

Derek Parfit’s early work on the metaphysics of persons has had a vast influence on Western philosophical debates about the nature of personal identity and moral theory. Within the study of Buddhism, it also has sparked a continuous comparative discourse, which seeks to explicate Buddhist philosophical principles in light of Parfit’s conceptual framework. Examining important Parfitian-inspired studies of Buddhist philosophy, this article points out various ways in which a Parfitian lens shaped, often implicitly, contemporary understandings of the anātman (no-self) doctrine and its relation to Buddhist ethics. I discuss in particular three dominant elements appropriated by Parfitian-inspired scholarship: Parfit’s theoretical categories; philosophical problems raised by his reductionist theory of persons; and Parfit’s argumentative style. I argue that the three elements used in this scholarship constitute different facets of one methodological approach to cross-cultural philosophy, which relies on Western terminology and conceptual schemes to establish a conversation with non-Western philosophy. I suggest that while this methodology is fruitful in many ways, philosophy as a cosmopolitan space may benefit significantly from approaching Buddhist philosophy using its own categories and terminology.

Overview

AI snapshot

Written from the paper’s full text.

TL;DR

Hanner argues that Derek Parfit’s reductionist account of persons has strongly and often implicitly shaped late-20th- and early-21st-century Western interpretations of the Buddhist no-self doctrine and its ethical implications. The article surveys key Parfitian readings and contends that while such comparisons are productive, they risk subordinating Buddhist philosophy to Western categories, and it recommends greater use of Buddhist frameworks.

Key findings

  • The paper identifies three recurring Parfitian elements in Buddhist studies: Parfit’s theoretical categories (reductionism, eliminativism, non-reductionism), the philosophical problems raised by his reductionism and utilitarianism, and his argumentative style; these function as facets of one cross-cultural method.
  • It traces shifts among interpreters: Collins first compared Parfit’s qualitative identity and successive selves with Buddhist conventional persons and altruism, later qualifying that anātman is not fully reductionist because conventional truth remains necessary; Duerlinger extended reductionism to synchronic identity; Giles classified Buddhism as eliminativist; Siderits defined reductionism and eliminativism semantically and treated anātman as reductionist because person-discourse is useful and translatable.
  • Perrett used Śāntideva’s Bodhicaryāvatāra 8.90–103 to address obligations to future generations, while Siderits reconstructed a Buddhist reply to the alienation objection through ironic involvement and conventional persons.
  • Goodman’s Consequences of Compassion (2009) is said to be implicitly Parfitian in three ways: grounding ethics in anātman, emphasizing deconstruction of identity, and privileging ultimate truth; the author contrasts this with five Bodhicaryāvatāra verses (8.111, 8.112, 8.115, 8.117, 8.120) where Śāntideva uses conventional identity and habituation to justify altruism.

Methods

  • Conceptual and historical survey with philosophical argument, not an empirical study; it examines representative Parfitian-inspired scholarship from the 1980s onward, including Collins, Duerlinger, Giles, Siderits, Perrett, and Goodman.
  • Analysis focuses on how Western categories, problems, and argument forms are transferred into Buddhist exegesis, with close reading of selected Bodhicaryāvatāra verses as a counterexample to Goodman’s consequentialist reading.
  • Sources are primarily published books, articles, and translations; no dataset or formal coding is used.

Limitations

  • Stated: the survey is not exhaustive; sources were selected to highlight typical interpretive features; no work is treated in full; Parfit’s historical and thematic contexts are not elaborated; differences between Parfitian categories and Buddhist anātman are left beyond scope.
  • Evident: the argument is interpretive and selective, centered on a limited set of scholars and verses, so it cannot establish how widespread or uniform these Parfitian tendencies are; it also relies on English translations for the Śāntideva verses.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1007/s11841-018-0668-3

Cites

66 of 66 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

69 Own interpretation · 38 No basis given · 31 No full text of the sources · 22 Sources not found · 7 Not checked yet

Show all 44 claims

  • Probably not a substantial claim. 107
  • It may state two separate claims as one. 46
123 of 123
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Parfit's early work on personal identity has had a vast influence on Western philosophical debates about personal identity and moral theory.

    “Derek Parfit's early work on the metaphysics of persons has had a vast influence onWestern philosophical debates about the nature of personal identity and moral theory.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The works surveyed are representative of contemporary Parfitian-inspired scholarship on Buddhism.

    “Examining important Parfitian-inspired studies of Buddhist philosophy, this article points out various ways in which a Parfitian lens shaped, often implicitly, contemporary understandings of the anātman (no-self) doctrine and its relation to Buddhist ethics.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Parfit's reductionist theory and the Buddhist anātman doctrine are sufficiently comparable for the comparison to be philosophically fruitful.

    “While I am sympathetic to the analogies between Parfit's reductionist theory and Buddhist philosophy, my intention in what follows is to explore the ways in which the Parfitian perspective shapes, often implicitly, contemporary philosophical understandings of the doctrine of anātman (noself) and, specifically, this doctrine's relation to Buddhist moral theory.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Parfitian categories are Western theoretical categories external to Buddhist texts.

    “In Parfitian-inspired readings, the anātman doctrine, understood as a form of reductionism, has been used for such cross-cultural endeavors, thereby adding a second layer (alongside the Western theoretical categories) to the method of explicating Buddhist views in reference to Western conceptual frameworks.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    There is an autonomous and authentic Buddhist viewpoint that a cross-cultural method may or may not permit.

    “One question this technique poses, therefore, concerns the degree to which this cross-cultural method permits for an autonomous and authentic depiction of the Buddhist viewpoint.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The anātman doctrine has an original meaning that can be extended by Parfitian reductionism.

    “Goodman thus not only buttresses the nonrealist view of personal identity, but also extends the range of the original meaning of anātman, which now incorporates Parfit's reductionist understanding of personal identity.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The critical history of Indological scholarship is correct that seeking Western philosophical answers in Asian literature tends to introduce external agendas.

    “According to the critical history of Indological scholarship, the exercise of looking for answers to Western philosophical questions in Asian literature tends to involve the introduction of external agendas into the texts.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    On the ultimate level, there are no selves or persons.

    “Even though there are no selves or persons on the ultimate level, self and other exist according to conventional truth, and are conceptually distinct from one another.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    On the conventional level, self and other exist and are conceptually distinct.

    “Even though there are no selves or persons on the ultimate level, self and other exist according to conventional truth, and are conceptually distinct from one another.”
9 of 9

Citations

Cites

Show all 68 references

Research works printed but not linked: 3

  1. Bastow, D. (1986). Self-construction in Buddhism. Ratio, 28(2), 97–113.
  2. Parfit, D. (1984). Reasons and persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
  3. Taber, J. (2006). On borrowing from the Indian philosopher’s toolbox: Comments on mark Siderits, Personal Identity and Buddhist Philosophy. APA Newsletter on Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophy, 6(1), 7–12.

Cited by

Metadata

Authors
Hanner, O.
Affiliations
University of California, Berkeley (US)
Corresponding author
Hanner, Oren
Venue
Sophia
Published
2018-06
Volume
57
Issue
2
Pages
211-231
ISSN
  • 0038-1527 (ISSN-L)
  • 1873-930X
OpenAlex
W2887504914
Cited by
16
References
68
Citations by year
2024: 1 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 11 · 2020: 1
FWCI
39.26
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Sophia (publishedVersion)
  • PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
Funders
  • Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst
  • American Council of Learned Societies
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Religious studies › Indian and Buddhist Studies
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Study and Philosophy of Religion
Keywords
Derek Parfit, Buddhist philosophy, personal identity, reductionism, anatman, Buddhist ethics, metaphysics of the person, comparative philosophy, cosmopolitanism

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