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Mind Stuffed with Red Herrings: Why William James’ Critique of the Mind-Stuff Theory Does not Substantiate a Combination Problem for Panpsychism

Shani, Itay·2010·Acta Analytica
DOI 10.1007/s12136-010-0095-8
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Metadata

Authors
Shani, I.
Affiliations
University of Johannesburg (ZA)
Corresponding author
Shani, Itay
ORCID
Shani, Itay
Venue
Acta Analytica
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Published
2010-04-15
Volume
25
Issue
4
Pages
413-434
ISSN
  • 0353-5150 (ISSN-L)
  • 1874-6349
DOI
10.1007/s12136-010-0095-8
OpenAlex
W2119206120
Cited by
24
References
0
Citations by year
2025: 1 · 2021: 1 · 2019: 14 · 2017: 2 · 2016: 3 · 2015: 1 · 2014: 1 · 2012: 1
FWCI
0.42
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
Locations
Acta Analytica (publishedVersion)
Funders
Inyuvesi Yakwazulu-Natali
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
Keywords
William James, Principles of Psychology, panpsychism, combination problem, physicalism, consciousness, metaphysics of mind

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Mind Stuffed with Red Herrings: Why William James’ Critique of the Mind-Stuff Theory Does not Substantiate a Combination Problem for Panpsychism. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1007/s12136-010-0095-8
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Shani, I. (2010). Mind Stuffed with Red Herrings: Why William James’ Critique of the Mind-Stuff Theory Does not Substantiate a Combination Problem for Panpsychism. Acta Analytica. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-010-0095-8