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A Failure to "Do No Harm" — India's Aadhaar biometric ID program and its inability to protect privacy in relation to measures in Europe and the U.S.

Open access
Dixon, Pam · 2017 · Health and Technology

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 17 of the 17 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; none of the 68 sources its claims cite is checked for support yet.

Abstract

It is important that digital biometric identity systems be used by governments with a Do no Harm mandate, and the establishment of regulatory, enforcement and restorative frameworks ensuring data protection and privacy needs to transpire prior to the implementation of technological programs and services. However, when, and where large government bureaucracies are involved, the proper planning and execution of public service programs very often result in ungainly outcomes, and are often qualitatively not guaranteeable. Several important factors, such as the strength of the political and legal systems, may affect such cases as the implementation of a national digital identity system. Digital identity policy development, as well as technical deployment of biometric technologies and enrollment processes, may all differ markedly, and could depend in some part at least, on the overall economic development of the country in question, or political jurisdiction, among other factors. This article focuses on the Republic of India’s national digital biometric identity system, the Aadhaar , for its development, data protection and privacy policies, and impact. Two additional political jurisdictions, the European Union, and the United States are also situationally analyzed as they may be germane to data protection and privacy policies originated to safeguard biometric identities. Since biometrics are foundational elements in modern digital identity systems, expression of data protection policies that orient and direct how biometrics are to be utilized as unique identifiers are the focus of this analysis. As more of the world’s economies create and elaborate capacities, capabilities and functionalities within their respective digital ambits, it is not enough to simply install suitable digital identity technologies; much, much more - is durably required. For example, both vigorous and descriptive means of data protection should be well situated within any jurisdictionally relevant deployment area, prior to in-field deployment of digital identity technologies. Toxic mixes of knowledge insufficiencies, institutional naïveté, political tomfoolery, cloddish logical constructs, and bureaucratic expediency must never overrun fundamental protections for human autonomy, civil liberties, data protection, and privacy.

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

The paper argues that India’s Aadhaar biometric ID program was deployed before adequate privacy regulation, creating mission creep, coerced consent, and serious privacy and autonomy risks. It compares India with the EU and U.S. to show that the GDPR offers the strongest biometric protections, while U.S. protections are fragmented and incomplete.

Key findings

  • Aadhaar enrollment reached 97% of adult Indians and 67% of children by 2016, and the system later surpassed one billion enrollees; by 2016 it had become mandatory in many contexts and was expanding from subsidies into banking, health, scholarships, and other services.
  • The paper reports concrete exclusion/error rates in Aadhaar: 49% failure-to-match in Jharkhand and 37% in Rajasthan, meaning many holders could not be matched to receive benefits.
  • The Aadhaar Act and related Indian rules are described as lacking comprehensive privacy protections, while the proposed Privacy Bill of 2014 and earlier bills were not passed; the system also had reported security leakages, including a case involving the bank details of one million Aadhaar pension beneficiaries.
  • The paper contrasts this with the EU GDPR, which treats biometric data as sensitive and requires strong safeguards and often explicit consent, while the U.S. relies on a patchwork of sectoral and state rules, with Illinois BIPA identified as the strongest state biometric privacy law.

Methods

  • Comparative policy analysis of three jurisdictions: India, the European Union, and the United States.
  • Uses documentary and legal analysis of statutes, regulations, court decisions, policy reports, and government actions related to biometrics and privacy.
  • Main analytical lens is whether policies satisfy a “Do No Harm” standard, especially around consent, mission creep, and privacy-by-design.

Limitations

  • The paper does not report original empirical data collection or a primary dataset; its claims are based on legal and policy materials, so any limits of those source materials are not directly assessed in the text.
  • It is a cross-jurisdictional policy argument, so the findings are not framed as a causal evaluation of Aadhaar outcomes in a controlled study. *(evident from the text)*
  • The discussion emphasizes 2016–2017 legal and policy conditions; later developments are not covered. *(evident from the text)*

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1007/s12553-017-0202-6

Cites

17 of 17 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Figures

Fig. 1 Special processing requirements and biometrics: high risk processing requirements (These requirements will be applicable to processing of biometric data.) Source: International Association of Privacy Professionals
Fig. 1 Special processing requirements and biometrics: high risk processing requirements (These requirements will be applicable to processing of biometric data.) Source: International Association of Privacy ProfessionalsCC BY · PubMed Central

Verification

Claims the paper makes

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Citations

Cites

Show all 17 references

Research works printed but not linked: 15

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  2. Abdullah M, Alhijily S. Biometric in healthcare security system, face - Iris fusion system. Acad Res Int. 2011;3(1):11–9.
  3. Wang Y, Jiang X, Zhang D. Conference paper. Sixth International Conference on Graphic and Image Processing (ICGIP 2014).
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  5. Selinger E, Hartzog, W. Obscurity and privacy (May 21, 2014). Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Technology (Joseph Pitt & Ashley Shew, eds., 2014). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2439866 .
  6. Kaur P, Neeru N. A hybrid approach for secure biometric authentication using fusion of iris and ear. International Journal of Advanced Research in Computer Science and Software Engineering, Vol. 5, Issue 8 August 2015. Available at: http://ijarcsse.com/docs/papers/Volume_5/8_August2015/V5I8-0273.pdf .
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  8. Barnwal P. Curbing leakage in public programs with biometric identification systems: evidence from India’s fuel subsidies, 2015. PhD Thesis, Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs, New York. Available at: http://www.ldeo.columbia.edu/~avangeen/publications/documents/Barnwal%202015_%20PhD%20Disseration%20draftv2.pdf .
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  10. Greenleaf G. Global data privacy laws: 89 countries, and accelerating (February 6, 2012). Privacy Laws & Business International Report, Issue 115, Special Supplement, February 2012; Queen Mary School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 98/2012. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2000034 .
  11. Batch K. Summary of a workshop on the technology, policy, and cultural dimensions of biometric systems. National Academy Press, 2006-02-06.
  12. Refusal to Use Biometric Attendance System. The news international, Vol. 26, No. 54, April 26, 2016.
  13. Boersma K, van Brakel R, Fonio C, Wagenaar P. Histories of state surveillance in Europe and beyond, London: Routledge 2014. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2437990 . See pages 170–185. · DOI · Paper page
  14. Rubinstein Ira S. Privacy and regulatory innovation: moving beyond voluntary codes, 6 I/S A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society 356 (2011), available at http://www.is-journal.org/hotworks/rubinstein.php .
  15. Rubinstein Ira S. Regulating privacy by design (May 10, 2011). Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 26, 1409, 2012. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1837862 .

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Dixon, P.
Corresponding author
Dixon, Pam
Venue
Health and Technology
Published
2017-06-14
Volume
7
Issue
4
Pages
539-567
ISSN
  • 2190-7188 (ISSN-L)
  • 2190-7196
OpenAlex
W2625450490
Cited by
61
References
17
Citations by year
2026: 9 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 6 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 5 · 2021: 14 · 2020: 11 · 2019: 5 · 2018: 4
FWCI
56.03
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Health and Technology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Law › Digitalization, Law, and Regulation
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Privacy, Security, and Data Protection
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Signal Processing › Biometric Identification and Security
Keywords
Aadhaar, digital identity, data protection, privacy, do no harm principle, India, European Union, United States, biometric enrollment, civil liberties, government surveillance, privacy policies

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: A Failure to "Do No Harm" — India's Aadhaar biometric ID program and its inability to protect privacy in relation to measures in Europe and the U.S. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1007/s12553-017-0202-6
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Dixon, P. (2017). A Failure to "Do No Harm" — India's Aadhaar biometric ID program and its inability to protect privacy in relation to measures in Europe and the U.S. Health and Technology. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12553-017-0202-6

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