A Failure to "Do No Harm" — India's Aadhaar biometric ID program and its inability to protect privacy in relation to measures in Europe and the U.S.
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 17 of the 17 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; none of the 68 sources its claims cite is checked for support yet.
Abstract
It is important that digital biometric identity systems be used by governments with a Do no Harm mandate, and the establishment of regulatory, enforcement and restorative frameworks ensuring data protection and privacy needs to transpire prior to the implementation of technological programs and services. However, when, and where large government bureaucracies are involved, the proper planning and execution of public service programs very often result in ungainly outcomes, and are often qualitatively not guaranteeable. Several important factors, such as the strength of the political and legal systems, may affect such cases as the implementation of a national digital identity system. Digital identity policy development, as well as technical deployment of biometric technologies and enrollment processes, may all differ markedly, and could depend in some part at least, on the overall economic development of the country in question, or political jurisdiction, among other factors. This article focuses on the Republic of India’s national digital biometric identity system, the Aadhaar , for its development, data protection and privacy policies, and impact. Two additional political jurisdictions, the European Union, and the United States are also situationally analyzed as they may be germane to data protection and privacy policies originated to safeguard biometric identities. Since biometrics are foundational elements in modern digital identity systems, expression of data protection policies that orient and direct how biometrics are to be utilized as unique identifiers are the focus of this analysis. As more of the world’s economies create and elaborate capacities, capabilities and functionalities within their respective digital ambits, it is not enough to simply install suitable digital identity technologies; much, much more - is durably required. For example, both vigorous and descriptive means of data protection should be well situated within any jurisdictionally relevant deployment area, prior to in-field deployment of digital identity technologies. Toxic mixes of knowledge insufficiencies, institutional naïveté, political tomfoolery, cloddish logical constructs, and bureaucratic expediency must never overrun fundamental protections for human autonomy, civil liberties, data protection, and privacy.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
The paper argues that India’s Aadhaar biometric ID program was deployed before adequate privacy regulation, creating mission creep, coerced consent, and serious privacy and autonomy risks. It compares India with the EU and U.S. to show that the GDPR offers the strongest biometric protections, while U.S. protections are fragmented and incomplete.
Key findings
- Aadhaar enrollment reached 97% of adult Indians and 67% of children by 2016, and the system later surpassed one billion enrollees; by 2016 it had become mandatory in many contexts and was expanding from subsidies into banking, health, scholarships, and other services.
- The paper reports concrete exclusion/error rates in Aadhaar: 49% failure-to-match in Jharkhand and 37% in Rajasthan, meaning many holders could not be matched to receive benefits.
- The Aadhaar Act and related Indian rules are described as lacking comprehensive privacy protections, while the proposed Privacy Bill of 2014 and earlier bills were not passed; the system also had reported security leakages, including a case involving the bank details of one million Aadhaar pension beneficiaries.
- The paper contrasts this with the EU GDPR, which treats biometric data as sensitive and requires strong safeguards and often explicit consent, while the U.S. relies on a patchwork of sectoral and state rules, with Illinois BIPA identified as the strongest state biometric privacy law.
Methods
- Comparative policy analysis of three jurisdictions: India, the European Union, and the United States.
- Uses documentary and legal analysis of statutes, regulations, court decisions, policy reports, and government actions related to biometrics and privacy.
- Main analytical lens is whether policies satisfy a “Do No Harm” standard, especially around consent, mission creep, and privacy-by-design.
Limitations
- The paper does not report original empirical data collection or a primary dataset; its claims are based on legal and policy materials, so any limits of those source materials are not directly assessed in the text.
- It is a cross-jurisdictional policy argument, so the findings are not framed as a causal evaluation of Aadhaar outcomes in a controlled study. *(evident from the text)*
- The discussion emphasizes 2016–2017 legal and policy conditions; later developments are not covered. *(evident from the text)*
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Claims the paper makes
0 Valid · 10 Not valid · 57 Not checked · 46 Own results and interpretations
In the paper
“The Bill was passed as a “money bill,” instead of being debated by a Parliamentary panel.”
§ A Failure to “Do No Harm” -- India’s Aadhaar biometric ID program and its inability to protect privacy in relation to measures in Europe and the U.S. > India’s national digital biometric ID system and policies > Aadhaar policy in India
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites [49] Waghmode V. Aadhaar-linked attendance a must. The Times of India, June 29, 2016.
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Not matched
None of the sources cited for this claim could be matched to a paper in Crossref, so there is nothing to check it against.
In the paper
“Thus far, there is reasonable proof that the Aadhaar system has already had some security leakages that could be deemed to be of the inadvertent variety.”
§ A Failure to “Do No Harm” -- India’s Aadhaar biometric ID program and its inability to protect privacy in relation to measures in Europe and the U.S. > India’s national digital biometric ID system and policies > The Aadhaar identity system
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites [38] U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). Facial recognition technology: commercial uses, privacy issues, and applicable federal law, GAO-15-621. Washington, D.C.: U.S. GAO, July 30, 2015.
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Not matchedcites [22] Shah R. Is your sensitive data like Aadhaar, PAN card details safe with the government? DNA daily news and analysis, March 23, 2017. Available at: http://www.dnaindia.com/money/report-is-your-sensitive-data-like-aadhaar-pan-card-safe-with-the-government-2364851 .
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Not matched
In the paper
“the uses of the Aadhaar have expanded sizably, growing from a narrow subsidy program to one that includes banking, health, scholarships, and numerous public services.31”
§ A Failure to “Do No Harm” -- India’s Aadhaar biometric ID program and its inability to protect privacy in relation to measures in Europe and the U.S. > India’s national digital biometric ID system and policies
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites [31] Banerjee, SS. From cash to digital transfers in India: the story so far. CGAP Brief, Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), Washington, DC 2015 Available at: http://www.cgap.org/sites/default/files/Brief-From -Cash-to-Digital-Transfers-in-India-Feb-2015_0.pdf .
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Not matched
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The “failure to match” rate of 49% in Jharkhand means that 49% of Aadhaar holders in that state cannot be matched to their digital biometric identifier.”
§ A Failure to “Do No Harm” -- India’s Aadhaar biometric ID program and its inability to protect privacy in relation to measures in Europe and the U.S. > India’s national digital biometric ID system and policies > Aadhaar policy in India
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The Aadhaar Act as passed is not a comprehensive privacy bill for the Aadhaar system.”
§ A Failure to “Do No Harm” -- India’s Aadhaar biometric ID program and its inability to protect privacy in relation to measures in Europe and the U.S. > India’s national digital biometric ID system and policies > Aadhaar policy in India
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
47 more claims
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Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
The source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“And just like in the case of corporate identity management systems, moral argumentation aimed at justifying Aadhaar implementation is overshadowed by numerous data breaches, instances of data abuse, and function creep that effectively undermine the validity of this justification (Dixon 2017).”
From Sovereignty, privacy, and ethics in blockchain-based identity management systems (2021) · cites this paper as Dixon 2017
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe cited source says what the claim attributes to it.
In the citing paper
“Dixon (2017), providing a timeline for the implementation of Aadhaar, points out that the system was effectively put in place in the absence of any connected regulatory and policy guidance.”
From Sovereignty, privacy, and ethics in blockchain-based identity management systems (2021) · cites this paper as Dixon (2017)
Citations
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Cited by
Design Choices for Central Bank Digital Currency: Policy and Technical Considerations
Allen, S., Čapkun, S., Eyal, I., Fanti, G. C., Ford, B., Grimmelmann, J., Juels, A., Kostiainen, K., Meiklejohn, S., Miller, A., et al. (2020) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w27634 · Cited by 210
“This use of biometrics for identity thus raises much more serious security and privacy concerns [110], [111], as the biometric template database becomes an incredibly attractive target for hackers and foreign state adversaries alike.”
BackgroundSchulz, K., Gstrein, O. J., & Zwitter, A. (2020) · Futures · doi:10.1016/j.futures.2020.102611 · Cited by 127
“…also challenge the setup of the system based on problems with the accuracy and reliability of the biometric data, the mandatory nature of the system which creates challenges for weak and sick people living in rural areas, as well as dangers for members of the transgender community (Dixon, 2017).”
Mir, U. B., Kar, A. K., Dwivedi, Y. K., Gupta, M. P., & Sharma, R. S. (2020) · Government Information Quarterly · doi:10.1016/j.giq.2019.101442 · Cited by 93
Shahin, S., & Zheng, P. (2018) · Social Science Computer Review · doi:10.1177/0894439318789343 · Cited by 69
“But “consent” itself is so vaguely defined that it has little practical value (Dixon, 2017).”
BackgroundThe impact of digital government on citizen well-being
Welby, B. (2019) · OECD working papers on public governance · doi:10.1787/24bac82f-en · Cited by 94
“…a backdrop of repeated criticism about vulnerabilities in the platform and an inadequate approach to information security the Indian government has so far failed to pass legislation which would establish protections for the data of its citizens (Anusha and Rajkumar, 2017[67]; Dixon, 2017[68]).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Dixon, P.
- Corresponding author
- Dixon, Pam
- Venue
- Health and Technology
- Published
- 2017-06-14
- Volume
- 7
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 539-567
- ISSN
- 2190-7188 (ISSN-L)
- 2190-7196
- PMC
- PMC5741784
- OpenAlex
- W2625450490
- Semantic Scholar
- 600829a4c8633775589c9d79a07d867fd1f79e5b
- Cited by
- 61
- References
- 17
- Citations by year
- 2026: 9 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 6 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 5 · 2021: 14 · 2020: 11 · 2019: 5 · 2018: 4
- FWCI
- 56.03
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Locations
- Health and Technology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Law › Digitalization, Law, and Regulation
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Privacy, Security, and Data Protection
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Signal Processing › Biometric Identification and Security
- Keywords
- Aadhaar, digital identity, data protection, privacy, do no harm principle, India, European Union, United States, biometric enrollment, civil liberties, government surveillance, privacy policies
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