The DOI matches its Crossref record; 159 of the 159 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 3 of the 93 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Moral Philosophy and the ‘Ethical Turn’ in Anthropology
Open accessAbstract
Moral philosophy continues to be enriched by an ongoing empirical turn, mainly through contributions from neuroscience, biology, and psychology. Thus far, cultural anthropology has largely been missing. A recent and rapidly growing ‘ethical turn’ within cultural anthropology now explicitly and systematically studies morality. This research report aims to introduce to an audience in moral philosophy several notable works within the ethical turn. It does so by critically discussing the ethical turn’s contributions to four topics: the definition of morality, the nature of moral change and progress, the truth of moral relativism, and attempts to debunk morality. The ethical turn uncovers a richer picture of moral phenomena on the intersubjective level, one akin to a virtue theoretic focus on moral character, with striking similarities of moral phenomena across cultures. Perennial debates are not settled but the ethical turn strengthens moral philosophy’s empirical turn and it rewards serious attention from philosophers.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
This research report introduces moral philosophy audiences to anthropology’s “ethical turn,” a descriptive and rapidly growing subfield that studies morality through ethnography. It argues the ethical turn enriches debates about defining morality, moral change and progress, moral relativism, and debunking, while cautioning that its definitions are broad and its evidence often piecemeal.
Key findings
- The ethical turn is a descriptive, non-normative project that explicitly studies morality and ethics; it has become “the fastest growing subfield within anthropology” and challenges earlier Durkheimian and comparative-list approaches that treated morality as externally sanctioned rules or mere cross-cultural value inventories.
- The ethical turn defines morality in two main ways: a virtue-ethics/self-formation approach and an ordinary-interaction approach; these accounts uncover a richer intersubjective picture of moral phenomena but risk being too inclusive, since they do not readily distinguish moral considerations from prudential, epistemic, or aesthetic norms.
- On moral change and progress, the reviewed literature offers mechanisms such as breakdown and rituals, self-accounting, and moral exemplars; conscious reflection appears as a condition for change, but the ethical turn does not fully explain why new criteria arise or how exemplars afford change beyond a society’s current values.
- On relativism and debunking, the paper argues that alleged descriptive ethical relativism is not well established by piecemeal ethnographic comparisons; apparent differences may reveal commonalities such as reflective freedom and intentionality, and the ethical turn supports criticism of artificial trolley-style dilemmas as unrepresentative of everyday ethics.
Methods
- Design: critical research report/review, not an empirical study; it introduces notable works in the anthropological ethical turn to an audience in moral philosophy.
- Data or sample: secondary literature—monographs, edited volumes, research articles, and ethnographies—rather than primary fieldwork or a systematic sample.
- Main analysis: conceptual and thematic discussion of four topics: the definition of morality, moral change and progress, moral relativism, and debunking arguments; it contrasts the ethical turn with earlier anthropological treatments of morality.
Limitations
- The paper states that interdisciplinary dialogue faces a shortage of common language and common problems, that piecemeal or pairwise cultural comparisons are not expedient for settling descriptive relativism, and that open questions remain about ethnographic methodology and inferences from ethnographic data to philosophical positions.
- The paper states or makes evident that the ethical turn’s definitions may err on the side of being too inclusive and that it offers no explicit answer to whether character formation is one area of morality or the exclusive area.
- Evident from the text: as a review, it presents a limited selection of works (“too many to mention but a limited selection here”) and does not provide primary data to adjudicate the philosophical debates it discusses.
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Claims the paper makes
3 Valid · 5 Not valid · 56 Not checked · 67 Own results and interpretations
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“Quantitative approaches based on ethnographic data, as carried out by Oliver Curry and collaborators (Curry 2016;Curry et al. 2018) are promising approaches to settle truth”
§ Moral Philosophy and the 'Ethical Turn' in Anthropology > 5 Moral relativism
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Curry 2016 source
- Partly supportedcites Curry et al. 2018 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Section 3.1, “The content of morality” (page unavailable), reports an analysis of ethnographic records from 60 societies bearing on whether cooperative moral values recur across cultures. But this paper reports that analysis as another study; its own Methods (sections 4.1.1 and 6.1, pages unavailable) describe questionnaire surveys in the UK and US, not an analysis of ethnographic data. It therefore supports the relevance of that approach but not the implication that this paper carried it out to settle descriptive relativism. (LLM, conf=0.87)
hedgedstates a possible cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“based on ethnographic data, as carried out by Oliver Curry and collaborators (Curry 2016;Curry et al. 2018) are promising approaches to settle truth of descriptive ethical relativism.”
§ Moral Philosophy and the 'Ethical Turn' in Anthropology > 5 Moral relativism
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Curry 2016 source
- Partly supportedcites Curry et al. 2018 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Section 3.1, “The content of morality” (page unavailable), reports that an analysis of ethnographic records from 60 societies found broadly shared positive moral judgments. But this questionnaire paper reports that analysis as a separate Curry et al. (2019) study; it did not itself carry out the ethnographic analysis. The description of the approach as promising for settling descriptive ethical relativism is the citing authors’ assessment, not a finding this source states. (LLM, conf=0.84)
hedgedstates a possible cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
None of the sources cited for this claim could be matched to a paper in Crossref, so there is nothing to check it against.
In the paper
“and that ethical questions are central in human lives, across cultural borders ( cf. Laidlaw 2014; Lambek 2010a):”
§ Moral Philosophy and the 'Ethical Turn' in Anthropology > 1 Introduction
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites Laidlaw 2014
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Not matchedcites Lambek 2010a
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
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- Not matched
A claim is checked only against the cited paper’s full text, never its abstract, and none is available for its sources.
In the paper
“Thus far, cultural anthropology has largely been missing.”
- Also stated in: § 1 Introduction · plain
“Cultural anthropology, however, and the desired thick accounts of inter-individual moral experience and behaviour are still missing.”
§ Moral Philosophy and the 'Ethical Turn' in Anthropology > Abstract
What the sources say
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Also stated in: § 1 Introduction · plain
None of the sources cited for this claim could be matched to a paper in Crossref, so there is nothing to check it against.
In the paper
“A recent and rapidly growing 'ethical turn' within cultural anthropology now explicitly and systematically studies morality.”
§ Moral Philosophy and the 'Ethical Turn' in Anthropology > Abstract
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites Lambek 2010a
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Not matchedcites Fassin 2014
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Not matched
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Citations
Cites
The weirdest people in the world?
Henrich, J., Heine, S. J., & Norenzayan, A. (2010) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x0999152x · Cited by 12,641
The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.
Haidt, J. (2001) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.108.4.814 · Cited by 8,048 · cited 1×
“Finally, moral anthropology promises to enrich the recent debate about debunking arguments in moral philosophy (cf. Sauer 2018; e.g. Greene 2008; Klenk 2018a; Haidt 2001).”
BackgroundEthics: Inventing Right and Wrong.
Feldman, F., & Mackie, J. L. (1979) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2184791 · Cited by 5,079 · cited 1×
“Mackie’s influential argument from relativity exemplifies the uncritical acceptance of descriptive relativism (Mackie 1977 emphasis added): The argument from relativity has as its premise the well-known variation in moral codes from one society to another and from one period to another, and also…”
BackgroundWEIRD languages have misled us, too
Majid, A., & Levinson, S. C. (2010) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x1000018x · Cited by 4,076
Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject
ISMAIL, S. (2006) · American Anthropologist · doi:10.1525/aa.2006.108.3.603 · Cited by 4,074
The geography of thought : how Asians and Westerners think differently--and why
Nisbett, R. E. (2003) · Cited by 3,750
After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory
Burrell, D. B., & MacIntyre, A. (1984) · Journal of Law and Religion · doi:10.2307/1051043 · Cited by 3,573
38. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory
MacIntyre, A. (2016) · Essays and Reviews · doi:10.1515/9781400848393-039 · Cited by 3,326
Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity
Asad, T. (2020) · doi:10.1515/9780804783095 · Cited by 3,313 · cited 2×
“…(2007) influence on the ethical turn, the ‘Western’ concept of freedom is taken to be the absence of external constraints on acting, whereas many have observed that some people wilfully and happily accepts such constraints in their lifes, for example by veiling (cf. Asad 2003; Abu-Lughod 2000).”
Background(2005) · Project Muse (Johns Hopkins University) · Cited by 2,795
Research works printed but not linked: 17
- Brandt, Richard. 1954. Hopi ethics. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Henrich, Joseph. 2017. The secret of our success. How culture ist driving human evolution, domesticating our species and making us smarter. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Howell, Signe (ed.). 1997b. The ethnography of moralities. London: Routledge.
- Humphrey, Caroline. 1997. Examplars and rules: Aspects of the discourse of moralities in Mongolia. In The ethnography of moralities, ed. Signe Howell, 25–47. London: Routledge.
- Ladd, John. 1957. The structure of a moral code. Navajo ethics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Lambek, Michael. 2010c. Toward an Ethics of the Act. In Ordinary ethics: Anthropology, language, and action, ed. Michael Lambek, 39–63. New York, NY: Fordham University Press.
- Lambek, Michael, Veena Das, Didier Fassin, and Webb Keane (eds.). 2015. Four Lectures on Ethics. Anthropological Perspectives. Masterclass. Chicago, IL: HAU.
- Edel, May Mandelbaum, and Abraham Edel. 1959. Anthropology & ethics. The quest for moral understanding. New Brunswick, N.J: Transaction Publishers.
- Morris, Ian. 2015. Foragers, Farmers, and Fossil Fuels. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Parkin, David. 1986. Introduction. In The anthropology of evil, ed. David Parkin, 1–21. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Robbins, Joel. 2014. Deontology and consequentialism. In Moral anthropology: A critical reader, ed. Didier Fassin and Samuel Lézé, 118–123. London: Routledge.
- Sidnell, Jack. 2010. The Ordinary Ethics of Everyday Talk. In Ordinary ethics: Anthropology, language, and action, ed. Michael Lambek, 123–139. New York, NY: Fordham University Press.
- Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter (ed.). 2008. Moral Psychology. The Cognitive Science of Morality: Intuition and Diversity. Volume 2. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
- Westermarck, Edward. 1897. Normative und psychologische Ethik. In Dritter internationaler Congress für Psychologie, 429–431. Munich: J.F. Lehmann.
- Westermarck, Edward. 1932. Ethical relativity. Westport, CN: Greenwood Press.
- Williams, F. E. 1930. Orokaiva Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Wong, David B. 1986. Moral relativity. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Cited by
How Do Technological Artefacts Embody Moral Values?
Klenk, M. (2020) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-020-00401-y · Cited by 105
“Anthropologists have recently taken what they claim to be an ‘ ethical turn ’ and begun to systematically investigate the nature of morality (cf. Klenk 2019 for an overview).”
BackgroundSelf-citationWhat makes a “good” forensic anthropologist?
Marten, M. G., Winburn, A. P., Burgen, B. R., Seymour, S. K., & Walkup, T. (2023) · American Anthropologist · doi:10.1111/aman.13874 · Cited by 13
Skakun, I. (2022) · Futurity Philosophy. · doi:10.57125/fp.2022.12.30.04 · Cited by 13
Recent Work on Moral Revolutions
Klenk, M., O’Neill, E., Arora, C., Blunden, C., Eriksen, C. L., Frank, L. E., & Hopster, J. K. G. (2022) · Analysis · doi:10.1093/analys/anac017 · Cited by 12
Self-citationInterdisciplinary Value Theory
Steinert, S. (2023) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-10733-7 · Cited by 9
Metadata
- Authors
- Klenk, M.
- Affiliations
- Delft University of Technology (NL)
- Corresponding author
- Klenk, Michael
- ORCID
- Klenk, Michael
- Venue
- Zeitschrift für Ethik und Moralphilosophie
- Published
- 2019-08-01
- Volume
- 2
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 331-353
- ISSN
- 2522-0063 (ISSN-L)
- 2522-0071
- OpenAlex
- W2964483581
- Cited by
- 59
- References
- 158
- Citations by year
- 2026: 19 · 2025: 11 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 10 · 2022: 9 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 3 · 2019: 1
- FWCI
- 24.59
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (tdm)
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (vor)
- Locations
- Zeitschrift für Ethik und Moralphilosophie (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- Research Repository (Delft University of Technology) (submittedVersion)
- Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Funders
- Delft University of Technology
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Social Sciences › Anthropology › Anthropological Studies and Insights
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
- Keywords
- ethical turn, cultural anthropology, ethics, definition of morality, moral change, moral progress, moral relativism, moral character, virtue ethics, intersubjectivity
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