Explainable machine learning practices: opening another black box for reliable medical AI
Open accessAbstract
In the past few years, machine learning (ML) tools have been implemented with success in the medical context. However, several practitioners have raised concerns about the lack of transparency—at the algorithmic level—of many of these tools; and solutions from the field of explainable AI (XAI) have been seen as a way to open the ‘black box’ and make the tools more trustworthy. Recently, Alex London has argued that in the medical context we do not need machine learning tools to be interpretable at the algorithmic level to make them trustworthy, as long as they meet some strict empirical desiderata. In this paper, we analyse and develop London’s position. In particular, we make two claims. First, we claim that London’s solution to the problem of trust can potentially address another problem, which is how to evaluate the reliability of ML tools in medicine for regulatory purposes. Second, we claim that to deal with this problem, we need to develop London’s views by shifting the focus from the opacity of algorithmic details to the opacity of the way in which ML tools are trained and built. We claim that to regulate AI tools and evaluate their reliability, agencies need an explanation of how ML tools have been built, which requires documenting and justifying the technical choices that practitioners have made in designing such tools. This is because different algorithmic designs may lead to different outcomes, and to the realization of different purposes. However, given that technical choices underlying algorithmic design are shaped by value-laden considerations, opening the black box of the design process means also making transparent and motivating (technical and ethical) values and preferences behind such choices. Using tools from philosophy of technology and philosophy of science, we elaborate a framework showing how an explanation of the training processes of ML tools in medicine should look like.
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It is unclear whether making AI explainable will satisfy non-experts because considerable expertise in computer science and/or data analytics may be required to understand what is being explained.
“it is unclear whether making AI explainable will satisfy non-experts because considerable expertise in computer science and/or data analytics may be required to understand what is being explained [120, 186].”
From The ethics of using artificial intelligence in scientific research: new guidance needed for a new tool (2025) · cites this paper as [186]
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References 32 · Cited by 61
Research works printed but not linked: 8
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- Authors
- Ratti, E., & Graves, M.
- Affiliations
- Johannes Kepler University of Linz (AT)
- Corresponding author
- Ratti, Emanuele
- Venue
- AI and Ethics
- Published
- 2022-02-15
- Volume
- 2
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 801-814
- ISSN
- 2730-5953 (ISSN-L)
- 2730-5961
- OpenAlex
- W4213139361
- Cited by
- 61
- References
- 32
- Citations by year
- 2026: 9 · 2025: 20 · 2024: 13 · 2023: 12 · 2022: 7
- FWCI
- 4.28
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Locations
- AI and Ethics (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PhilSci-Archive (University of Pittsburgh) (acceptedVersion)
- University Library Linz repository (Johannes Kepler Universitat Linz) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Bristol Research (University of Bristol) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Funders
- Johannes Kepler University Linz
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI)
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
- Health Sciences › Medicine › Health Informatics › Artificial Intelligence in Healthcare and Education
- Keywords
- explainable AI, artificial intelligence in healthcare, algorithmic transparency, trust in AI, algorithmic opacity, AI regulation, reliability analysis, philosophy of technology, philosophy of science
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