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Democracy, epistemic agency, and AI: political epistemology in times of artificial intelligence

Open access
Coeckelbergh, Mark · 2023 · AI and Ethics

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 48 of the 48 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 5 of the 21 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Abstract

Abstract Democratic theories assume that citizens have some form of political knowledge in order to vote for representatives or to directly engage in democratic deliberation and participation. However, apart from widespread attention to the phenomenon of fake news and misinformation, less attention has been paid to how they are supposed to acquire that knowledge in contexts shaped by artificial intelligence and related digital technologies. While this topic can also be approached from an empirical angle, this paper contributes to supporting concerns about AI and democracy by looking at the issue through the lens of political epistemology, in particular using the concept of epistemic agency. It argues that artificial intelligence (AI) endangers democracy since it risks to diminish the epistemic agency of citizens and thereby undermine the relevant kind of political agency in democracy. It shows that next to fake news and manipulation by means of AI analysis of big data, epistemic bubbles and the defaulting of statistical knowledge endanger the epistemic agency of citizens when they form and wish to revise their political beliefs. AI risks to undermine trust in one’s own epistemic capacities and hinder the exercise of those capacities. If we want to protect the knowledge basis of our democracies, we must address these problems in education and technology policy.

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

The paper argues that AI—especially machine learning in social media—threatens democracy by diminishing citizens’ epistemic agency, their control over forming and revising political beliefs. It analyzes fake news, manipulation, epistemic bubbles, and the defaulting of statistical knowledge, and recommends education and technology regulation to protect democracy.

Key findings

  • AI can undermine epistemic agency by eroding trust in one’s own epistemic capacities: fake news and deepfakes make citizens doubt their ability to distinguish truth from falsehood, opening the door to technocracy and totalitarianism. The paper cites a 2019 altered video of Nancy Pelosi that was debunked but shared on Facebook and then Twitter by Donald Trump, receiving millions of views.
  • AI-based micro-targeting can directly manipulate political beliefs. The paper cites Cambridge Analytica, where Facebook user data were used by the Trump presidential campaign in 2016 to target voters by personality type, and AI automatically tested thousands of variations of an ad before deciding which one to place.
  • Non-intended effects also reduce epistemic agency: recommender and search algorithms create epistemic bubbles/filter bubbles that reduce exposure to opposing views and make belief revision harder; AI also defaults statistical/correlational knowledge over causal scientific evidence, illustrated by an adapted thought experiment about Claire, raised in a white supremacist environment, who may be prevented from revising her belief by AI-provided statistics.
  • The paper recommends education about statistics and its limitations, critical reasoning, and epistemic virtues; regulation of AI developers and Big Tech; democratic governance of AI; possible epistemic rights; and global governance, since current institutions are insufficiently supranational.

Methods

  • Conceptual/philosophical paper in political epistemology; no empirical data collection or sample. It focuses on AI in the sense of machine learning algorithms used in digital social media and on the Internet.
  • Main analysis uses the concept of epistemic agency to build conceptual arguments and justifications about AI, knowledge, and democracy, drawing on examples such as Pizzagate, Cambridge Analytica, the Pelosi deepfake, and claims about China and Myanmar, plus an adapted thought experiment from Bondy.
  • The paper derives normative policy recommendations from this conceptual analysis rather than from empirical testing.

Limitations

  • The paper states it is limited to offering conceptual arguments and justifications based on epistemic agency; it acknowledges that empirical reality is more complex, that epistemic agency was already under attack before AI, and that AI might also have good effects on democracy, though that is not its topic.
  • The paper states its argument relies on “if” and “in so far” qualifications—for example, that epistemic bubbles are created and effective—and notes empirical criticisms that the echo chamber is overstated and that depolarization tendencies have been observed.
  • Evident from the text: there is no empirical measurement or testing; examples are illustrative and sometimes anecdotal; the Claire case is a thought experiment; and the causal claims about AI’s effects on epistemic agency are not systematically tested.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1007/s43681-022-00239-4

Cites

48 of 48 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

5 Valid · 1 Not valid · 12 Not checked · 69 Own results and interpretations

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Citations

Cites

Show all 48 references

Research works printed but not linked: 6

  1. Anders, G.: On promethean shame. In: Müller, C.J. (ed.) Prometheanism, pp. 29–95. Rowman & Littlefield, London (2016)
  2. Arendt, H. 1951/2017. The Origins of Totalitarianism. London: Penguin
  3. Bergamini, D.: Need for democratic governance of artificial intelligence. Council of Europe, Strasbourg (2020)
  4. Berlin, I.: Two concepts of liberty. In: Berlin, I. (ed.) The proper study of mankind, pp. 191–242. Chatto & Windus, London (1997)
  5. O’Neil, C.: Weapons of math destruction. How big data increases inequality and threatens democracy. The Crown Publishing Group, New York (2016)
  6. Palumbo, A.: Epistemic turn or democratic U-turn? on the tension between philosophical reasoning and political action in deliberative democracy. Teor. Polit. 2, 269–291 (2012)

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Coeckelbergh, M.
Affiliations
University of Vienna (AT)
Corresponding author
Coeckelbergh, Mark
Venue
AI and Ethics
Published
2022-11-22
Volume
3
Issue
4
Pages
1341-1350
ISSN
  • 2730-5953 (ISSN-L)
  • 2730-5961
OpenAlex
W4309712795
Cited by
115
References
46
Citations by year
2026: 48 · 2025: 40 · 2024: 18 · 2023: 9
FWCI
19.40
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • AI and Ethics (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Funders
University of Vienna
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Misinformation and Its Impacts
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Political Theory and Democracy
Keywords
artificial intelligence, democracy, epistemic agency, political epistemology, political knowledge, fake news, misinformation, epistemic bubbles, political agency, technology policy

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Democracy, epistemic agency, and AI: political epistemology in times of artificial intelligence. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1007/s43681-022-00239-4
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Coeckelbergh, M. (2023). Democracy, epistemic agency, and AI: political epistemology in times of artificial intelligence. AI and Ethics. https://doi.org/10.1007/s43681-022-00239-4

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

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