The first compliance cycle of China's National Emissions Trading Scheme: insights and implications
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 20 of the 20 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 6 of the 40 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Abstract
Abstract China’s national Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), the largest ETS in terms of the amount of CO 2 regulated, was launched on the trading platform operated by the Shanghai Environment and Energy Exchange (SEEE) on July 16th 2021, and has successfully completed its first compliance cycle on December 30th, 2021. During the operation of its first cycle, China’s national ETS differs from other international ETSs in many aspects, including trading products and participants, allowance allocation method, compliance term, and offset mechanism, leading to certain unique trading patterns. Some unique settings are worth noticing including key emitters dominated by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) who also dominate transactions, large-scale power groups’ carbon strategies, allowances for 2 years of 2019 and 2020 being processed in one compliance period and allowed inter-year banking of allowances. All these have led to trading patterns characterized by cyclical demand-driven trading, insufficient trading capabilities of regulated entities, stable allowance price and an increased price of CCER. Nonetheless, the successful running of its first compliance cycle offers invaluable experience for future ETS development in operational mechanism improvement, sector coverage expansion, allocation optimization, and introduction of different types of market players and tradable products, and provides a good reference for future international expansion.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
China’s national ETS completed its first compliance cycle from July 16 to December 30, 2021, with 178.79 million tonnes of CEAs traded, 7.66 billion yuan (1.20 billion dollars) in value, and a 99.5% compliance rate. The cycle showed compliance-driven periodic trading, a “smiling-curve” carbon price, and unique features including power-sector-only coverage, free allocation, two-year allowances, and CCER offsetting.
Key findings
- The first compliance cycle lasted 114 trading days and recorded a cumulative transaction volume of 178.79 million tonnes of Chinese Emission Allowances (CEAs), totaling 7.66 billion yuan (1.20 billion dollars), with a 99.5% compliance rate. The closing price was 54.22 yuan (8.50 dollars)/tonne, up 13% and 5.84% compared to the opening price and first-day closing price, respectively.
- The market covered 2,162 key compliance entities from the power generation sector; over 90% participated for the first time, and only 186 had been regulated in pilot carbon markets before. More than 50% of regulated companies engaged in either CEA or CCER trades, and firms used more than 32 million tonnes of CCER for settlement offset, totaling over 900 million yuan (141.16 million dollars).
- Trading was concentrated near the surrender deadline: July–October total transaction amount was around 20.2 million tonnes with average daily turnover under 300,000 t; November average daily volume exceeded 1 million tonnes and monthly volume exceeded 23 million tonnes; December average daily volume exceeded 5.8 million tonnes and total volume reached 136 million tonnes. The price followed a “smiling curve,” with the highest at 62.29 yuan (9.77 dollars)/tonne on December 30, the lowest at 38.5 yuan (6.04 dollars)/tonne on October 27, and an average trading price of 42.85 yuan (6.72 dollars)/tonne.
- The compliance gap was 0.5% of verified allowances, or 43.4 million tonnes of CEAs equivalently. Shandong and Jiangsu each had more than 200 regulated companies, together about one-fourth of the national total, while Hainan had only seven; Hainan became the first province to achieve 100% compliance, and China Huadian Corporation was the first corporation group to achieve group-level allowance full compliance.
Methods
- This is a perspective/descriptive analysis of the first compliance cycle of China’s national ETS, drawing on market performance data from the Shanghai Environment and Energy Exchange (SEEE), MEE notices, published enterprise lists, and media/agency reports.
- The sample covers the 114-day first compliance period from July 16 to December 30, 2021, 2,162 key power generation compliance entities, CEA spot trading, and CCER offset transactions.
- The main analysis is descriptive and trend-based, covering transaction volume, transaction distribution, carbon price formation, compliance rates, and offset use; no formal causal model or econometric analysis is reported.
Limitations
- Stated: as a new market, China’s national ETS covered only the power generation sector, traded only CEA spot, lacked variety in products and market participants, had inadequate market supervision, and did not include institutional investors or market makers in the first compliance cycle; the trading period from allowance issuance to surrender was relatively short and condensed.
- Evident: the paper is a perspective/descriptive account rather than a causal evaluation, and it does not test emission-reduction outcomes or counterfactuals.
- Evident: the analysis relies on exchange/MEE data and secondary reports, with no independent verification or robustness analysis described.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
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Claims the paper makes
2 Valid · 7 Not valid · 36 Not checked · 83 Own results and interpretations
The cited sources that could be checked couldn’t confirm or dispute this claim.
In the paper
“For example, the Shanghai pilot carbon market changed from completely free allocation to the partially paid allocation with a 1% ~ 7% 13 proportion being auctioned, depending on the compliance status.”
What the sources say
- Could not verifycites [13] Zhang H, Zhang R, Li G, Li W, Choi Y (2020a) Has China’s emission trading system achieved the development of a low-carbon economy in high-emission industrial subsectors? Sustainability 12:5370 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Our copy of Zhang et al. (2020, Sustainability) mentions Shanghai only as one of the seven pilot regions (Introduction, p. 1) and lists 'quota allocation methods' generically among ETS components (1. Introduction); it contains no statement about Shanghai moving from free to partially paid allocation or about a 1%~7% auction share tied to compliance status. Searches on 'Shanghai auction allocation proportion', '1% to 7% auctioned compliance', 'free allocation auction baseline', and 'Appendix A pilot ETS sectors' returned only reference-list entries, the research design (2.1), data (2.3), placebo (3.3) and implications (3.5) sections, none of which address auction share. The paper is a quasi-experimental impact evaluation, so this design detail is simply not in our copy; nothing contrary is stated either. (LLM, conf=0.70)
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In the paper
“all emission allowances were distributed to regulated companies by the government for free as determined by benchmarks.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“China's system determined its emission target based on the actual output levels and benchmarks, aiming to find a balance between industrial growth and emission reduction.”
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“totaling 7.66 billion yuan (1.20 billion dollars) 2 in value”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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A result the paper states — it cites no source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“trading of spot allowances was limited to the 2162 power generation companies in the first compliance cycle.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
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Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ 3.1 The market ran smoothly andorderly withreasonable price fluctuations
“The CEA's closing yield fell in the range of -2.91% to 4.08%, with an average yield of 0.02%.”
§ 2.2.3 The formation andtrend ofcarbon price
“a closing price of 54.22 yuan (8.50 dollars)/tonne on the last day of the first compliance cycle, which increased by 13% and 5.84% compared to the opening price and closing price on the first day, respectively.”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ 2.2.2 Transaction distribution
“the total trading volume reached 136 million tonnes, twice as much as the total of the previous 5 months.”
§ 2.2.1 Transaction activity
“with a cumulative trading volume of 178.79 million tonnes”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ 3.3 The total transaction volume achieved amilestone
“During the first compliance cycle, the CEA and CCER transaction volumes have reached 178.79 million”
§ 2 The first compliance cycle ofChina's national ETS 2.1 The large-scale market hasshown apromising start
“with a cumulative transaction volume of 178.79 million tonnes of Chinese Emission Allowances (CEAs)”
Citations
Cites
The European Union Emissions Trading System reduced CO 2 emissions despite low prices
Bayer, P., & Aklin, M. (2020) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1918128117 · Cited by 545
Emission reduction effect and carbon market efficiency of carbon emissions trading policy in China
Zhang, W., Li, J., Li, G., & Guo, S. (2020) · Energy · doi:10.1016/j.energy.2020.117117 · Cited by 497
Self-citationCO2 Prices, Energy and Weather
Mansanet-Bataller, M., Pardo, A., & Valor, E. (2007) · The Energy Journal · doi:10.5547/issn0195-6574-ej-vol28-no3-5 · Cited by 472 · cited 1×
“With regulated and non-regulated entities both participating in the market, Phase I of EU ETS (2005-2007) showed a diverted carbon price from marginal abatement cost [10] and was mainly affected by energy prices and weather conditions [11].”
BackgroundThe effectiveness of China’s regional carbon market pilots in reducing firm emissions
Cui, J., Wang, C., Zhang, J., & Zheng, Y. (2021) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2109912118 · Cited by 349
Carbon finance and carbon market in China: Progress and challenges
Zhou, K., & Li, Y. (2019) · Journal of Cleaner Production · doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2018.12.298 · Cited by 285 · cited 1×
“Other adjunct products and services, such as carbon funds, carbon trusts, carbon indices and carbon repurchase agreements, shall be explored to accurately match the financing or compliance demands of market participants and meet the needs of different types of participants [37].”
BackgroundReview of recent progress of emission trading policy in China
Huang, W., Wang, Q., Li, H., Fan, H., Qian, Y., & Klemeš, J. J. (2022) · Journal of Cleaner Production · doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2022.131480 · Cited by 238
Profiting from Regulation: Evidence from the European Carbon Market
Bushnell, J. B., Chong, H., & Mansur, E. T. (2013) · American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · doi:10.1257/pol.5.4.78 · Cited by 199
Zhang, Y.-J., Liang, T., Jin, Y.-L., & Shen, B. (2020) · Applied Energy · doi:10.1016/j.apenergy.2019.114290 · Cited by 194 · cited 1×
“Thus, the expectation on carbon market to both reduce emission and achieve green economic transition is high as it is considered to be a proper policy design to balance low-carbon transition promotion and economic development simultaneously [13, 14].”
BackgroundGovernance of CO2 markets: Lessons from the EU ETS
de Perthuis, C., & Trotignon, R. (2014) · Energy Policy · doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2014.05.033 · Cited by 147
Markets for Pollution Allowances: What Are the (New) Lessons?
Goulder, L. H. (2013) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.27.1.87 · Cited by 132
Research works printed but not linked: 4
- ICAP (2022) Emissions trading worldwide: status report 2022. International Carbon Action Partnership, Berlin
- Wang K, Li S, Lu M, Wang J, Wei Y (2022) Review and Prospect of China's carbon market (2022) (forecasting and prospects research report). CEEP-BIT
- Shi Y, Nie B, Wang L, Chen Y (2021) Research on building a unified market for carbon assets and carbon trading in the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area. Low Carbon World. https://doi.org/10.16844/j.cnki.cn10-1007/tk.2021.03.125 · doi:10.16844/j.cnki.cn10-1007/tk.2021.03.125
- Paris Agreement (2015) Paris agreement. In report of the conference of the parties to the United Nations framework convention on climate change
Cited by
Fang, L., Guo, Y., & Liu, B. (2024) · Journal of Cleaner Production · doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2024.141783 · Cited by 41
Yan, X., & He, T. (2024) · Energy Policy · doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2024.114261 · Cited by 28
Does china’s national carbon market function well? A perspective on effective market design
Zheng, Y., & Zhang, B. (2023) · Journal of Chinese Governance · doi:10.1080/23812346.2023.2214023 · Cited by 26
Ye, B., Pu, H., Song, Y., & Jiang, J. (2025) · Environmental Impact Assessment Review · doi:10.1016/j.eiar.2025.107804 · Cited by 17
Law, Y. K., & Fong, C. S. (2025) · World · doi:10.3390/world6020058 · Cited by 10
“Compliance rates reached 99.5% among 2162 power generation companies, reflecting the success of the regulatory framework [50,51].”
Influential
Metadata
- Authors
- Li, J., Yao, Y., & Wang, X.
- Corresponding author
- Li, Jin
- ORCID
- Li, Jin
- Venue
- Carbon Neutrality
- Published
- 2022-10-26
- Volume
- 1
- Issue
- 1
- ISSN
- 2731-3948 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4307462054
- Cited by
- 25
- References
- 19
- Citations by year
- 2026: 8 · 2025: 8 · 2024: 5 · 2023: 4
- FWCI
- 3.42
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- diamond
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (tdm)
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (vor)
- Locations
- Carbon Neutrality (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Climate Change Policy and Economics
- Physical Sciences › Energy › Renewable Energy, Sustainability and the Environment › Renewable energy and sustainable power systems
- Physical Sciences › Environmental Science › Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law › International Environmental Law and Policies
- Keywords
- emissions trading, allowance allocation, carbon credit prices, state-owned enterprises, allowance banking, trade patterns, carbon market design
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