The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Budget processes and commitment to fiscal discipline
Abstract
This paper develops a political-economy model of the budget process focusing on the common pool problem of the public budget. We show that the externality arising from the fact that public spending tends to be targeted at individual groups in society while the tax burden is widely dispersed creates a bias towards excessive expenditures and debt. This bias can be reduced by introducing elements of centralization in the budget process, that is, institutional structures that strengthen a comprehensive view of the budget over the particularistic view of the spending ministers and the members of parliament. Using examples from EC countries, we show how budget processes lack or possess such elements. We then present empirical evidence supporting the claim that centralizing elements reduce the deficit bias. The last section concludes with models for reform of the budget process.
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Cites
The Logic of Collective Action.
Golembiewski, R. T., & Olson, M. (1966) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.2307/2091298 · Cited by 11,364
Majoritarian Incentives, Pork Barrel Programs, and Procedural Control
Baron, D. P. (1991) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111438 · Cited by 223
Signalling Games in Political Science
Banks, J. T. (2013) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781315014777 · Cited by 141
Signaling Games in Political Science
Banks (2013) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9780203065990 · Cited by 97
Cited by
Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work
Giné, V. L., & Tsebelis, G. (2003) · Reis · doi:10.2307/40184562 · Cited by 3,359
Tax base variability and procyclical fiscal policy in developing countries
Talvi, E., & Végh, C. A. (2005) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2004.07.002 · Cited by 799
Kopits, G., Symansky, S., GKopits@imf.org, & SSymansky@imf.org (1998) · Occasional Papers · doi:10.5089/9781557757043.084 · Cited by 521
Tied to the mast? National fiscal rules in the European Union
Debrun, X., Moulin, L., Turrini, A., Ayuso-i-Casals, J., & Kumar, M. S. (2008) · Economic Policy · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0327.2008.00199.x · Cited by 477
On graduation from fiscal procyclicality
Frankel, J. A., Vegh, C. A., & Vuletin, G. (2013) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2012.07.001 · Cited by 448
Metadata
- Authors
- von Hagen, J., & Harden, I. J.
- Venue
- European Economic Review
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1995-04
- Volume
- 39
- Issue
- 3-4
- Pages
- 771-779
- ISSN
- 0014-2921 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3122160272
- Cited by
- 600
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 11.24
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- von Hagen, J., & Harden, I. J. (1995). Budget processes and commitment to fiscal discipline. European Economic Review. https://doi.org/10.1016/0014-2921(94)00084-d
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.