The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A monopolistic market for information
Open accessAbstract
We analyze a model where traders buy information from a monopolistic seller, which is subsequently used in a speculative market. In order to overcome the dilution in the value of information due to its leakage through informative prices, the seller of information may prefer to sell noisier versions of the information he actually has. Moreover, to obtain higher profits, it is desirable for the seller to sell different signals to different traders, so that the added noise realizations do not affect equilibrium prices. One way of doing so, which does not require discrimination, is to sell identically distributed personalized signals to each of a large number of traders.
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Citations
Cites
On the impossibility of informationally efficient markets
Stiglitz, J. E., & Grossman, S. J. (1980) · Columbia University · doi:10.7916/d8765r99 · Cited by 3,645
On the aggregation of information in competitive markets
Hellwig, M. F. (1980) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(80)90056-3 · Cited by 1,241
Information aggregation in a noisy rational expectations economy
Diamond, D. W., & Verrecchia, R. E. (1981) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(81)90026-x · Cited by 1,067
A Noisy Rational Expectations Equilibrium for Multi-Asset Securities Markets
Admati, A. R. (1985) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911659 · Cited by 778
Self-citationInformation Acquisition in a Noisy Rational Expectations Economy
Verrecchia, R. E. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913389 · Cited by 639
Fees Versus Royalties and the Private Value of a Patent
Kamien, M. I., & Tauman, Y. (1986) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885693 · Cited by 632
The law of large numbers with a continuum of IID random variables
Judd, K. L. (1985) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(85)90059-6 · Cited by 492
Delegated portfolio management
Bhattacharya, S., & Pfleiderer, P. (1985) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(85)90076-6 · Cited by 306
Self-citationViable allocations of information in financial markets
Admati, A. R., & Pfleiderer, P. (1987) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(87)90116-5 · Cited by 87
Self-citationGeneral equilibrium with information sales
Allen, B. (1986) · Theory and Decision · doi:10.1007/bf00134168 · Cited by 11
Cited by
Testing Asymmetric-Information Asset Pricing Models
Kelly, B., & Ljungqvist, A. (2012) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhr134 · Cited by 580
The market for information and the origin of financial intermediation
Allen, F. (1990) · Journal of Financial Intermediation · doi:10.1016/1042-9573(90)90006-2 · Cited by 412
Metadata
- Authors
- Admati, A. R., & Pfleiderer, P.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Theory
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1986-08
- Volume
- 39
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 400-438
- ISSN
- 0022-0531 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2013160208
- Cited by
- 317
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 5.23
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
