The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Introduction: Symposium on evolutionary game theory
Open accessAbstract
Interest in evolutionary game theory has recently increased dramatically. I present a brief overview of the subject and the symposium. An evolutionary model consists of a large population of myopic and unsophisticated players playing some game repeatedly through time. Strategies that are “good” replies to the distribution of actions chosen by the current population will be played by a larger fraction of the population in the next period. Thus, players learn from the experience of the population. Results on dynamics, convergence, and equilibrium concepts and their interpretation are discussed.
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Citations
Cites
Young, H. P. (1993) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2951778 · Cited by 2,399
Cited by
(2011) · SpringerReference · doi:10.1007/springerreference_60360 · Cited by 2,855
Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
Kandori, M., Mailath, G. J., & Rob, R. (1993) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2951777 · Cited by 2,044
Self-citationThe Contributions of the Economics of Information to Twentieth Century Economics
Stiglitz, J. E. (2000) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355300555015 · Cited by 1,469
Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics
Stiglitz, J. E. (2002) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/00028280260136363 · Cited by 1,455
On economic applications of evolutionary game theory
Friedman, D. (1998) · Journal of Evolutionary Economics · doi:10.1007/s001910050054 · Cited by 879
Metadata
- Authors
- Mailath, G. J.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Theory
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1992-08
- Volume
- 57
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 259-277
- ISSN
- 0022-0531 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2080158665
- Cited by
- 178
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 28.77
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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