The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A note on subsidizing gifts
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“Moreover, Coasian bargaining cannot overcome the externalities involved in direct redistribution of money to charities or family 1Kaplow 19952.”
From Is the Taxable Income Elasticity Sufficient to Calculate Deadweight Loss? The Implications of Evasion and Avoidance (2009) · cites this paper as Kaplow 1995
In the citing paper
“Avoidance strategies that are clearly legal can also be deterred by private transfer costs.The most important example is charitable contributions, for which the benefits to recipients may not be fully internalized by the donor, effectively creating a transfer cost 1Kaplow 19952.”
From Is the Taxable Income Elasticity Sufficient to Calculate Deadweight Loss? The Implications of Evasion and Avoidance (2009) · cites this paper as Kaplow 1995
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving
Andreoni, J. (1990) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2234133 · Cited by 5,825
Research works printed but not linked: 12
- Andreoni, 1988, Privately provided public goods in a large economy: The limits of altruism, Journal of Public Economics, 35, 57, 10.1016/0047-2727(88)90061-8 · DOI · Paper page
- Becker, 1974, A theory of social interactions, Journal of Political Economy, 82, 1063, 10.1086/260265 · DOI · Paper page
- Bernheim, 1988, Altruism within the family reconsidered: Do nice guys finish last?, American Economic Review, 78, 1034
- Bernheim, 1985, The strategic bequest motive, Journal of Political Economy, 93, 1045, 10.1086/261351 · DOI · Paper page
- 1993, Budget of the United States Government: Fiscal Year 1994
- Coase, 1960, The problem of social cost, Journal of Law and Economics, 3, 1, 10.1086/466560 · DOI · Paper page
- Cox, 1987, Motives for private income transfers, Journal of Political Economy, 95, 508, 10.1086/261470 · DOI · Paper page
- Friedman, 1988, Does altruism produce efficient outcomes? Marshall versus Kaldor, Journal of Legal Studies, 17, 1, 10.1086/468119 · doi:10.1086/468119
- Hochman, 1969, Pareto optimal redistribution, American Economic Review, 59, 542
- Hochman, 1977, The optimal tax treatment of charitable contributions, National Tax Journal, 30, 1, 10.1086/NTJ41862109 · doi:10.1086/ntj41862109
- Myerson, 1979, Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problem, Econometrica, 47, 61, 10.2307/1912346 · DOI · Paper page
- Stiglitz, 1977, Impact of recent developments in public finance theory on public policy decisions, American Economic Review, 67, 295
Cited by
The Myth of Ownership: Taxes and Justice
Murphy, L., & Nagel, T. (2002) · doi:10.1093/0195150163.001.0001 · Cited by 768
The Theory of Taxation and Public Economics
Kaplow, L. (2011) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781400839223 · Cited by 344
Self-citationChetty, R. (2009) · American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · doi:10.1257/pol.1.2.31 · Cited by 340
Bequest motives and the annuity puzzle
Lockwood, L. M. (2012) · Review of Economic Dynamics · doi:10.1016/j.red.2011.03.001 · Cited by 316
A theory of impact philanthropy
Duncan, B. (2004) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(03)00037-9 · Cited by 312
Metadata
- Authors
- Kaplow, L.
- Venue
- Journal of Public Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1995-11
- Volume
- 58
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 469-477
- ISSN
- 0047-2727
- Cited by
- 52
- References
- 1
- Language
- en
- Licence
- www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: A note on subsidizing gifts. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1016/0047-2727(95)01482-h
- The paper
- Kaplow, L. (1995). A note on subsidizing gifts. Journal of Public Economics. https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(95)01482-h
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.