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Cited by 1,128

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Do corporations award CEO stock options effectively?

Open access
Yermack, David·1995·Journal of Financial Economics
DOI 10.1016/0304-405x(95)00829-4
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Abstract

This paper analyzes stock option awards to CEOs of 792 U.S. public corporations between 1984 and 1991. Using a Black-Scholes approach, I test whether stock options' performance incentives have significant associations with explanatory variables related to agency cost reduction. Further tests examine whether the mix of compensation between stock options and cash pay can be explained by corporate liquidity, tax status, or earnings management. Results indicate that few agency or financial contracting theories have explanatory power for patterns of CEO stock option awards.

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Metadata

Authors
Yermack, D.
Venue
Journal of Financial Economics
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
1995-10
Volume
39
Issue
2-3
Pages
237-269
ISSN
0304-405X (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1016/0304-405x(95)00829-4
OpenAlex
W2088111862
Cited by
1,128
References
2
FWCI
45.95
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
hybrid

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Do corporations award CEO stock options effectively? https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1016/0304-405x(95)00829-4
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Yermack, D. (1995). Do corporations award CEO stock options effectively? Journal of Financial Economics. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(95)00829-4

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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.