Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies
Open accessThe claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, M-FOS far outperforms both policy-gradient learners and higher-order methods (LOLA, M-MAML), securing payoffs above mutual cooperation against all opponents and rediscovering Zero-Determinant extortion.
“In the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (Aumann, 1974), M-FOS far outperforms both policy-gradient learners and higher-order methods (LOLA, M-MAML), securing payoffs above mutual cooperation against all opponents and rediscovering Zero-Determinant extortion.”
From Open Challenges in Multi-Agent Security: Towards Secure Systems of Interacting AI Agents (2025) · cites this paper as Aumann, 1974
The citation is attached to “Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma,” rather than to the subsequent M-FOS performance claim. Our copy's examples discuss two-person non-zero-sum games and matching pennies, but the passages found when searching for the iterated or repeated Prisoner's Dilemma do not identify that game. The cited connection cannot be verified from our copy. (LLM, conf=0.76)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Cites
No references could be resolved yet.
Research works printed but not linked: 4
- Aumann, R.J., 1964, Mixed and behavior strategies in infinite extensive games, in: M. Dresher, L.S. Shapley and A.W. Tucker, eds., Advances in game theory (Princeton University Press, Princeton) 627-650.
- Kuhn, H.W., 1953, Extensive games and the problem of information, in: H.W. Kuhn and A.W. Tucker, eds., Contributions to the theory of games II (Princeton University Press, Princeton) 193-216.
- Savage, L.J., 1954, The foundations of statistics (John Wiley, New York).
- Von Neumann, J. and 0. Morgenstem, 1944, Theory of games and economic behavior (Princeton University Press, Princeton); 3rd ed., 1953.
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Evolution of the Social Contract
Skyrms, B. (2014) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139924825 · Cited by 743 · see citing works
Open Problems in Cooperative AI
Dafoe, A., Hughes, E., Bachrach, Y., Collins, T., McKee, K. R., Leibo, J. Z., Larson, K., & Graepel, T. (2020) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2012.08630 · Cited by 93 · see citing works
Multi-Agent Risks from Advanced AI
Hammond, L., Chan, A., Clifton, J., Hoelscher-Obermaier, J., Khan, A., McLean, E., Smith, C., Barfuss, W., Foerster, J., Gavenčiak, T., et al. (2025) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2502.14143 · Cited by 10 · see citing works
Normative Disagreement as a Challenge for Cooperative AI
Stastny, J., Riché, M., Lyzhov, A., Treutlein, J., Dafoe, A., & Clifton, J. (2021) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2111.13872 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Open Challenges in Multi-Agent Security: Towards Secure Systems of Interacting AI Agents
de Witt, C. S., Krawiecka, K., Krawczuk, I., Hagag, B., Anderson, W. L., Belcak, P., Bucknall, B., Cai, X., Chopra, A., Cohen, D., et al. (2025) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2505.02077 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
“In the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (Aumann, 1974), M-FOS far outperforms both policy-gradient learners and higher-order methods (LOLA, M-MAML), securing payoffs above mutual cooperation against all opponents and rediscovering Zero-Determinant extortion.”
- Authors
- Aumann, R. J.
- Affiliations
- Hebrew University of Jerusalem (IL)
- Corresponding author
- Aumann, Robert J.
- ORCID
- Aumann, Robert J.
- Venue
- Journal of Mathematical Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1974-03
- Volume
- 1
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 67-96
- ISSN
- 0304-4068 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2112794046
- Cited by
- 1,630
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 36 · 2025: 53 · 2024: 50 · 2023: 62 · 2022: 57 · 2021: 48 · 2020: 62 · 2019: 60 · 2018: 52 · 2017: 69 · 2016: 59 · 2015: 56 · 2014: 59 · 2013: 77 · 2012: 59
- FWCI
- 3.44
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- www.dklevine.com
- Locations
- Journal of Mathematical Economics (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Keywords
- subjectivity, correlation, randomized strategies, mixed strategies, subjective probability, correlated equilibrium, game theory
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
