Blocking defector invasion by focusing on the most successful partner
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The performance of the learned interaction mechanism in promoting cooperation is attributed to its ability to help populations form homogeneous strategic clusters.
“our findings suggest that the performance of the learned interaction mechanism in promoting cooperation is attributed to its ability to help populations form homogeneous strategic clusters.”
From Enhancing Cooperation through Selective Interaction and Long-term Experiences in Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (2024) · cites this paper as Szolnoki and Chen, 2020
The Results (pp. 6–8) show distinct strategic domains and report that selective cooperation can prevail over defection. But the Conclusion (p. 8) attributes that success to biased weakening at domain boundaries, which blocks defector invasion—not to helping populations form homogeneous strategic clusters. The paper also does not describe its investment rule as a learned interaction mechanism. (LLM, conf=0.82)
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Cites
Indirect reciprocity can stabilize cooperation without the second-order free rider problem
Panchanathan, K., & Boyd, R. (2004) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature02978 · Cited by 881 · see citing works
The evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods game with conditional peer exclusion
Quan, J., Li, X., & Wang, X. (2019) · Chaos An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science · doi:10.1063/1.5119395 · Cited by 53 · see citing works
Flagged first, then by citations
Research works printed but not linked: 5
- [2][2] M. Perc, A. Szolnoki, Coevolutionary games - a mini review, BioSystems 99 (2010) 109-125. -
- [3][3] K. Sigmund, The Calculus of Selfishness, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2010. -
- [4][4] A. Szolnoki, M. Mobilia, L.-L. Jiang, B. Szczesny, A. M. Rucklidge, M. Perc, Cyclic dominance in evolutionary games: a review, J. R. Soc. Interface 11 (2014) 20140735. -
- [10][10] K. Sigmund, C. Hauert, M. A. Nowak, Reward and Punishment, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 98 (2001) 10757-10762. -
- [43][43] X. Wang, Z. Zheng, F. Fu, Steering eco-evolutionary game dynamics with manifold control, Proc. R. Soc. A 476 (2020) 20190643. -
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Sorted by citations
Ren, T., & Zeng, X.-J. (2024) · Proceedings of the Thirty-ThirdInternational Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.24963/ijcai.2024/22 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
“Consistent with theoretical models [Szolnoki and Chen, 2020], our findings suggest that the performance of the learned interaction mechanism in promoting cooperation is attributed to its ability to help populations form homogeneous strategic clusters.”
Result
- Authors
- Szolnoki, A., & Chen, X.
- Affiliations
- Institute for Technical Physics and Materials Science (HU)
- University of Electronic Science and Technology of China (CN)
- Corresponding author
- Szolnoki, Attila
- Venue
- Applied Mathematics and Computation
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2020-11
- Volume
- 385
- Pages
- 125430
- ISSN
- 0096-3003 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3036443818
- Cited by
- 43
- References
- 2
- Citations by year
- 2025: 8 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 6 · 2022: 9 · 2021: 12 · 2020: 4
- FWCI
- 10.34
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- arxiv.org
- Locations
- Applied Mathematics and Computation (publishedVersion)
- Repository of the Academy's Library (Library of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences) (acceptedVersion)
- arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- arXiv (Cornell University)
- Funders
- National Natural Science Foundation of China
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
- Keywords
- spatial public goods game, cooperation, neighbor selection, investment allocation, synergy factor, blocking mechanism, interaction topology, evolutionary dynamics
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