Mentalizing and Marr: An information processing approach to the study of social cognition
Abstract
To interact successfully, individuals must not only recognize one another as intentional agents driven primarily by internal mental states, but also possess a system for making reliable and useful inferences about the nature of those beliefs, feelings, goals, and dispositions. The ability to make such mental state inferences (i.e., to mentalize or mindread) is the central accomplishment of human social cognition. The present article suggests that our understanding of how humans go about making mental state inferences will benefit from treating social cognition primarily as an information processing system that comprises a set of mechanisms for elaborating more basic social information into an understanding of another's mind. Following Marr's [Marr, D., 1982. Vision. W. H. Freeman, San Francisco, CA] framework for the study of such information processing systems, I suggest that questions about social cognition might profitably be asked at three levels--computation, algorithm, and implementation--and outline a number of ways in which a description of social cognition at the middle level (i.e., the step-by-step processes that give rise to mental state inferences) can be informed by analysis at the other two.
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These results are consistent with emerging views that social cognition is best thought of as a consortium of many mental processes, rather than the product of merely one or two.
“Finally, these results are consistent with emerging views that social cognition is best thought of as a consortium of many mental processes, rather than the product of merely 1 or 2 (Ames 2005;Malle 2005;Mitchell 2006; cf.Leslie et al. 2004).”
From Activity in Right Temporo-Parietal Junction is Not Selective for Theory-of-Mind (2008) · cites this paper as Mitchell 2006
Mentalizing about similar versus dissimilar others is associated with a distinct division of labor in medial prefrontal cortex: a dorsal aspect for dissimilar others and a more ventral aspect (vMPFC) for similar others.
“Specifically, a dorsal aspect of the medial prefrontal cortex has been associated with mentalizing about people perceived to be dissimilar from oneself, whereas a more ventral aspect of medial prefrontal cortex (vMPFC) has been linked to mentalizing about those perceived to be similar.”
From Repetition suppression of ventromedial prefrontal activity during judgments of self and others (2008) · cites this paper as [14]
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References 63 · Cited by 122
- Authors
- Mitchell, J. P.
- Affiliations
- Harvard University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Mitchell, Jason P.
- ORCID
- Mitchell, Jason P.
- Venue
- Brain Research
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2006-03
- Volume
- 1079
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 66-75
- ISSN
- 0006-8993 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2022993718
- Cited by
- 122
- References
- 63
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 6 · 2022: 6 · 2021: 7 · 2020: 6 · 2019: 9 · 2018: 5 · 2017: 5 · 2016: 1 · 2015: 6 · 2014: 12 · 2013: 9 · 2012: 11
- FWCI
- 1.42
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Brain Research (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Child and Animal Learning Development
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Action Observation and Synchronization
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Face Recognition and Perception
- Keywords
- mentalization, theory of mind, social cognition, information processing, Marr's levels of description, mental state inference, computational theory of mind, algorithms, implementation, intentional agents
- MeSH terms
- Electronic Data Processing, Cognition, Humans, Social Behavior, Social Perception
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