The DOI matches its Crossref record; 52 of the 52 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The psychology of meta-ethics: Exploring objectivism
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Citations
Cites
Schwartz, S. H. (1992) · Advances in Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/s0065-2601(08)60281-6 · Cited by 14,619
The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.
Haidt, J. (2001) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.108.4.814 · Cited by 8,048
Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong.
Feldman, F., & Mackie, J. L. (1979) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2184791 · Cited by 5,079
Handbook of socialization theory and research
Grusec, J. E., & Hastings, P. D. (2007) · Cited by 5,003
The Moral Judgment Of The Child
Piaget, J. (2013) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781315009681 · Cited by 4,372
Handbook of socialization: theory and research
(2007) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.45-0345 · Cited by 3,352
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy
Williams, B. (2006) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9780203969847 · Cited by 2,714
Cosmides, L. (1989) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/0010-0277(89)90023-1 · Cited by 2,471
When Morality Opposes Justice: Conservatives Have Moral Intuitions that Liberals may not Recognize
Haidt, J., & Graham, J. (2007) · Social Justice Research · doi:10.1007/s11211-007-0034-z · Cited by 2,385
Farber, M., & Ayer, A. J. (1938) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2180985 · Cited by 2,113
Cited by
The Theory of Dyadic Morality: Reinventing Moral Judgment by Redefining Harm
Schein, C., & Gray, K. (2018) · Personality and Social Psychology Review · doi:10.1177/1088868317698288 · Cited by 659
Political diversity will improve social psychological science
Duarte, J. L., Crawford, J. T., Stern, C., Haidt, J., Jussim, L., & Tetlock, P. E. (2015) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x14000430 · Cited by 563
The Psychology of Moral Conviction
Skitka, L. J. (2010) · Social and Personality Psychology Compass · doi:10.1111/j.1751-9004.2010.00254.x · Cited by 503
The Psychology of Moral Conviction
Skitka, L. J., Hanson, B. E., Morgan, G. S., & Wisneski, D. C. (2021) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-063020-030612 · Cited by 454
The myth of harmless wrongs in moral cognition: Automatic dyadic completion from sin to suffering.
Gray, K., Schein, C., & Ward, A. F. (2014) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: General · doi:10.1037/a0036149 · Cited by 309
Metadata
- Authors
- Goodwin, G. P., & Darley, J. M.
- Venue
- Cognition
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2008-03
- Volume
- 106
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 1339-1366
- ISSN
- 0010-0277 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2146415075
- Cited by
- 415
- References
- 52
- FWCI
- 2.47
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Goodwin, G. P., & Darley, J. M. (2008). The psychology of meta-ethics: Exploring objectivism. Cognition. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2007.06.007
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.