When children are better (or at least more open-minded) learners than adults: Developmental differences in learning the forms of causal relationships
Abstract
Children learn causal relationships quickly and make far-reaching causal inferences from what they observe. Acquiring abstract causal principles that allow generalization across different causal relationships could support these abilities. We examine children's ability to acquire abstract knowledge about the forms of causal relationships and show that in some cases they learn better than adults. Adults and 4- and 5-year-old children saw events suggesting that a causal relationship took one of two different forms, and their generalization to a new set of objects was then tested. One form was a more typical disjunctive relationship; the other was a more unusual conjunctive relationship. Participants were asked to both judge the causal efficacy of the objects and to design actions to generate or prevent an effect. Our results show that children can learn the abstract properties of causal relationships using only a handful of events. Moreover, children were more likely than adults to generalize the unusual conjunctive relationship, suggesting that they are less biased by prior assumptions and pay more attention to current evidence. These results are consistent with the predictions of a hierarchical Bayesian model.
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Youth may be more capable of handling a non-therapeutic group climate because of their greater resilience.
“Another explanation may be found in the resilience of youth, who possibly can adjust better to a suboptimal group atmosphere than adults (Lucas et al., 2014). Youth may be more capable of handling a non-therapeutic group climate because of their greater resilience.”
From Safety First! Residential Group Climate and Antisocial Behavior: A Multilevel Meta-analysis (2025) · cites this paper as Lucas et al., 2014
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References 35 · Cited by 240
- Authors
- Lucas, C. G., Bridgers, S., Griffiths, T. L., & Gopnik, A.
- Affiliations
- University of Edinburgh (GB)
- University of California, Berkeley (US)
- Corresponding author
- Lucas, Christopher G.
- Venue
- Cognition
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2014-05
- Volume
- 131
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 284-299
- ISSN
- 0010-0277 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2109860023
- Cited by
- 240
- References
- 35
- Citations by year
- 2026: 17 · 2025: 13 · 2024: 28 · 2023: 23 · 2022: 34 · 2021: 23 · 2020: 26 · 2019: 18 · 2018: 29 · 2017: 15 · 2016: 4 · 2015: 6 · 2014: 3 · 2013: 1
- FWCI
- 21.85
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Cognition (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- Air Force Office of Scientific Research (FA9550-10-1-0232, FA9550-07-1-0351)
- James S. McDonnell Foundation
- National Science Foundation (BCS-1023875)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Child and Animal Learning Development
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Categorization, perception, and language
- Keywords
- causal learning, children versus adults, generalization, causal inference, Bayesian hierarchical model, developmental differences, open-mindedness
- MeSH terms
- Adult, Child Development, Child, Preschool, Female, Generalization, Psychological, Humans, Language, Learning, Male, Causality
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