Believe it or not: Moving non-biological stimuli believed to have human origin can be represented as human movement.
Abstract
Does our brain treat non-biological movements (e.g. moving abstract shapes or robots) in the same way as human movements? The current work tested whether the movement of a non-biological rectangular object, believed to be based on a human action is represented within the observer's motor system. A novel visuomotor priming task was designed to pit true imitative compatibility, due to human action representation against more general stimulus response compatibility that has confounded previous belief experiments. Stimulus response compatibility effects were found for the object. However, imitative compatibility was found when participants repeated the object task with the belief that the object was based on a human finger movement, and when they performed the task viewing a real human hand. These results provide the first demonstration that non-biological stimuli can be represented as a human movement if they are believed to have human agency and have implications for interactions with technology and robots.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
To measure imitation interference independent of spatial compatibility effects, spatial and imitative processes need to be dissociated.
“To measure imitation interference independent of spatial compatibility effects, spatial and imitative processes need to be dissociated (Gowen, Bolton, & Poliakoff, 2016;Marsh et al., 2016;Boyer, Longo, & Bertenthal, 2012;Cooper, Catmur, & Heyes, 2012;Catmur & Heyes, 2011;Wiggett, Hudson, Tipper, & Downing, 2011;Bertenthal, Longo, & Kosobud, 2006).”
From Functional Specificity and Sex Differences in the Neural Circuits Supporting the Inhibition of Automatic Imitation (2018) · cites this paper as Gowen, Bolton, & Poliakoff, 2016
No citation lists for this paper
No citation lists for this paper yet — checked again daily.
References 42 · Cited by 34
- Authors
- Gowen, E., Bolton, E., & Poliakoff, E.
- Affiliations
- University of Manchester (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Gowen, E.
- Venue
- Cognition
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2016-01
- Volume
- 146
- Pages
- 431-438
- ISSN
- 0010-0277 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2119967897
- Cited by
- 34
- References
- 42
- Citations by year
- 2025: 1 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 3 · 2019: 5 · 2018: 9 · 2017: 2 · 2016: 1
- FWCI
- 6.55
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Update notices
- erratum (2017-07-01)
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Cognition (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Research Explorer (The University of Manchester) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Action Observation and Synchronization
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Social Robot Interaction and HRI
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Motor Control and Adaptation
- Keywords
- human agency, belief, motor representations, stimulus-response compatibility, human hand, robots, technology interaction, embodied cognition
- MeSH terms
- Adult, Female, Humans, Imitative Behavior, Male, Motion Perception, Psychomotor Performance, Young Adult
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review